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These have this Privilege, that each has a parcel of 
Towns belonging to them whom none but they are to work 
for. The ordinary work they do for them is mending 
their Tools, for which every Man pays to his Smith a 
certain Rate of Corn in Harvest time according to 
ancient Custom.
Robert Knox, An Historical Relation of Ceylon 
(1981: 205) (originally 1681)
2PREFACE
The idea for this thesis developed as a result of work I undertook 
as a research assistant on a demographic survey in India. During an 
initial visit in 1978-9, I became interested in the effects of 
occupational and educational change on caste, on which subject I 
subsequently wrote my honours thesis, Stablility and Challenge: Caste 
Responses to Changes in Occupation and Education in an Indian Village. 
While reading for this subject I became interested in the concept of 
the jajmani system.
As described in the anthropological literature, jajmani is a 
system whereby the services of a range of craftsmen, which may include 
barbers, washermen, carpenters, and blacksmiths, are provided in return 
for fixed annual allocations of harvested grain rather than for payment 
in money or payment for each service tailored to the size of the 
service. The services are provided only by the appropriate castes and 
may include other specified ritual duties. Jajmani relations have been 
identified as being hereditary and as involving duties and 
responsibilities on the parts of those giving and those receiving the 
service.
The literature on the jajmani relations interested me but did not 
seem to describe the relationships I had noted in the field. During my 
next visit in 1979-80, I was determined to explore this matter but at 
first I made little progress.
I asked the chief landlords of the village in which I was working, 
Mayasandra, in Karnataka State, South India, whether they made the 
annual payments of grain to their labourers that anthropologists held 
to characterize the jajmani system. They uniformly said that they did 
not but paid their labourers in cash, usually on a purely casual basis. 
Conversations I had with the labourers reinforced this information. It
3was only when I had cross-questioned a much wider range of people, that 
I found that harvest payments were made, but only by the smaller 
farmers of Mayasandra and in the outlying hamlets. They were paid not 
to the labourers, but only to the so-called service castes, the 
Barbers, Washermen, Blacksmiths etc. (When an occupation is spelled 
with an initial capital letter it designates the caste which 
traditionally undertook that work.)
On rereading the literature, I found that I had made several 
unwarranted assumptions. Firstly, although theoretical models of the 
jajmani system generally cover all occupational groups (see Wiser, 
1958; Dumont, 1980), most ethnographic descriptions (including Wiser’s) 
only mention the service castes, and the few exceptions are highly 
suspect.
The second assumption was that the large landlord was the 
archetypal jajman. Dumont argued that 'only those who have at their 
disposal the main source of wealth and power, the land, can really 
display the system in all its pomp' (Dumont 1980: 102). Yet in 
Mayasandra, the large landlords were the category least involved in 
jajmani relations. As a consequence, I became interested in why the 
theoretical models of the jajmani system did not match my experiences 
In Mayasandra or of ethnographers elsewhere in India. One factor is 
that the theorists were seeking to describe the ideal past rather than 
the actual present. During my research, however, I became convinced 
that the disagreement between the research and the evidence ran deeper 
than this. The reason is, I believe, that models of the jajmani system 
were not simply drawn from the ethnographic evidence, but were affected 
by older theories. Clearly, this is inevitable as no theory can be 
entirely original, and, indeed, older theories are a necessary 
intellectual stimulus providing both interpretations for ethnographic
4data and questions to answer. Nevertheless, a reliance on earlier 
theories can be a major drawback if it means that anthropologists 
ignore the evidence.
The major concept, I believe, to influence models of the jajmani 
system was that of the "village community”, and its predecessor, the 
"village republic". I believe, the debate on the jajmani system to be 
part of a continuous discourse with its origins in the concept of the 
village republic and including the concept of the village community.
The first two chapters of this thesis explore the development of 
the discourse. To what extent did the identification of jajmani 
relations, and especially of a jajmani system, emerge from field 
observations and to what extent did the ideas have a life of their own, 
resting perhaps on a previous generation of ideas themselves brought 
into being by circumstances and controversies only remotely connected 
with jajmani relations? There is some substance in the latter 
contention and its exploration will take us back two centuries in 
discovering what each theorist owed to his predecessors.
The first chapter will concentrate on the missionary William Wiser 
who was the first social scientist to use the term, "The Hindu Jajmani 
System". I will show how he derived his understanding of the system 
from previous writers on the village community. It will also focus on 
writers in the village republic/community debate concentrating on 
Thomas Munro and Mark Wilks who first developed the concept of the 
village republic, Henry Summner Maine who played a major part in 
replacing the concept of the village republic with that of the village 
community, and Radkamal Mukerjee who was to have a major influence on 
Wiser's formulation of the jajmani system.
The second chapter will be concerned with how anthropologists have 
modified Wiser's concept of the jajmani system. It concentrates on
5what I regard as being the two main interpretations of the jajmani 
system. According to the first argument, the jajmani system is a 
labour system, in which landlords use the power derived from their 
control of the principal means of production, land, to exploit their 
workers. The most succinct expression of this viewpoint is 
Oscar Lewis1 Village Life in North India.
The second interpretation of the jajmani system is associated with 
Louis Dumont. He was interested in how ideology has affected the way 
people behave. He regarded the jajmani system as an example of how 
ideology, specifically the ideology of caste, can affect economic 
behaviour.
Through the first two chapters of the thesis, I aim at separating 
the essential and persisting themes and identifying modifications and 
rejections, I rarely attempt to judge these concepts in terms of the 
social realities of the day. Indeed, there are no data which would 
allow this, but only the interpretations chronicled here.
I postpone such judgments until after a brief description of my 
own field work. This helps to provide a factual basis for separating 
reality from pre-conception. Though contemporary field work can 
provide no certainty about the nature of jajmani relations even half a 
century ago, change is sufficiently gradual for some revealing light to 
be thrown. Certainly, the testimony of the older population is 
invaluable for understanding the recent past. Furthermore, the limited 
information which there is about the past is often more in keeping with 
contemporary evidence than with the models of the theorists.
The field data for this thesis was collected during three separate 
trips to India in 1978-9, 1979-80 and 1980-1. This material is drawn 
from nine villages in Tumkur district of the South Indian state of 
Karnataka. I stayed in the largest village, Mayasandra, which is the
6market and governmental centre for the surrounding villages. I also 
visited all the villages involved for extensive periods.
I believe that these villages are representative of a large region 
of South India. Specifically this is the Multan region of south 
Karnataka but more generally of much of the Decaan plateau. I have 
studied several villages, so as to look at jajmani relations in a wide 
variety of situations.
I collected survey data on matters which I regarded as being of 
central importance to a study of jajmani such as which families still 
made jajmani payments, who received them and the size of the payments 
involved. I also attempted to find out how much families knew about 
jajmani payments by their parents and grandparents. I collected enough 
survey data for these to be cross-checked by the caste and religion of 
the families and by whether or not the families own land.
I complemented the quantitative data of the survey with my own 
observations of such aspects of village life as peoples' daily 
activities, the village economy and local religion. This was useful in 
understanding the context in which jajmani payments occur.
I also had extensive interviews with a wide range of people. This 
allowed me to investigate more wideranging issues than I could cover in 
the survey. In particular, it provided subjective information 
involving attitudes, feelings and ideas about the nature of jajmani and 
other ties in the villages. Interviews made it possible to gather 
information on topics too sensitive to be investigated through a 
survey. One such issue was bonded labour. Bonded labour is illegal 
but quite common. While it is not a jajmani relationship itself, its 
study is important in studying the total context of the economic and 
social relationships that occur between castes.
7Chapter 1 : THE ORIGINS OF THE JAJMANI DEBATE
Wiser: The Concept of a System
The term jajmani was originally used in the anthropological 
literature by William Wiser in his work, The Hindu Jajmani System (1958
- 1st edition 1936).^ According to Wiser (1958: xviii), in the Indian 
village, ’each caste...at some time during the year is expected to 
render a fixed type of service to each other caste'. He noted that 
there was no exact equivalent of this system in the West so he adopted, 
what he asserted to be the North Indian terminology: the person 
providing the service (Wiser used the example of a carpenter) calls his 
entire clientele his 'jajmani' or 'birt' - these terms being identical 
in meaning. The individual family or head of the family whom the 
carpenter serves is called the carpenter's 'jajman'. The 'jajman' 
speaks of the carpenter's family and all other families that serve him 
as his 'kam-wale' or 'kam-kame-wale' (i.e. workers), if they are of 
the serving castes, i.e shudras or lower. If the one who serves is a 
'Pandit' (the title of a Brahman priest), a 'Bhat' (astrologer), or 
another from one of the three upper caste divisions [or varnas], he is 
referred to-by his caste name - 'Pandit', 'Bhat' etc. and not as a 
'kam-kame-wale' (Wiser 1958, xviii).
Wiser called the services supplied 'jajmani services'; the 
payments, 'jajmani payments'; the relations created by these services, 
'jajmani ties'; and the total of these relationships, the jajmani 
system. In the more recent literature, the single term jajman was 
adopted for all family heads receiving jajmani services. The term 
kamin is usually preferred to Wiser's kam-karne-wale for the person 
supplying the service.
As Wiser understood it, ideally this relationship was not a 
one-way tie between those who served and those who were served. 
Jajmani ties created a community where all castes ’existed' to serve 
each other. Caste restricted people from employment outside their 
traditional occupations thus forcing villagers to recruit people of 
other castes than their own to do many jobs. In return for these 
services the castes supplied their own services to other castes. Wiser 
summarized his concept in the statement, ’Each in turn is master. Each 
in turn is servant1. (Wiser 1958: xxi)
The ties by which these services were exchanged were permanent 
between families. That is, the tie was inherited by succeeding 
generations. As with other property, the son of each ’kam-wale’ or 
’kamin1 would inherit his share of ’jajman’ (patron) families.
In return for supplying standardized services, a kamin received a
standardized set of payments and concessions. For Wiser, the system of
rewards for services is the strength of the system:
In return for the various services rendered, there are 
payments in cash and in kind made daily, monthly, 
biannually, per piece of work, and on special 
occasions, depending on the type of service rendered 
and in part on the goodwill of the jajman. The 
strength of the system depends, however, not on the 
actual payments made but on the concessions granted to 
the different occupational groups. These may be listed 
as : (a) free residence site; (b) free food for the 
family; (c) free clothing; (d) free food for animals;
(e) free timber; (f) free dung; (g) rent-free land; (h) 
credit facilities; (i) opportunities for supplementary 
employment; (j) free use of tools, implements and draft 
animals; (k) free use of raw materials; (1) free hides;
(m) free funeral pyre plot; (n) casual leave; (o) aid 
in litigation; (p) variety in diet; (q) healthful 
location.
These concessions do not apply equally to all, but 
vary according to custom. (Wiser 1958: xxiv)
The key point to note of Wiser’s model of the jajmani system is 
that there was no place for bargaining. Unlike the situation in a 
capitalist society where individuals seek private financial gain,
9jajmani binds the economic and the social together. An individual 
cannot exploit others for his individual gain except at the risk of a 
grave social backlash. Wiser gave the example of a farmer who 
attempted to break his jajmani obligations by selling his crop, but who 
was forced to back down when his kamins distributed his crop ’for’ him 
according to the traditional practice (Wiser 1958: 116).
Wiser recognized that his description of the jajmani system did 
not accurately represent the ethnographic reality of Karimpur. He 
claimed as an instance of change from the original ideal the failure of 
some castes to carry out their duties towards other castes. ’The 
Brahman, bard, barber, water-bearer and washerman, in refusing to serve 
some of their fellow Hindu castes on the grounds that they are 
untouchable, are contributing to the disintegration of their own 
religious system’ (1958: 113). Wiser believed this was due to 
historical causes, ranging from the medieval invasions of the Rajputs 
to private land ownership and individual legal rights introduced by the 
British, which upset the equilibrium of the jajmani system.
Wiser argued that such changes, which he believed threatened the 
communal aspect of Indian villages, were not a recent phenomenon. He 
maintained that the jajmani system itself is 'a disintegrated form of 
the ancient village commune *. He added, 'The Hindu Jajmani System as 
it stands today in Karimpur is ancient in that it recognizes the claims 
of the different occupational groups to a share of the earnings of the 
village as a whole, but it is not ancient in its detailed form as 
described in the preceding pages' (1958: 108).
Wiser cited Radhakamal Mukerjee who claimed that the contemporary 
village system was the hybrid offspring of two contrasting social 
systems. One was a primitive Dravidian tribal society based on 
communal ownership of property and the other, the ancient Indo-European
10
society based on family ownership of property. The result was a 
community based on exchange between families.
Wiser’s work was important in that it was the first detailed study 
of jajmani ties. It would, nevertheless, be a mistake to assume that 
Wiser was an innocent missionary who discovered the jajmani system by 
happenstance. In fact, he was strongly influenced by earlier writers, 
as is indicated by the subtitle to The Hindu Jajmani System, A 
Socio-Economic System Interrelating Members of a Hindu Village 
Community in Services.
2
Wiser quoted extensively from writers on the village community 
e.g., Sir Henry Maine and Radhakamal Mukerjee. The influence of these 
writers shows in Wiser’s reliance on historical explanations for 
understanding jajmani. It also comes out in his belief that, in an 
ideal jajmani system, all castes would provide services for each other 
in an essentially egalitarian system. The jajmani debate has, in some 
ways, been a sophisticated attempt to maintain the main premise of the 
theorists of the village community, that the village was the central 
institution of Indian society, the jajmani system itself providing the 
underlying ties maintaining the village as a community and not just as 
an agglomeration of people. To comprehend, the influence of the village 
community debate on the jajmani debate through Wiser and others we need 
to study it in depth.
Munro and Wilks; The Village Republic
The concept of the village community or rather village republic 
had its origins in discussions of British officers of the East India 
Company, on how to collect enough revenue to pay for the Company’s 
expensive wars without endangering India’s and the Company’s future 
prosperity.^
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Early attempts to introduce a land tax reflected the laissez-faire 
economic theories of the time. It was believed necessary that, in 
order to develop India's resources, a system of land tenure should be 
introduced that would encourage land owners to develop their own land. 
According to Adam Smith and contemporary economists, the cause of a 
nation's wealth was the collective desire of individuals to better 
themselves, self-interest being the most powerful force making for 
economic development. Economists believed that governments did not 
have a major role in economic development as they were not seen as 
being a source of wealth. The economists thought that governments 
should provide a basic infrastructure, legal and material (roads etc.), 
within which economic development could take place. Otherwise, the 
State would encourage individual incentive by collecting only as much 
taxation as was necessary to carry out basic services.
Adam Smith believed that the best way such necessary taxes could
4
be levied on land was by means of a ’permanent settlement’. This was 
a tax that would remain fixed irrespective of changes in the land's 
productivity. Under this system, any increase in production would 
accrue to the farmer, thus providing him with a powerful incentive to 
improve the land’s productivity. A second advantage, in view of Adam 
Smith's lack of enthusiasm for government, was that, as wealth 
developed, the proportion of revenue collected by the government would 
fall, thereby allowing more private investment.
To the officers of the East India Company a question rose about 
whom a settlement should be concluded with. The problem occurred 
because Indian land tenure differed from British land tenure and it was 
not clear who owned the land. According to the political economists 
land was owned by the person who collected the rent. They defined rent 
as the profit contributed by land, as distinct from that contributed by
the fanner's or tenant's labour or by capital."* Rent, however, had to 
be distinguished from taxation which was the revenue needed to carry 
out the functions of government.
In Britain it was fairly clear who owned the land for there was a 
market in land. A farmer selling land was selling the right to rent. 
It was not so clear in India as there was only an underdeveloped land 
market. Thus a debate rose on what payments were actually made and 
whether these bore comparison to rent or tax. In India the right to 
rent was attributed by various theorists to one of three levels, the 
sovereign, the 'zamindar' - roughly equivalent to overlord, and to the 
'ryot' - equivalent to peasant. According to the theorists concerned 
the ryot paid rent or tax to the zamindar and the latter paid rent or 
tax to the sovereign. What separated the theorists was the basis of 
their calculus for deciding what was rent and what was tax.
An early argument emphasised the very high levels of land revenue 
demanded by the king. This was used to argue that the king was the 
real land proprietor. Such an argument was useful for the East India 
Company for it helped to justify the very heavy demands and land 
revenue needed to pay for the wars caused by the Company's aggressive 
policy of expansion. They were doing no more than taking their 
rightful due.
The alternative view proposed was that 'grasping' Indian kings had 
forced taxation up to dangerous levels threatening India's prosperity, 
and one might add the future well-being of the Company. Most advocates 
of this view held that the real landholders were the zamindars. It was 
argued that the zamindar was equivalent to the enterprizing British 
landlord who was held to be responsible for the success of British 
agriculture,^*  ^ that by returning to the zamindar his rent through a
12
g
permanent settlement, he too would be encouraged to improve his land.
9 '
This view 'triumphed* in the Bengal permanent settlement.
The perceived failure of the Bengal permanent settlement led to a 
proposal for ryotwari settlement, settlement with the peasants. Though 
originally developed by Colonel Alexander Read in his settlement of the 
Baramahal (Beaglehole 1966: 8), the main advocate of ryotwari 
settlement was Read's assistant, Thomas Munro, later governor of Madras 
1820-1827 (Beaglehole 1966: 121). According to Munro, the zamindar was 
merely an hereditary farmer of reveune. By treating him as the 
landowner, the Company was failing to encourage the true landowner, the 
ryot to improve his l a nd.^ The solution was individual agreements 
with each ryot as to the amount of tax to be paid. I will not go into 
Munro's reasons for believing that the ryot was the landowner as they 
are not strictly relevant to my theme. What are relevant are the 
conclusions he and others drew from this belief.^
Though many officials concurred with Munro that ryotwari 
settlement was preferable to zamindari settlement, it was open to the 
attack that it was bureaucratic, stretched the resources of the 
Company, and was an unwarranted interference in the affairs of the 
villages.
Colonel Mark Wilks, resident at the Court of Mysore, held that the
solution was not to make settlements directly through the ryots, but
indirectly through the agency of the village republic, a concept he
borrowed from Munro himself.
He quoted Munro,
Every village, with its twelve Ayangadees as they are 
called, is a kind of little republic, with the Potail 
[i.e. Patel] at the head of it; and India is a mass of 
such republics. The inhabitants, during war, look 
chiefly to their own Potail. They give themselves no 
trouble about the breaking up and division of kingdoms; 
while the village remains entire, they care not to what 
power it is transferred: wherever it goes the internal '
13
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management remains unaltered; the Potail is still the 
collector and magistrate, and head farmer. From the 
age of Manu until this day the settlements have been 
made either with or through the Potails (Munro quoted 
by Wilks 1810, Vol. 1, 121).
Wilks was not simply using the village republic as a crafty coup 
de grace to Munro's argument. He claimed that, if recognized, the 
village republic could be a very useful ally of the East India Company. 
After all, according to Munro, the Indians 'give themselves no trouble 
about the breaking up and division of kingdoms, while the village 
remains entire, they care not to what power it is transferred: wherever 
it goes the internal management remains unaltered' (Wilks 1810). If 
the company left the village republic alone it need face no trouble 
from the villagers.
According to Wilks the village republic could, given the right
circumstances, also play a role in India's development. He claimed
that economic and social development in India had been prevented by the
12
rapaciousness, despotism and extreme instability of Indian states.
He reasoned that the East India Company had the right and indeed the
obligation to impose its rule so as to provide the essential stability
13
and security in which true development could take place.
Fostering economic and social development by providing a true
freedom, quite explicitly did not mean intervening in the daily affairs
of the Indian villager. This is what truly separated Wilks and Munro.
Wilks argued that the British had no right to seek to change India by
replacing the ancient laws with their British equivalents, which anyway
he believed to be inappropriate. He argued that
'The founder of a philosophical Utopia would certainly 
reject with abhorrence a system which tends to enslave 
the human mind, and to entail hereditary degradation on 
a large portion of his citizens. But we are not here 
discussing speculative theory. The objects in our 
contemplation are not metaphysical entities to be 
moulded Into ideal forms, but human beings, already 
fixed in stubborn and immovable prejudices, to which
15
any system founded in wisdom and humanity must 
necessarily conform. It is not the question, it never 
can be a question, whether the English or the Hindoo 
code of religion and jurisprudence be entitled to the 
preference, but whether the Hindoo law and religion, 
for they are one and the same, are, or are not, to be 
maintained, or whether we are at liberty to invade 
both. (1810, Vol. 1, 498-9).’
Wilks believed that ’the Hindoo code (with all its numerous
imperfections on its head), combined with the local customs, or common 
law of India, [is] not ill-adapted to the state of society to which it 
is intended to apply’ (Ibid., 501).
Besides, Wilks argued, the introduction of English law might
provoke Indians into opposing British rule. He wrote that,
’The spirit of the English constitutions assigns to the 
mass of the people (14) an extensive control over the 
exercise of public authority; and deems the executive 
government to be the representative of the public will.
The spirit pervades the whole body of its laws. These 
laws necessarily reflect back, and reproduce the 
principles from which they spring: and it is matter for 
grave reflection, that, if this species of reaction 
should ever be produced in India, from that moment it 
is lost to this country for ever ... The efficient 
protection of our native subjects in all the rights 
which they themselves consider to be essential to their 
happiness, is certainly the most sacred and imperious 
of our duties; and it is on this express ground that 
our present regulations, considered as a system of 
jurisprudence for the south of India, appear to me to 
require a radical reform. (Wilks 1810, Vol. 1, 495-6)’
Wilks thought that, while the British should protect Hindu law, it 
should be implemented not by them, but by the Indians themselves. He 
believed that to implement properly the Hindu law required people well 
versed in it, and trusted by the community. This was the importance of 
the village republic. The village republic already contained an 
institution composed of such people, the Panchaiet or Indian jury 
(Ibid., 501). He said that the Indian village also had the means to 
enforce the law with a system of village policemen, who formed part of 
the system of village servants.
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The term 'village republic' is interesting. It meant for Wilks 
and Munro an ordered society in which basic civil rights are respected
- including private property and profit. Its opposite was despotism - 
a sort of parasitic anarchy (Ibid., 28). The term implies a community 
which has certain basic civil liberties and a defined territory. Wilks 
saw this as a community of landholders - in which others who were not 
members also resided, comparable to the small republics of Greece, and 
their slaves.
Unlike the Greek republics the Indian village republics were not 
true independent States. One can compare Wilks' view of the village 
republic with Adam Smith's view of the town in Medieval Europe. Smith 
believed that in Europe towns had been of fundamental importance in 
economic development during the Middle Ages. They had been able to 
develop due to the considerable political autonomy from feudal lords, 
civil rights and policies of low taxation granted them by the monarchs. 
Smith thought that it was the avarice of the lords who took the profit 
earned by others that had held back economic development outside the 
towns. The towns were granted special rights by kings who wanted their 
political support to oppose the demands of feudal lords (see Smith 
1974: 496-507).
Wilks argued that in India the government could seek political
support and encourage economic development through a sort of compact,
not with the towns but with the villages:
'A company of merchants may confer a more solid benefit 
than was announced in the splendid proclamation of the 
Roman consul to the cities of Greece: freedom, in its 
most rational, safe, and acceptable form, may be 
proclaimed to the little republics of India, by 
declaring the fixed and moderate revenue that each 
shall pay, and leaving the interior distribution to 
themselves, interfering only on appeal from their own 
little magistrate, either in matters of revenue, or of 
landed, or of personal property. Under such a system 
varying only from their ancient constitution in 
substituting for the tax on industry, involved in the
17
exaction of a proportion of the crop, a fixed money 
payment, which is also of great antiquity in India; the 
waste would quickly be covered with luxuriant crops, 
because every extension of culture Ti [cultivation] 
would be a clear profit to the proprietor.
(Wilks 1810 Vol. 1: 196-7)'
The extreme political instability had discouraged the development of 
trade and thus the towns and the industries they contained. Those 
artisans and tradesmen who did exist were mainly the village
- 15 servants.
Indeed, according to Wilks, it was the self-sufficiency brought
about by this internalized division of labour that enabled the village
republic to survive amidst general chaos. Wilks' interest in this
division of labour led to what Louis Dumont has termed the first
recorded description of the jajmani system:
Every Indian village is, and appears always to have 
been, in fact, a separate community or republic; and 
exhibits a living picture of that state of things which 
theorists have imagined in the earlier stages of 
civilization, when men have assembled in communities 
for the purpose of reciprocally administrating to each 
other's wants: 1. the Could, the Patail, Muccuddim, or 
Mundil (as he is named in different languages), is the 
judge and magistrate; 2. the Curnum, Shanboag, or 
Puturanee, is the registrar; 3. the Taliary or 
Sthulwar, and 4. the Totie, are severally the watchmen 
of the village and of the crops; 5. the Neerguntee 
distributes the water of the streams or reservoirs in 
just proportion to the several fields; 6. the Jatishee, 
or Joshee, or astrologer, performs the essential 
service of announcing the seasons of seed time and 
harvest, and the imaginary benefit of unfolding the 
lucky or unlucky days and hours for all the operations 
of farming; 7. the smith, and 8. carpenter, frame the 
rude instruments of husbandry, and the ruder dwellings 
of the farmer; 9. the potter fabricates the only 
utensils of the village; 10. the washerman keeps clean 
the few garments which are spun, or purchased at the 
nearest market; 11. the barber contributes to the 
cleanliness and assists in the toilet of the villagers;
12. the silversmith, marking the approach of luxury, 
manufactures the simple ornaments with which they 
delight to bedeck their wives and their daughters; and 
these twelve officers (Barra bullowuttee, or 
Ayangadee), or requisite members of the community, 
receive the compensation of their labour, either in 
allotments of land from the corporate stock, or in 
fees, consisting of a fixed proportions of the crop of
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every farmer in the village. In some instances the 
lands of a village are cultivated in common,, and the 
crop divided in the proportions of the labour 
contributed, but generally each occupant tills his own 
field; the waste land is a common pasture for the 
cattle of the village; its external boundaries are as 
carefully marked as those of the richest field, and 
they are maintained as a common right of the village, 
or rather the township (a term which more correctly 
describes the thing in our contemplation), to the 
exclusion of others, with as much jealousy and rancour 
as the frontiers of the most potent kingdoms. Such are 
the primitive component parts of all the kingdoms of 
India1 (Ibid., 117-119).
Wilks’ description included much that Wiser later defined as part 
of the jajmani system. Wilks saw the village as being a community 
where groups of people have certain assigned services to perform for 
the community. Those services may be paid for by a share of the crop 
(Wiser talked of fixed quantity of grain). Although there are earlier 
description of jajmani r e l a t i o n s , t h i s  is the first expression of 
jajmani ties, as part of a larger system.
In one important respect Wilks' theory differed from Wiser's. 
Although Wilks mentioned village servants and the payments that tie 
them to the village, he was not interested in the social ties suggested 
therein. For Wilks it was enough that the village servants had certain 
functions, for which they were paid by the village. In contrast, Wiser 
focused on those ties, because he saw them as a way by which castes, 
through exchanging services, create an integrated community. For 
Wiser, the jajmani system was the way that rights and obligations 
associated with jajmani ties created a moral force that could link all 
the castes into a joint community.
The difference between them can in part be related to their 
different themes. Wiser was in the tradition of the modern social 
scientist. He was trying to understand the village through living in 
it, and by carrying out a modern social survey. This meant that he 
investigated the social relations and institutions that tied village
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society together as being interesting in their own right. While Wilks 
obviously had considerable interest in Indian customs and beliefs, his 
book is consciously didactic in regard to the immediate political 
realities he confronted as ’resident' (adviser) to the court of Mysore. 
Wilks was putting forth a political argument that the British should 
make use of the village for administration. For him, the village 
republic was a political unit.
This political unit consisted not of the entire community, but 
only of the landowners. Although Wilks referred to men having 
assembled to administer reciprocally to each other’s needs, the 
emphasis throughout the book is on the landowners as being the citizens 
who make up the village republic and not on their tenants, or the 
village servants c.f. Sparta and slaves. Wilks’ view of the village is 
not of a socialistic ideal. He goes to some pains, in attempting to 
deflect, in advance, criticism of his ideas, by stating that a certain 
degree of inequality is and must be a part of the village (Wilks 1810 
Vol.l: 178). What Wilks was emphasizing was not the 'socialistic 
community’ that Wiser saw (albeit that Wiser recognized that inequality 
existed) but a republic of men who shared certain basic rights and 
equally recognized basic obligations. The landed men were the backbone 
of such a community, those who had a stake in the land and who provided 
the stability that was the basis of any evolving society.
In Wilks' theory, the role of the village servants is that they 
allow the village, based on the landowners, . to be autonomous, 
independent of outside political turmoil and economic disruption. 
Village servants supplied the needs of the village in administration, 
religion, crafts and other services that the farmers could not supply 
for themselves. To ensure village autonomy, it would have been 
important that these people be paid in a way that helped to preserve
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village autonomy. While Wilks was not explicit on this, this is 
presumably why he stated that village servants were paid in land or by 
a share of the grain. This would have been the simplest and most 
effective means of using the village’s own resources to pay for such 
services. No doubt, in a society where trade was as underdeveloped as 
Wilks suggested it was in India (due to the lack of national 
authority), village servants may well have preferred to be paid in land 
or grain, than in money.
After Wilks, proponents of the village republic lost the political 
debate. Thomas Munro became governor of Madras Presidency and was able 
to implement direct ryotwari tenure. Interest shifted to the republic 
as a social institution and it was renamed the village community. This 
change was encouraged by a belief that the Indian village community was 
a fossilized remnant of what European society had been.
Maine: The Community of Status
The period, in which the village community was most popular, was 
the heyday of theories of social evolution. The proponents of social 
evolution were very interested in Indian village communities because of 
the discovery of the relationship between the Indo-European languages 
at the end of the eighteenth century. The man most responsible for 
this was Sir Wiliam Jones, Chief Justice of the Indian High Court, and 
a leading orientalist (see Encyclopaedia Britannica 1982, Vol. 9: 433, 
Vol. 10: 993). He was one of the first Englishmen to learn Sanskrit 
and translated a number of the major Sanskrit texts. Jones noted great 
similarities in vocabulary and grammar between Sanskrit, Ancient Greek, 
and Latin. From this observation, he argued that these languages were 
descended from a common ancestor. This, he believed to be Sanskrit.
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Later, similarities were found in other aspects of culture. The 
gods, religious beliefs and myths, as revealed in the Rig Veda, India's 
oldest religious text, had much in common with early Greek and Roman 
beliefs. Not surprizingly, people looked for similarities in social 
and economic organization. As the village community was supposed to be 
the most stable Indian institution many believed it to be the most 
ancient. Wilks was probably influenced by the theories of Jones. He 
quoted a namber of passages from Jones’ translations of Sanskrit texts 
(eg Manu - see Wilks 1810: 121), and would have been aware of Jones’ 
Indo-European theory. However, while Wilks stated that the village 
republics were at an early stage of development, he did not claim that 
they could be used to trace the early development of an Indo-European 
society. He compared the village republics with the Greek Republics, 
but he did this only in terms of the requirements for development: in 
this he was following Adam Smith, not Jones. Among those who suggested 
that the village community could be used to trace the development of 
Western Society was Sir Henry Sumner Maine.
Maine, born in 1822, was educated at Pembroke College, Cambridge, 
where he excelled in classical studies. From 1847 to 1854 he was 
Professor of Civil Law at Cambridge, and also lectured on human law at 
the Inns of Court in London. These lectures formed the basis of his 
major work, Ancient Law, first published in 1861. From 1863 to 1869 
Maine was a legal member of the Council of the Governor-General in 
India, where he was largely responsible for the codification of Indian 
law. During this period, he served as Vice-Chancellor of Calcutta 
University. On returning to England in 1869, he became the first 
Professor of Historical and Comparative Jurisprudence at Oxford, and, 
in 1887, Professor of International Law at Cambridge. He died in 1888 
at Cannes, France (Encyclopaedia Britannica 1982, Vol.VI: 509).
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Maine combined interests in the classics and in law in his life’s 
work, an attempt to trace the development of modern European law from 
its roots. However, as even the-oldest sources of European law (e.g. 
Roman law), were themselves remote from the origins of European law, 
they did not by themselves provide adequate data on the origins and 
early development of law, nor more importantly the ’context’ in which 
early law developed. For Maine, even where written documentation 
concerning laws existed, an analysist who did not take into account the 
different ’moralities' of societies was liable to misunderstand the 
laws he was studying: ’The mistake of judging the men of other periods 
by the morality of our own day has its parallel in the mistake of 
supposing that every wheel and bolt in the modern social machine had 
its counterpart in more rudimentary societies'. (Maine cited in Block 
1974: 238)
For Maine the Indian village community was a solution to these 
problems for it was, he believed, a living society with many 
similarities to the society in which early European law had arisen, 
which could be studied directly in a largely unchanged form. These 
similarities were a result, in Maine’s view, of a common ancestry.
Although Maine’s assumption that (second-hand) reports on Indian 
village society could be used to interpret European data was 
questionable, Maine claimed to be introducing hard evidence into a 
field that had previously been entirely speculative. He wrote that, 
’Theories, plausible and comprehensive, but absolutely unverified, such 
as the Law of Nature or the Social Compact, enjoy a universal 
preference over sober research into the primitive history of society 
and law’ (1916: 3 ) . ^  In order to rid the study of jurisprudence of 
speculation, it was necessary ’to commence with the simplest social 
forms in a state as near as possible to their rudimentary condition.
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In other words, if we followed the course used in such inquiries, we 
should penetrate as far as we could in the history of primitive 
societies. (Maine 1916: 128-9)'
The Indian village community was particularly important to Maine, 
as an example in his argument on the origin of property. Maine thought 
that contemporary theories on the origin of property placed too much 
emphasis on the actions of individuals. He argued that 'there is a 
strong a priori improbability of our obtaining any clue to the early 
history of property if we confine our notice to the proprietary rights 
of individuals. It is more than likely that joint-ownership, and not 
separate ownership, is the really archaic institution, and that the 
forms of property which will afford us instruction will be those which 
are associated with the rights of families and groups of kindred. 
(1916: 217)'
Maine argued that the village community supported this assertion 
for It was an assemblage of co-proprietors' organised on the model of, 
and originating from, the patriarchal family (1916: 272). Usually the 
co-proprietors were kinsmen, and, even if they were not, they regarded 
themselves as such (1916: 275). Just as Maine held that the principal 
characteristic o f . the patriarchal family was the subordination of 
individual rights to the 'corporation', he also believed that in the 
village community individual rights were subordinated to the community. 
Similarly, in the patriarchal family, each person had an ascribed role, 
according to their age, sex and birthrank, and so, too, in the village 
community each person had rights and responsibilities fixed by custom.
Although Maine held that 'a body of kindred holding a domain in 
common, is the simplest form of an Indian village community', he also 
noted the existence of village servants: 'the Community is more than a 
brotherhood of relatives and more than an association of partners. It
24
is an organized society, and, besides providing for the management of 
the common fund, it seldom fails to provide, by a complete staff of 
functionaries, for internal government, for. police, for the 
administration of justice, and for the appointment of taxes and public 
duties' Maine 1916: 274). Unfortunately, Maine's work adds nothing to 
our understanding of village servants. Indeed, his views on village 
servants seem to be anomalous in terms of his statements about the 
patriarchal community. Maine's emphasis, throughout his discussion, 
was that in a patriarchal system there is no finely articulated 
hierarchy of law or government separate from the family's own hierarchy 
of authority. It would only be in a society where individual rights 
are respected, that such systems would be necessary. Thus there would 
seem to be little need for functionaries to administer justice or 
apportion public duties.
The importance of Maine’s views on the village community, in terms 
of the jajmani system, lies not in what he said about village servants, 
but in what he said on the nature of Indian society. Maine's emphasis 
on the village community's denial of the individual contrasting with 
Western society's celebration of the individual, as summed up in his 
formula that 'the movement of progressive societies has been from 
status to contract' (Maine 1916: 174) (status was where a person's 
relations with others was ascribed, contract was where a person was 
free to determine his own relations), has been influential ever since.
But, whereas Maine attributed the dominance of status to family, 
later writers have associated it with caste. Maine's emphasis on the 
family was undoubtedly because he was interested in making comparisons 
using the village community to elucidate how m o d e m  European 
institutions had developed. As such, Maine’s interest was in what he 
believed it had in common with other early Indo-European societies, 
i.e. the patriarchal family.
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Maine’s emphasis on the subordination of the individual to the 
community is still a central concept in the ’jajmani debate’.
Maine, Wilks, Rationalism, and the Social Contract
Maine’s and Wilk’s thoughts on India owed much to the long 
European tradition of rationalism. The rationalists believed in a 
’rational’ view of the universe and of man’s place in it. They 
believed that, through the power of induction and deduction, it would 
be possible to discover ’the laws’ that underlay nature. Great 
progress was being made in the physical sciences, as in the case of 
Newtons’ laws of motion. Similarly, they though it should be possible 
to discover laws underlying the social institutions of man.
According to traditional European views, the West’s hierarchical 
society (at that time) was necessary because it had been ordained by 
God for the good of man. In particular, the central institution of 
society, the state, was necessary as men were essentially sinful 
beings, who had to be preserved from their own evil inclinations. 
However, the rationalists had a different understanding of society and 
the state, largely, because they had a very different view of man. 
They argued that a loving God would not have created an essentially 
evil being; therefore man’s nature must be good. The problem was to 
answer what purpose society and the state served.
One solution to this problem was to argue that individuals had 
short-term desires which conflicted with the long-term needs of the 
general population. To solve this problem they entered into a ’social 
compact’ which established social relations, the laws that protected 
them and a political structure that enforced the laws (see Hobbes 1981, 
Rousseau 1968).
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The theory of the social compact gave a great impetus towards 
studying other societies, as it implied that societies were once 
simpler in nature than they later became. The advocates of the social 
compact, were interested in finding such simpler societies, either in 
their own history, or in other areas of the world, both as proof for 
their theories, and in order to investigate the nature of those 
relationships. They thought that, in the long period of time that 
followed the compact in their own society, men had lost sight of the 
reasons for the compact. This had in part been due to growth of 
irrational thought through religion. The rationalists were not 
necessarily opposed to religion, but they were to revelation and 
mysticism, as they believed all truths were open to logical 
investigation.
Thus, by finding a society that was still close to its original 
state, it should be possible to prove the universiality of the 
compacts, and to study their nature. Such societies could be found in 
two ways, either by looking back into one's own history, or by looking 
overseas for primitive societies.
The histories produced by those who believed in the social compact 
tended to have an ahistorical feel about them, as the writers were more 
interested in proving the existence of laws and institutions that were 
true for all societies. Therefore, though these histories were 
preferable to the older dynastic histories, in that they took an 
interest in society, they still tended to see the difference between 
societies in superficial terms and thus were unable to explain social 
change.
However, the interest which they raised in ancient society and 
ancient law led to genuine rationalist historians, who were more
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conscious of the changes taking place in ancient society. The most 
famous of these historians was Edward Gibbon.
Gibbon (1981) was not interested in an original social compact as 
such but his view of Rome as a rational society which was slowly 
undermined by irrational forces had much in common with the earlier 
theorists. He identified these forces with Christianity. Though the 
rationalists were not necessarily against the concept of God, they 
often identified Christianity with revelation and mysticism, which they 
believed obscured the real truth that was to be found through logical 
investigation.
The theories of the rationalists had a major influence on concepts
of the village community. Wilks in his History of Mysore seems to have
had in mind both the social compact and the Greek Republic in his
description of the village republic. The former shows in a description
that could have come straight from Hobbes or Rousseau:
’Every Indian village is, and appears always to have 
been, in fact, a separate community or republic; and 
exhibits a living picture of that state of things which 
theorists have imagined in the earlier stages of 
civilization, when men have assembled in communities 
for-the purpose of reciprocally administering to each 
other's wants’ (1810: 117).
Wilks made several references to the Greek Republic as an ideal model
for the village republic. He said that the greatest boon that Britain
could confer on India was to grant the same autonomy of affairs to the
village republic that Rome once gave to the Greek Republics (Wilks 1810
Vol. 1: 196-7).18
Whereas Wilks used rationalist views in order to examine Indian 
society, Maine used Indian society in order to examine rationalist 
concepts. The Indian village community was an ideal concept for this 
purpose. Maine used the village community to dispute the rationalist 
belief in ’Natural Law’ and to argue against the idea of the social
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compact. Maine did this by disputing that ancient society, as 
represented by the village community, was organized on principles which 
were equivalent to those used in modern society. If the principles 
were not equivalent, the concept of a natural law that applied to all 
societies was meaningless. This logic applied even more strongly to 
the idea that there was an original covenant, still applying between 
men. Such a concept was meaningless, if it could be shown that early 
society was based on different principles of organization than later 
society. This may be illustrated by Maine’s argument that one of the 
key differences between ancient and modern society was that ancient 
society was based on the family whereas modern society was based on the 
individual.
This was symptomatic of the fact that individual-based societies 
were founded on relations of contract, whereas family-based societies 
were founded on status. As such, the concept of a social compact was 
absurd - the very notion of an agreement based on abstract principles 
was unknown to the society. In Maine’s view the advocates of the 
social compact were putting the cart before the horse. Society did not 
arise out of an agreement of individuals. Rather, the individual 
evolved out of society.
Maine argued convincingly that natural law and the social compact 
were based on idealistic views of what society, law, and the state were 
about. Maine’s argument was that law and the state developed out of 
the all dominating family of the early village community. Law evolved 
slowly to meet the specific needs required in societies, at different 
stages of development. Maine thought that to ignore this would be a 
dangerous lapse of judgement, for it would lead to the development of 
unsuitable law.
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The difference between Maine and the rationalists was not really 
that he believed that law should be seen in a historical setting 
whereas they believed that there was an ideal underlying system of law 
which they contrasted with the inferior law of the statute book. It 
was that, whereas the rationalist had a rather static view of society, 
Maine saw history as the steady progression of society slowly improving 
itself. Thus, whereas the rationalists admired the ’primitiveness' of 
the ancient state, Maine denigrated it. For Maine, Europe not Asia was 
the centre of mankind.
Mukerjee: The Collective Conscious and the Utopian Community
The final writer in the village republic debate to influence Wiser 
was Radkhamal Mukerjee, Professor of Economics at the University of 
Lucknow in the early decades of this century. The major influence on 
Mukerjee was Emile Durkheim who was seeking to explain how the 
’utopian' society might be achieved; Mukerjee insisted it existed in 
the here and now in the Indian village community.
Like the earlier writers Mukerjee compared India and the West, but 
by contrast made the comparison to India's advantage and emphasised 
that the West had achieved much in material progress, at the cost of 
spiritual deprivation. He claimed that Western spiritual deprivation 
was due to the nature of the Western economy and the Western state. 
Industrialists had reduced the working people to being wage slaves. 
They no longer had the time or the control over their lives necessary 
to develop themselves fully in all spheres of knowledge. The state, 
instead of intervening to reduce this deprivation, acted solely in the 
interests of the owners of property.
Thus the economic and social institutions of the West were 
divorced from 'the individual'. Mukerjee argued that to abolish this
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division it was necessary to reorganize the institutions of society. 
This required the recognition that the concept of 1 individualism’is a 
myth; where the Western individual is by no means in full control of 
his life. Such a belief merely encouraged the development of an 
all-powerful state while allowing industrialists to alienate the 
individual from the ownership and means of production.
Mukerjee claimed the solution was to break down the distinction 
between the governing and governed, that is between the state and the 
individual. Mukerjee said that it was increasingly being recognised 
that,
The old controversy between rights and duties, law and 
liberty, which is another version of the Individual and 
the State as fixed and antithetical concepts, is not 
resolved in the emphasis on mutual interaction, and on 
the vital process of association which indeed makes the 
State and remakes the Individual. (Mukerjee 1923: vi)
Essentially, Mukerjee was asserting that true liberty did not 
consist of the passive allocation of rights by an omniscient state. It 
consisted in the recognition that the state played an active role in 
the lives of its citizens, and that, in a truly democratic society, the 
citizens should actively participate in the state. It was only by 
doing so that they could fully develop as citizens in the true sense 
and not just as subjects of the state.
According to Mukerjee, to reduce the state to the level of the
governed it was necessary to introduce administrative decentralisation
for a decentralized government would be more responsive to local needs.
Secondly it was necessary to organize society into its ’economic and
functional groups’, on professional lines so that people could
participate in the economic decisions that affected their lives. In
the East this had already happened:
The desire of each economic and functional group to 
render itself as an autonomous unit is universal among 
Eastern communities. This has corresponded with the
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ethnic and social history of many countries which have 
left a great part of administration to semi-independent 
local and communal bodies without the superimposition 
of the State’s authority or sanction. In political 
evolution these are prior to and independent of the 
State, and entrusted with the settlements of disputes, 
the maintenance of schools, temples, mosques, and 
public works, the relief of distress, the 
administration of a common fund, and even the 
protection of property. All this had achieved a degree 
of economic and political decentralisation, hardly to 
be found elsewhere. Not decentralisation conceded by a 
central government, but real decentralisation which 
reveals the growth of federalism. It is less connected 
with the fact that China and India form continents of 
villages than with the organic and functional 
solidarity of Asian society, from the guild-halls and 
platforms of their flourishing cities spring the same 
communal impulse and standards which organise and 
direct life in family or clan altar, the village 
shrine, or under the shade of the spreading banyan 
tree. (1923: xvi)
The integration of economic and functional groups into local assemblies
prevented their conflicting interests leading to the rise of
narrow-minded vested interest groups. Mukerjee stated that,
In the East there has been a differentiation of social 
and economic functions and interests and their 
corresponding organs, the occupational or professional 
guilds, unions and brotherhoods. But at the same time 
there has been an interweaving of divergent interests 
in the local assemblies and unions which are peacefully 
orientated at the bottom of the social structure, thus 
preventing the rise and development of organised 
political classes, identifying themselves with 
particular and exclusive economic interests. Neither 
the evils of party system nor of class rule would be 
natural in a system which has sought to harmonise 
conflicting interests and functions in a long unending 
chain of free local and functional bodies, while the 
all-pervasive authority of the modern State is 
distributed here among a number of more or less 
independent intermediary jurisdictions. (1923: 89-90)
In rural India, the village community formed the context within
which the functional groups and the assembly, operated,
The most difficult thing for a foreigner to understand 
about the village community is that it is a functional 
and territorial group in one, representing and 
fulfilling common interests, economic, juridicial and 
religious. The indigenous polity has expanded both in 
the area and the occupation lines and combined the 
geographical basis for certain types of problems,
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particularly those in which the interests of consumers 
is dominantly concerned, and the functional basis for 
working out a delimitation of occupation and 
profession, confiding the care of . their problems to 
those most concerned in them. (1923: 354)
In the village community, people belonged to their own 
occupational guilds which were usually but not always coterminous with 
caste. Each caste had its own panchayat (council) which had full 
jurisdiction over matters that only affected the caste, such as 
marriage disputes - each caste being endogamous. Questions that 
affected individuals from more than one caste, a category that covered 
most occupational disputes, would be dealt with by a general village 
assembly representing all the members of the village. The village 
assembly acted both to complement the caste panchayat in dealing with 
matters that the latter were not competent to deal with, and to 
supplement them, in supporting their decisions.
An example was given by Mukerjee. If someone refused to obey a
panchayat decree, he was ostracized. Mukerjee wrote,
To carry this into effect, the caste Panchayats must 
have to refer to the Village Assembly, which alone has 
control over the village, and the barber and the 
washerman.(19) (1923: 272)
Mukerjee concluded from this that,
...the strength and efficiency of caste-government 
depended upon the active co-operation of each caste 
with the village government as a whole. Village 
autonomy, and caste autonomy, indeed, mutually support 
each other. (1923: 272)
Mukerjeefs model of the village community is reminiscent in some 
ways of Maine's. They both argued that it was based on status. The 
major difference between the two was that Mukerjee rejected as illusory 
a vital premise in Maine’s contract theory: that in Western society 
individuals are free to behave as they wish. By so doing he was 
rejecting the premise that the movement of progressive societies had 
been from status to contract. More fundamentally, Maine's views
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implied that there was a hidden individual waiting to emerge given the 
right conditions. The individual would then be able to organise his 
relations with other individuals through contracts. In contrast, 
Mukerjee believed that the individual had to develop through 
participation in society.
Status fitted more naturally into Mukerjee's ideas than contract. 
However, while Mukerjee accepted Maine's position that in the village 
community an individual's social relations were determined by his 
structural position within a group, he rejected Maine's argument that 
those individuals of high status had absolute power over those of 
inferior status. Mukerjee said that, although people with high status 
did have great authority over those below them, this authority was not 
arbitrary. Those who had such authority had to respect the rights of 
all. Furthermore, authority over inferiors also meant, in the context 
of the village community, great obligations to them. As Mukerjee put 
it,
...the discretion of the Hindu patria potestas or any 
other status is a bundle of duties with a conception of 
right in due subservience to the proper performance of 
those duties. (1923: 123)
For Mukerjee status can be related to the Hindu concept of "dharma".
A definition of "dharma" is "right behaviour" (Concise Oxford
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Dictionary). This means in its most immediate context, how each 
person should behave according to his status as defined by caste, sex, 
age, office etc. In a wider sense, dharma means an order in which 
everybody has certain duties to perform for the total good. These 
duties are to be performed according to dharma in the first sense. For 
example, as a member of a family, a man would have his dharma as a son: 
he had to show respect towards his parents who had given him the gift 
of life, and look after them in their old age. He also had his dharma 
as a husband, as a father, and as a son-in-law. Similarly, as a member
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of a caste, he had to follow the dharma of that caste which meant 
behaving in certain ways towards members of other castes, and following 
the caste occupation. A man might also have dharma as the hereditary 
bearer of an office, such as the king, or on a minor level, a village 
watchman. Thus, an individual's dharma was made up of totally fixed 
roles, such as membership of caste, or roles determined by his 
structural position as in a family, which is affected by the 
developmental cycle. The only exception to this statement is the 
ascetic who renounces secular life. But there were attempts to 
incorporate this too. It was argued that there should be four stages 
in a man's life, as a child, a student, a husband and father, and 
finally an ascetic.
An individual's dharma was not to be taken lightly. It was
better to do one's own dharma than somebody else's, even if this meant
going against personal sentiment, or committing a sin. An individual's
dharma was assigned by God for reasons of his own which no mere mortal
could expect to understand. Thus Krishna told Arjuna, a Kshatrya, who
was contrite at being forced to kill his cousins, the Kauravas, that he
must do his caste duty. Indeed, doing one's caste duty was the proper
way of worshipping him, Krishna (God). To quote,
By dedicating the work that is proper (to his caste) to 
Him who is the source of the activity of all beings, by 
whom this whole universe was spun, a man attains 
perfection-and-success.
Better (to do) one's own (caste) duty, though 
devoid of merit, than (to do) another's, however well 
performed. By doing the work prescribed by his own 
nature a man meets with no defilement.
Never should a man give up the work to which he is 
born, defective though it be: for every enterprise is 
choked by defects, as fire by smoke.
(Zaehner 1969: 394-5)
The relevance of dharma to Mukerjee was that it provided him with 
a view of Indian society in which individuals worked for the good of 
all. While dharma served as the rationale for people to co-operate
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with each other, the functional group provided the organisation which
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made it possible.
More generally Mukerjee’s ideas were clearly largely drawn from 
those of Emile Durkheim who modified Maine’s distinction between 
societies based on status and societies based on contract into a 
distinction between societies based on 'mechanical solidarity’ and 
others based on ’organic solidarity'. He made this distinction because 
he argued that no society could be based on contract alone, as 
contracts themselves depended on the pre-existing sanction of society.
Nevertheless, the moral rules suitable for societies in which 
contract played a major role differed from those where it was of minor 
importance. Contract was more important in societies with a highly 
developed division of labour. Such societies had an innate social 
cohesion which he termed 'organic solidarity' because individuals were 
naturally dependent on each other, allowing the organization of 
societies on a hitherto unprecedented scale.
This very dependence meant, however, that those in a weak position 
in the division of labour were open to exploitation by those in a 
stronger position. Durkheim argued that such a situation would not 
only be unjust but it would also be dangerously unstable, and would 
inevitably result in the destruction of social relations.
Durkheim argued that moral rules were necessary to prevent such a
situation (which he called ’anomie’) occuring. Durkheim claimed:
That such anarchy is an unhealthy phenomenon is clearly 
very evident, since it runs counter to the very purpose 
of society, which is to eliminate or at least to 
moderate warfare among men, by subjecting the physical 
law of the strongest to a higher law.
(Durkheim 1984: xxxiii)
Only a social rule can serve as a barrier against abuses of power
for only,
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a duly constituted society enjoys the moral and 
material supremacy indispensable for prescribing what 
the law should be for individuals, for the only moral 
entity which is above that of private individuals is 
the one constituted by the collectivity.
(Durkheim 1984: xxxiv)
The role of society is not passive in formulating these rules, it:
intervenes actively and positively in the formulation 
of each rule. Firstly it is the arbiter appointed by 
nature for disentangling conflicting interests and 
assigning appropriate bounds to each. Next, it has a 
paramount interest in the maintenance of order and 
peace. If anomie is an evil it is above all because 
society suffers through it, since it cannot exist 
without cohesion and regulation. Thus moral or legal 
rules, essentially expressed social needs which society 
alone can identify. They rest upon a climate of 
opinion, and all opinion is a collective matter, the 
result of being worked out collectively. To be shot of 
anomie a group must thus exist or be formed within 
which can be drawn up the system of rules that it is 
now lacking.
(Durkheim 1984: xxxiv-xxxv)
However, though western political institutions represented the 
collectivity these were unsuited to introducing moral rules into 
economic relations, the major problem area. This required separate 
institutions:
Political society as a whole, or the state, clearly 
cannot discharge this function. Economic life, because 
it is very special and is daily becoming increasingly 
specialized, lies outside their authority and sphere of 
action. Activity within a profession can only be 
effectively regulated through a group close enough to 
that profession to be thoroughly cognisant of how it 
functions, capable of perceiving all its needs and 
following every fluctuation in them. The sole group 
that meets these conditions is that constituted by all 
those working in the same industry, assembled together 
and organized in a single body. This is what is termed 
a corporation or professional group.
(Durkheim 1984: xxxv)' 
Unfortunately institutions such as the medieval guild had decayed
in the West. Unions were not professional groups for they represented
only parts of and not entire professions. Indeed their very existence
assumed power conflicts whereas in a true collectivity such power
conflicts would not arise.
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In contrast, societies with an undeveloped division of labour 
lacked such an organic solidarity. Morality alone imposed social 
cohesion. It was only by people having a strongly shared set of 
beliefs, in Durkheim's terminology a ’collective conscious’, that 
people could behave ’socially’. These shared beliefs were protected by 
moral sanctions characteristically expressed in religious terms 
(Durkheim 1984: 119-120).
Clearly, Mukerjee was affected by Durkheim’s arguments. His view 
of the alienation of the Western individual has much in common with 
Durkheimian anomie. His solution, the creation of functional groups, 
was identical to Durkheim’s. The difference was that Mukerjee claimed 
that they already existed in the Indian village community in the form 
of castes and caste panchayats.
Nevertheless, despite Mukerjee’s view that the village community 
represented the perfect solution to the problems of organic solidarity, 
his concept of the village community was much closer to Durkheim's 
model of mechanical solidarity.
Durkheim's concept of the collective conscious was to exercise a 
strong influence on later concepts of the village community. This is 
evident in Wiser's and Dumont's views of the subordination of the 
individual to the whole, and in Dumont's concept of the subordination 
of politics and economics to ideology.
Mukerjee's importance was that he recognised caste as being a
central institution in the village community. The concept of the
interdependent castes, where everybody has ascribed rights and duties,
provided Wiser with a model for the jajmani system as is well
illustrated by the following quote from Wiser.
The Hindu Jajmani System represents an 
interrelationship built upon clearly defined function.
It represents the organisation of a community based on 
the Hindu belief that God 'assigned separate duties and
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occupations to each individual from birth’, these 
duties being as fixed as the functions of a father and 
mother in a family. Its strength in giving stability 
and psychical integration to Indian village communities 
throughout the centuries is undisputed. (1958: 145)
Both the terminology and the concepts in this passage are clearly 
derived from Mukerjee’s writings. The only noticeable differences from 
Mukerjee’s works are the greater emphasis on the exchange of caste 
services rather than on functional government, and the use of the term, 
the Hindu jajmani system.
Wiser: The Community in a New Guise
Wiser was, thus, more truly a participant in the village 
community/jajmani system debate rather than the creator of an entirely 
new debate on the jajmani system. Nevertheless, he was important, for, 
by concentrating on a new aspect of the village community, the jajmani 
system, he gave new life to the debate. This occurred, I believe, for 
four main reasons.
The first follows from Wiser's emphasis on intercaste ties and the 
exchange of services. His emphasis on these two points was largely due 
to the fact that he was undertaking, '... a survey of the social, 
religious and economic life of a typical North Indian village' (Wiser 
1971: xiii). He was interested in the relation between society and 
economic development, in contrast for instance to Mukerjee who was 
arguing the case for political reform. This shift marked a major step 
forward for it involved the recognition that castes had to be seen in 
relation to one another and not as autonomous bodies.
The emphasis on caste appealed to anthropologists and sociologists 
who were interested in what distinguished India and not, as Maine was, 
in what India shared with the Indo-European past. For the social
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scientists caste could be seen either as an alternative to class or as 
an extreme form of class. Either way it was worthy of study.
The second reason for Wiser’s sucess is his use of 'system1. The 
term jajmani system emphasised Wiser’s belief that he was dealing with 
an alternative economic and social system to that of capitalism, 
wherein goods and services were exchanged for harvest payments, gifts 
and village concessions, without the need for cash. Thus, whereas the 
term ’community' had emphasised the parallels between Europe and India, 
the term system emphasised the differences.
The third reason why the jajmani system was attractive to social 
scientists was that, in contrast to previous writers, Wiser had offered 
firm ethnographic evidence for his conclusions. He had, afterall, 
carried out a social survey of the Indian village. Furthermore, he 
supported his thesis by identifying certain traits as characterising 
the jajmani system (e.g. harvest payments, village concessions, and 
hereditary ties) which were open to study either to prove or disprove 
Wiser’s hypothesis or merely to indicate where the system might exist.
The fourth reason is that his model of the jajmani system offered 
anthropologists ethnographic evidence for a prima facie challenge to 
both orthodox economics and the theory of economic determinism.
Proponents of orthodox economics attempted to discover universal 
tenets applicable to economies. The jajmani system challenged them by 
apparently providing an example of an economy in which the profit
motive was subordinated to the needs of the village community, exchange
22
being regulated by custom, and not by individual self-interest.
The jajmani system challenged economic determinist arguments which 
held that the social and political institutions of a society reflect 
its economy by offering an example of an economy which apparently 
reflected its social organisation. The argument centred on the nature
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of the jajmani tie. According to the economic determinists the 
relationship between the two castes involved in a jajmani tie was 
dependent upon each caste's access to resources. Their view implied 
that the relationship between the two castes would be an exploitative 
one - of the economically dependent caste by the caste which controlled 
the resources.
Their opponents argued that exchanges between castes did not just 
reflect power relations derived from control over resources but that 
the very exchange itself helped to create the social relations. The 
castes themselves existed to supply each other with their respective 
services. This was made necessary by the ideology of purity which 
stated that certain castes of great purity - in particular the Brahmans 
who were necessary to maintain relations with the Gods - had to be 
protected from pollution by castes of lesser purity.
In the following chapter I will discuss the arguments of a
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proponent of each side of this debate, Oscar Lewis and Louis Dumont.
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CHAPTER 2: THE JAJMANI SYSTEM: AN ANTHROPOLOGICAL DEBATE
Since Wiser, two main interpretations of the jajmani system have 
been advanced: jajmani as ’exploitation' and jajmani as an 
ideologically based exchange system. The first is representative of an 
’economic determinist' position, the second an ’ideological 
determinist’ view. I will discuss the ’exploitation’ hypothesis first.
Lewis: The Stark Community
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The most influential 'exploitationist’ has been Oscar Lewis.
Lewis came to India as a ’consulting anthropologist’ of the Ford
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Foundation in the early 1950s (Lewis 1958: vii-xiii). This was in 
the period just after the Second World War (and Indian independence) 
when American foundations, led by Ford, believed that they could supply 
the money and the skills to cure poverty, provided they knew what was 
needed. Thus, Lewis’ village study, like Wiser’s, was largely an 
attempt to identify the factors influencing economic and social 
development. However, whereas Wiser emphasised how well the 
traditional social system was adjusted to the poverty and insecurity of 
agrarian India, Lewis argued that poverty and insecurity were used to 
coerce and exploit the weak.
Lewis attributed his definition of the jajmani system directly to 
Wiser:
It is greatly to Wiser’s credit that he was able to 
characterise jajmani relations as a system ... Under 
this system each caste group within a village is 
expected to give certain standardised services to the 
families of other castes. A Khati (carpenter) repairs 
tools, for example; a Nai (barber) cuts hair; but they 
do not necessarily perform these services for everyone.
Each man works for a particular family or group of 
families with which he has hereditary ties. His father 
worked for the same families before him, and his son 
will continue to work for them, the occupation or 
services being determined by caste ... It is a 
characteristic of this system to operate without much 
exchange of money. For it is not an open-market
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economy, and the ties between jajman and kamin are not 
those of employer and employee in the capitalistic 
system. The jajman compensates his kamins for their 
work through periodic payments in cash or grain, made 
throughout the year on a daily, monthly, or bi-yearly 
basis. Kamins may also receive benefits such as free 
food, clothing, and residence site, the use of certain 
tools and raw materials, and so forth. To Wiser these 
concessions represent the strength of the system and 
are more important than the monetary payments.
(Lewis 1958: 55-57)
Unlike Wiser, Lewis did not see jajmani as a symmetrical system,
where ’each in turn is master. Each in turn is servant’ (Wiser, 1958:
xxi). He claimed that the landowner was always master, never servant.
Those farmers who had enough land to support themselves did not supply
jajmani services but only received them. Wiser saw this as evidence of
the breakdown of the jajmani system, the better off farmers no longer
wished to carry out their caste duties, while the lower castes no
longer could carry out their caste duties, as their services were not
in demand. Thus caste and occupation no longer matched, a situation
which Wiser perceived was destroying the basis of the jajmani system.
For Lewis, the jajmani system was simply a means by which landowners
ensured themselves a secure source of labour. He wrote:
...landownership is clearly the single most important 
determinant of power in the jajmani system. Indeed, a 
major function of the system is to ensure a stable 
labour supply for the dominant agricultural caste in a 
particular region by limiting the mobility of the lower 
castes, especially those who assist in agricultural 
work. (Lewis, 1958: xii)
The jajmani system made it the kamin’s obligation to supply his 
service rather than the landowner’s responsibility to hire the kamin. 
The kamin either had to provide the service himself, or to ensure that 
someone else provided it. Lewis noted that,
If a kamin leaves the village, he must get someone to 
take his place, usually a member of the same joint 
family’. (Lewis 1958: 57)
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When the kamin died it became his family’s responsibility to 
ensure the continuity of the service, either by one of the family 
members or by an outsider (usually a relative or an affine).
In return for these restrictions, the kamins gained certain 
benefits - the most important of which ensured security in a society 
where access to food and the other needs of life was uncertain. The 
obverse of having to supply services to the jajmans was that the kamin 
was guaranteed the need for his services. Moreover, he could rely on 
help from his jajmans in cases of trouble. Lewis pointed out that this 
had the effect of locking the kamin more tightly into the jajman’s 
hold:
All the Bhangis at Rampur are heavily into debt and owe 
money to the Jats. In the past, they used to borrow 
money from their jajmans, either interest-free or at 
very low rates'. (Lewis 1958: 70-1)
Lewis, like Wiser earlier, suggested that the jajmani system was now
disintegrating. He attributed this to the dissolution of the economic
and political integration of the castes. Changes in political
conditions meant that higher castes were no longer in a position to
exercise the control the jajmani system had provided them over the
lower castes. Two critical political changes were the abolition of
zamindari tenure, and the repeal of traditional law. Both these
measures came with independence.
According to Lewis, the abolition of zamindari tenure removed one 
of the landowners' main instruments of control over kamins, 'village 
concessions’ (Lewis 1958: 80-2). Lewis (1958: 57) agreed with Wiser’s 
view that concessions were more important for the kamin's welfare than 
the jajman's direct payments for they included rent-free land, house 
sites, grazing land, firewood etc. While these were normally 
considered part of the kamin's rights, any challenge to the jajman's 
position -could lead to their loss. The ending of zamindari tenure
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apparently made these rights general property, thereby destroying what 
Lewis regarded as one of the main props of the jajmani system.
The repeal of traditional law was equally important. Under the 
British, traditional caste relations were covered by the wajib-ul-arz. 
The wajib-ul-arz was the written version of the traditional law of each 
village (Lewis 1958: 74). It was enforceable under British law (Lewis 
1958: 60).26
These changing conditions provided fertile ground for outside 
reform movements such as the Arya Sumaj and the Congress Party to 
encourage the lower castes to assert their independence, especially by 
avoiding those actions which expressed their low status. In 
particular, this meant giving up activities which were regarded as 
polluting. Lewis gave an example of a low caste attempting to do just 
this:
With the coming of independence, the position of the 
Camars (27) was strengthened both legally and 
ideologically. Now the Jats could no longer enforce 
the provisions of the wajib-ul-arz, which specified the 
traditional village duties. The Camars stopped the 
payment of the house tax and the handling of dead 
animals. However, with the more limited opportunities 
for employment after the war, the Camars once again 
became dependent on the Jats... (28)
Giving up the practice of removing dead animals was a 
gradual process. For a while the Camars removed only 
those animals that died a lingering death from badly 
smelling wounds. The Jats disposed of other carcasses 
by burial. This violated provisions laid down in the 
wajib-ul-arz. Previously, when a Jat had buried a 
bullock, the Camars had reported the matter to the 
police, who then had the carcasses dug up and turned 
over to them. If the skin were decomposed, the Jat was 
made to pay the cost of the skin to his Camar...
In 1934 - the Camars temporarily gave up removing dead 
animals, partly because of objections raised by a 
doctor, who claimed that they were skinned too near the 
villagers' homes. Two years later, when a different 
place was set aside for the skinning, the removal of 
dead animals was resumed rather half-heartedly by the 
Camars. In 1947, on the eve of Indian independence, 
the Camars at Rampur gave up the practice altogether'.
(Lewis 1958: 74-5)
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The conflicts engendered by lower caste aspirations to improve 
their status, and their economic and social well-being, was leading, 
according to Lewis, to the undermining of the jajmani system. Not only 
were the lower castes unwilling to accept the patronage of the higher 
castes, but the various castes were no longer willing to trust each 
other to carry out their obligations according to the jajmani system. 
These developments encouraged on-the-spot payments and the collapse of 
the long term relationships between the families concerned.
Lewis argued that caste conflict had led to castes poaching on 
each other’s occupations. This was endangering the whole basis of the 
jajmani system -the exchange of caste services. The lower castes no 
longer felt obliged to provide services to the higher castes. More 
importantly, the higher castes were willing in times of conflict to 
carry out those services themselves. Lewis gave one example of how 
this happened:
The famine of 1944-45 damaged the jajmani relationships 
between the Khatis and the Jats. Since grain was 
scarce, the Jats decided to reduce the customary dues.
The village panchayat accordingly announced that the 
grain payments would be half the traditional amount 
that year. The Rampur Khatis and Lohars did not agree 
to these conditions and said that they would not work 
for their jajmans if they insisted on such terms. Six 
Jat families then broke off jajmani relationships with 
the Khatis and now do their own work, or else get it 
done by cash payments. Three of the Jat families have 
taken up carpentry. (Lewis 1958: 62-3)
Perhaps the most fundamental change of all, upon which the legal, 
political and social changes depended, were changes in the economic 
circumstances of the villagers. Technological change meant that many 
of the crafts carried out by specialised castes could be performed more 
cheaply by outside manufacturers. On the other hand, economic 
development meant that the lower castes could obtain work, particularly 
outside the village in occupations where, at least ostensibly, caste 
was not a factor. In this regard, it may be noted that Rampur is a
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mere fifteen miles from Delhi (Lewis 1958: 3), well within commuting 
29
distance by bus.
A final factor which greatly influenced the economic situation of
villagers was, Lewis argued, population growth. The resultant land
division and consequent impoverishment meant that even the families of
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high caste farmers were forced to work in the fields themselves.
This family work, together with the fact that smaller holdings demanded
less work, resulted in a reduced demand for field labour (as noted
above, Lewis regarded field labour as having been covered by the
jajmani system). He gave an example of how this affected one caste:
The women in most of the Jat and Brahman families at 
Rampur now handle cow dung and make cow-dung cakes 
themselves. However, the Bhangis are still 
indispensable as sweepers and removers of refuse from 
the home. So the jajmani relationship persists, 
although at a low rate of return for the Bhangis.
(Lewis 1958: 70)
To sum up, one may note that what truly distinguished Lewis’ 
analysis of jajmani from Wiser's was his rejection of Wiser’s concept 
of community. The only sense in which a village community could be 
said to have existed in Lewis’ writing was as the community of 
landowners. However, it was a much less coherent concept than that, 
for instance, of Mark Wilks, for Lewis' emphasis was on the individual 
interests of the landowners, and not the 'community' of the landowners. 
Lewis' rejection of the village community was reflected in his 
definition of, and explanation for, the jajmani system, in both of 
which he differed significantly from Wiser.
In Wiser's writings, the village was portrayed as a community 
where everyone had a right to share in the village resources so long as 
they carried out their caste duties. The exchange of caste services, 
that was the jajmani system, was the basis of the village community.
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These exchanges created an integrated organic society, in contrast to 
the atomistic society of the West.
In contrast, in Lewis' analysis of jajmani, caste was relatively 
unimportant. Jajmani was what Lewis’ student Beidelman called 'feudal' 
(Beidelman, 1959: 5), in that it was a way by which the landlords could 
exercise power over the labourers and extract cheap and reliable power. 
Lewis, too, maintained that the basis of the jajmani system was the 
control of land. Caste merely gave extra stability and strength to 
this arrangement but it was not the cause of it. Caste strengthened 
the arrangement by allocating a specific occupation to each caste, 
thereby restricting people’s choices in doing as they wished.
In regards to Lewis’ definition of jajmani, the major implication 
of his rejection of the village community was that it allowed him to 
widen the definition of services included within the jajmani system. 
If the jajmani system was primarily seen not in terms of creating 
village unity, but only as providing the landowners with labour, it was 
not necessary to restrict the jajmani system to caste services. Lewis' 
inclusion of services in the jajmani system which were not governed by 
caste monopolies made any distinction between village servants and 
jajmani servants irrelevant. Both types of 'servant' worked for the 
landowners.
Lewis, by repudiating Wiser's concept of community, rejected the 
view that Indian society could be studied as though it were shaped by 
different forces from those of Western society. The same forces of 
individuals seeking security and well-being for themselves and their 
families underlay all societies. These forces explain the jajmani 
system which benefited the landlords by providing them with cheap 
secure labour. The labourers were hardly in a position to reject the
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system; besides, it had the advantage from their point of view of 
providing them with some security.
In view of their differing points of view, it is not surprising 
that, while both Lewis and Wiser claimed that the jajmani system was 
breaking down, they differed as regards to the implications of this. 
Wiser emphasized the breaking down of community spirit, and the 
creation of an atomistic society. Lewis, in keeping with his ’dynamic' 
model, saw the collapse of the jajmani system, unleashing built-up 
tensions between the castes. The lower castes were no longer under the 
power of the upper classes and would try to assert their ’rights’. In 
Lewis’ words,
As the jajmani system declines, a great deal of tension 
is bound to develop between the upper and lower castes, 
particularly since the system’s decline is concomitant 
with a great increase in population and a decrease in 
the size of land holdings. Although the dominant 
position of the Jats is not yet in jeopardy in Rampur, 
their influence over the lower castes has been much 
reduced, and the demands of the lower castes have 
increased. In would, therefore, seem that the Jajmani 
System contains some explosive potentialities and that, 
as the system continues to weaken, we may expect to see 
a heightening of the conflict between the dominant and 
subordinate castes in villages such as Rampur.
(Lewis, 1958: 82-3)
Lewis suggested that the hierarchy of the caste system was 
breaking down but that castes themselves were not. Indeed, Lewis 
quoted M. N. Srinivas to the effect that they were setting up caste 
advancement societies to help the various members of the caste, and 
were even becoming influential political pressure groups.
Dumont: Jajmani, An Aspect of Caste
Before discussing my interpretation of jajmani, it is necessary to 
discuss one more writer, Louis Dumont. Dumont differed from the 
previous writers I have been examining primarily in the way he defined 
’system’.
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In Wiserfs work, the system was the series of economic exchanges 
which tied the castes of a village into a single economic and social 
community. The 'system1 of the jajmani system was equivalent to the 
’community' of the village community. Indeed Wiser referred to the 
jajmani system as being what was left of the ancient village commune. 
The village as a political unit, the village republic, no longer 
existed, but a degraded form of the village community - the economic 
and social unit - did. Wiser's contribution was to reveal the 
institutional basis of this community, as a series of exchanges which 
made up a jajmani ’system'.
Lewis referred to Wiser’s discovery of system in jajmani 
relationships as being his major contribution to anthropology. 
However, whereas Wiser used system as being equivalent to the entire 
economic and social system, a series of ties integrating people, Lewis 
was merely referring to a method of extracting labour. The system was 
restricted to the patron-client relationship involved. It was an 
aspect of village life, but not all of it.
Dumont used system in quite a different way from either of these
writers. Dumont saw system as an ideological model rather than as an
empirical system of social and economic relations. Dumont asked:
...what is to be understood by 'system' of castes? The 
word assumes two different senses, an empirical sense 
and an ideological one. The set of actual castes which 
are found together in a definite territory may be 
spoken of as a geographically circumscribed system of 
castes...there are good reasons for thinking that in 
the past the caste system in fact existed in the form 
of such concrete wholes spatially juxtaposed and each 
corresponding to a small political unit. It is 
therefore useful to consider things in this way, but 
from the theoretical point of view it is neither 
sufficient nor primary, for these concrete wholes, once 
isolated, are seen to be alike and to rest on common 
principles. In this sense, one can speak of the caste 
system as a pan-Indian institution. At this level, the 
caste system is above all a system of ideas and values, 
a formal, comprehensible, rational system, a system in
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the intellectual sense of the term...Our first task is 
to grasp this intellectual system, this ideology.
(Dumont, 1980: 35)
Although, in this quote, Dumont was defining system with regard to 
the caste system, clearly the same principles were applicable to the 
jajmani system. This would mean that the jajmani system could be seen 
either as a substantive system existing in a local area or as an 
ideological model. The substantive approach is similar to that taken 
by Wiser and Lewis. For Dumont, as a structualist, it was the 
definition of system as an ideological construct which mattered most. 
Dumont perceived the jajmani system as a series of ideas linking 
clients and patrons. By defining the jajmani system in terms of 
ideology, Dumont rendered the concept of the village community 
irrelevent. The jajmani system was no longer a community of social and 
economic relations but a theoretical model for understanding how caste 
affected one particular type of economic tie. What the ideas 
constituting the jajmani system were will be outlined below.
Dumont was interested in the jajmani system only as part of a 
general analysis of Indian society. Within this general interest, 
jajmani had an important place, as it showed, according to Dumont, how 
India’s economic and political institutions were affected by ideology. 
Therefore, to comprehend properly Dumont’s position on jajmani, it is 
necessary to summarise his views of Indian society in general.
In Dumont's major work, Homo Hierarchicus, he was attempting to
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bridge the gap between the study of Indology and the study of 
anthropology. A major achievement of Indology had been the elucidation 
of the Hindu texts, but Indologists had not studied the relationship 
between the texts and contemporary Indian society as this was not one 
of their goals. Unfortunately, anthropologists had almost entirely
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ignored the Hindu texts and Hindu ideology in the study of Indian 
society.
In accordance with the method of participant observation, many 
anthropological studies distinguished between people's behaviour, which 
the studies called 'society', and their beliefs, which the studies 
called 'culture'. The former represented the 'real' social 
institutions, the latter being merely an epiphenomenon. Such studies 
shied away from using the ancient texts on the grounds that they were a 
subjective aspect of local culture rather than the objective analysis 
of a trained anthropologist.
In Dumont's view such an approach was dangerously ethnocentric for
it interpreted Indian institutions in terms of western ideology,
thereby arriving at an extremely limited and distorted view of Indian
society (Dumont 1980: 2-3). This was very similar to Maine's view that
no-one could interpret ancient institutions who did not understand the
ancient mind. By so doing western anthropologists had negated one of
their principal purposes in studying Indian society, to use it as a
comparison for western society. It was necessary to study Indian (or
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any foreign) society in terms of its own ideology. This required a 
systematic examination of what Indian ideology was.
Dumont admitted that an exploration of ideology would be an almost 
impossibly difficult task for two reasons. Firstly, Indian concepts 
were very different from Western concepts, and secondly, ideology, like 
language, was only partly conscious; people could manipulate their 
ideology but they could not escape from it, that is they could not 
analyse it objectively, as they had nothing with which to compare it.
There was no easy solution to either of these problems. However, 
the first problem could be lessened by making use of India's own 
literary tradition. Although Indian ideology could be painstakingly
52
analysed by the anthropologists, it was simpler and often preferable to 
build on what the ancients had already done.
The apparent difficulty with this approach is that the ideology 
being discussed was religious and the ancient writings were largely 
religious instruction. The writings were concerned with how religious 
duties, government etc. could be organised in accordance with religious 
dharma. Hence, the ancient writers were interested in instructing 
their readers on how they should behave, and not in describing how they 
did behave. They were dealing with ideal types, not with social 
reality. For Dumont this was not a major difficulty, for he did not 
expect the texts to provide realistic social models, but only to 
indicate the ideological basis of the society.
Perhaps a more fundamental question is whether the ancient texts 
are still relevant. The texts do not describe contemporary Indian 
society, for Indian society has undoubtedly changed greatly. They may, 
however, still be relevant for studying ideology. Dumont did not 
explicitly comment on this point perhaps because it did not seem to be 
a difficulty to him. He appears to have assumed that Indian ideology 
did not change. This contrasts with his assertion that western 
individualism is a recent ideology (Dumont, 1980: 40-1).
The final difficulty with this approach is whether the literary 
tradition reflected the ideology of the whole society or merely that of 
the elite. It is implicit in the caste system that there could not be 
a single set of beliefs, for each caste will have different perceptions 
according to its position in the caste system. A higher caste, for 
instance, will be more interested in moksha, liberation from the world 
of daily existence, than will a lower caste who will be more concerned 
with daily problems. The higher castes will, therefore, perceive 
religion essentially in terms transcending daily existence and will be
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interested in the Vedic gods who do so. The lower castes will see 
religion in terms of solving everyday problems, and worship those gods, 
usually the village gods and goddesses, who are most likely to help in 
that.
This difference in religious motivation and behaviour is logical 
as the higher castes are much more likely to obtain moksha because they 
have gained merit from good actions in previous lives (the same good 
actions that are responsible for their present high ranking). The 
Hindus explain the differing interests of the higher and lower castes 
in terms of bodily humours. The high castes have a higher proportion 
of sattva which makes them more spiritually inclined. Thus, there is 
not a simple collective conscience of the kind envisaged by Durkheim.
Dumont accepts that castes do have different beliefs but regards 
this as unimportant. He says that to equate the views of Harijans with 
those of Brahmans is to impose an assumption of western individualism. 
In a hierarchical society, it is the views of those at the top which 
matter (Dumont 1980: xxi), and which, presumably, are systematized and 
so appeal to anthropologists. The views of others are, by implication, 
the pale imitation of their ’betters’’ views. Though this view seems 
elitist it is my impression from discussion with Harijans and others 
that it may be correct.
Dumont argued that the second problem of examining ideology, that 
of examining one’s own ideology objectively could be solved by use of 
the comparative method, in this case contrasting Indian and Western 
society to examine the ideology in each. He argued that the
comparative method was particularly important in determining what was
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ideological and what was not.
Though Dumont believed that Western society was based on 
’substance’, he claimed that Indian society was based on ’structure’.
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He quoted Louis de Broglie with reference to physics to illustrate the
difference between structure and substance:
[in quantum physics]...the individuality of the 
elementary particles is the more attenuated the more 
they are engaged in interaction. As, on the one hand, 
there is no completely isolated particle and as, on the 
other hand, the bonding of the particles into a system 
is practically never sufficiently complete for 
something of their individuality not to remain, it can 
be seen that reality seems in general to be somewhere 
between the concept of autonomous individuality and the 
concept of a completely fused system.
(Dumont, 1980: 40)
Dumont concluded that,
The solution in our subject is to avoid a mixture and 
to speak either one or the other of two languages.
This is possible because one corresponds well enough to 
modern mentality, the other to the mentality I shall 
call traditional because it is dominant in the 
societies which have preceded our own. According to 
one approach, a system is conceived as made up of 
objects each with its own essence, and it is in virtue 
of this essence, together with a definite law of 
interaction, that they act on one another: for example, 
physical bodies each have their own mass and act on 
each other to an extent determined by this mass and 
their relative position...According to the other 
approach, the 'elements’ in themselves of which the 
system seems to be composed are disregarded, and only 
considered as the product of the network of relations; 
this network would then constitute the system.
(Dumont, 1980: 39-40)
Once anthropologists realised that India was a structural society,
they would go much of the way toward understanding Indian ideology.
Dumont claimed that,
The passage from one mentality or state of mind to 
another, from the world of structure to the world of 
substance or conversely, is no doubt the major problem 
in the comparison of societies. Here we have the good 
fortune to find ourselves faced with a world which is 
structural to a very high degree. This deserves a 
moment’s reflection, for it is the prime reason for the 
difficulty we have in understanding the world of caste.
As soon as we hear of human groups which separate 
themselves, distinguish themselves, isolate themselves 
fiercely from one another, we believe we know what we 
have to deal with: very well, we think, we know about 
this, it is rather like what we do as individuals, 
these castes resemble our precious modern persons, they 
are just so many little societies shut in on themselves
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and juxtaposed as we are juxtaposed in our fellow men 
in modern society. Well, nothing is more false. The 
caste isolates itself by submission to the whole, like 
an arm which does not wish to marry its cells to those 
of the stomach...While in our society the reference is 
to the elements, in this society it is to the whole.
(Dumont, 1980: 140-41) (34)
The structuralist institution par excellance in India was the
caste system. Dumont argued that the caste system could be reduced to
the basic concept of hierarchy. In the West, hierarchy had the
connotation of power: the power of one individual over another but
according to Dumont, hierarchy in India did not have this connotation,
nor, he claimed, had it always had it in Europe. He pointed out that
the dictionary defined hierarchy in terms of status, not power:
...hierarchy in India certainly involves gradation, but 
is neither power nor authority; these must be 
distinguished. We can already do so within our own 
tradition. Thus the Shorter Oxford Dictionary says 
under 'hierarchy1: '(1) Each of the three divisions of 
angels... (2) Rule or dominion in holy things... (3) An 
organised body of priests or clergy in successive 
orders or grades...(4) A body of persons or things 
ranked in grades, orders, or classes, one above 
another.' It can be seen that the original sense of 
the term concerned religious ranking. We shall keep to 
this sense here, making it somewhat more precise. We 
shall admit that, any idea of command being left aside, 
the religious way of seeing things requires a 
classification of beings according to their degree of 
dignity. Yet the presence of religion is not 
indispensable, for the same applies whenever the 
differential elements of a whole are judged in relation 
to the whole, even if the judgement is philosophical as 
in Plato's Republic. (Dumont, 1980: 65-66)
Thus, hierarchy was not equivalent to power, but rather to status,
which in the case of India meant religious status. The distinction
between power and status was particularly important in the caste
system. One difficulty which anthropologists had when analysing the
caste system, was that, in many villages and regions, the most powerful
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and wealthy caste did not have the highest rank. Dumont argued that 
this supported his contention that caste was based on religious 
hierarchy, not power. The Brahmans who had the highest rank in the
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caste hierarchy were not necessarily particularly powerful, indeed they
were often poor and dependent on the patronage of lesser castes. They
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ranked highest because of their intrinsic religious merit. 
Similarly, the Harijan castes ranked lowest because they had least 
religious merit.
Dumoirt emphasised hierarchy as a structural concept by defining it
a s :
...the principle by which the elements of a whole are 
ranked in relation to the whole, it being understood 
that in the majority of societies it is religion which 
provides the view of the whole, and that the ranking 
will thus be religious in nature. (Dumont, 1980: 66)
In essence, he was arguing that in a hierarchy all the ranked 
elements reflected a single religious principle. This was in contrast 
to the atomistic society of the West, where 'hierarchy' was simply the 
reflection of the power that groups or elements had over other groups 
or elements.
Dumont argued jthat the religious principle which underlay 
hierarchy took the form of an opposition between purity and impurity. 
Dumont used the opposition of purity and imparity to explain the caste 
system. For his analysis, Dumont borrowed Bougie's definition of the 
caste system:
According to him [Bougie], the caste system is composed 
of hereditary groups...which are both distinguished 
from one another and connected together in three ways:
(1) by gradation and status or hierarchy;
(2) by detailed rules aimed at ensuring their 
separation;
(3) by divisions of labour and the 
interdependence which results from it.
Bougie sometimes tended to separate these three aspects 
from one another. However, it is obvious that all 
three exist together and that their separation is an 
analytic distinction introduced by the observer ... The 
three 'principles' rest on one fundamental conception 
and are reducible to a single true principle, namely 
the opposition of the pure and the impure. This 
opposition underlies hierarchy, which is the 
superiority of the pure to the impure, underlies 
separation because the pure and the impure must be kept
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separate, and underlies the division of labour because 
pure and impure occupations must likewise be kept 
separate. The whole is founded on the necessary and 
hierarchical coexistence of the two opposites.
(Dumont, 1980: 43)
The pure-impure opposition, provided a single principle which 
explained the great variety of forms which characterised the caste 
system as described by ethnographers. Caste hierarchy differed between 
villages, and between regions. Many villages lacked castes found in 
neighbouring villages, or alternatively had different sub-castes 
carrying out particular occupations. Even the exact position which a 
caste had in the hierarchy differed between villages. At the regional 
level the differences were even greater than they were at the village 
level, in that the criteria by which the castes were ranked differed. 
Dumont argued that these were not important problems for, although 
caste rank did differ, and although different criteria were used, the 
basic principle of purity and impurity still applied: for example, 
various aspects of lifestyle or occupation could be used to construct a 
hierarchy based on the purity-impurity opposition.
The lack of clear criteria for applying the principle of the 
purity-impurity opposition meant that caste hierarchy was often 
ambiguous. It was clearest amongst the castes at the extremes of the 
caste system, and least clear amongst the 'middle castes'. The extreme 
castes were usually those with the most clearly definable roles. 
Because of the multiplicity of criteria for determining rank, it was 
possible, within this ambiguous area, for factors which were not 
strictly ritual such as power to influence hierarchy.
Dumont did not see his belief that power modified the caste 
hierarchy as being contrary to his theory of caste as an ideological 
concept. Ideology provided the structure of the caste system within
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which power had a restricted role. He described his approach as
involving two stages:
...first, we shall be concerned with the ideology, 
which easily accounts for the overall framework; 
secondly, finding the concrete factor, power, in the 
'middle zone', a factor not immediately accounted for 
by the theory of purity, we shall consider it in turn.
(Dumont, 1980: 76)
Power was recognized but in a subordinate position to religion.
Dumont argued that this distinction between power and religious 
status was encapsulated in the ancient concept of varna. 
Anthropologists distinguished between caste as found in contemporary 
India, "jati" (or simply "caste"), and caste as described in the Hindu 
texts, "varna". Four varnas were mentioned in the texts: the Brahmans 
(priests), the Kshatryas (warriors or kings), the Vaishyas (merchants, 
originally farmers), and Shudras (farmers, originally servants). 
Outside the four varnas were the untouchables, though they were 
sometimes regarded as being Shudras.
Although the varna schema strongly influenced Indian notions of 
what the caste system was about, and had a major impact on the first 
Western analyses of caste, it has been discounted by more recent 
anthropologists. They argued its use had led to a distorted view of 
the caste system: for example, M.N. Srinivas, India's best known 
anthropologist, has written that:
The varna-model has produced a wrong and distorted 
image of caste. It is necessary for the sociologist to 
free himself from the hold of the varna-model if he 
wished to understand the caste system. It is hardly 
necessary to add that this is more difficult for Indian 
sociologists than it is for non-Indians.
(Srinivas, 1962: 66)
Varna was misleading as it emphasised vague cultural concepts, rather
than concrete sociological reality. As Professor Ghurye noted,
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...in each linguistic region, there are about 200 caste 
groups which are further sub-divided into about 3,000 
smaller units each of which is endogamous and 
constitutes the area of effective social life for the 
individual. The varna-scheme refers at best only to 
the broad categories of the society and not to its real 
and effective units. (Srinivas, 1962: 65)
As evidence for the vagueness of varna, Srinivas mentioned that,
The category of Shudra subsumes in fact the vast 
majority of non-Brahmanical castes which have little in 
common. It may at one end include a rich, powerful and 
highly Sanskritized group while at the other end maybe 
tribes whose assimilation into the Hindu fold is only 
marginal. The Shudra category spans such a wide 
structural and cultural gulf that its sociological 
utility is very limited.
(Srinivas, 1962: 65)
Dumont agreed that varna was not an accurate description of the 
caste system, but he argued it should not be seen as such. He stated 
that, while caste was a matter of birth, varna was a matter of function 
(Dumont, 1980: 69). It was a scheme for relating the various functions 
of society, and the people who carried out these function. In the 
contemporary context, it was tied to caste, but Dumont believed that 
varna predated the caste system.
Whereas the caste system was based on the opposition of purity and
impurity, varna was based on a series of oppositions, t-he most
important of which was the opposition between religious status and
power. The Shudra was opposed to the three higher vamas, known
collectively as the 'Twice Born', as servant to master. The Twice Born
were similarly divided between the Vaishya, originally the common
farmer, and the higher varnas, his political and religious superiors.
The final and most important opposition was the one which is of concern
in the present context: that between the Brahman and the Kshatrya, who
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represented respectively religious status and political power.
As with the purity-impurity opposition, the varna oppositions were 
asymmetrical. The Twice Born castes were superior to the Shudras; the
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Brahmans and the Kshatryas were superior to the Vaishyas, and the 
Brahmans were superior to the Kshatryas. By making the Brahmans 
superior to the Kshatryas, varna emphasised religious status over 
power. Thus, in contrast to the purity-impurity heirarchy, power was 
allocated a role, albeit on condition that it was subordinated to 
religious status.
It is not entirely clear why, within varna, the Brahman was 
superior to the Kshatrya, unless one refers to the outside schema of 
the pure-impure opposition. This is awkward as Dumont was using varna 
to explain an anomaly in the pure-impure hierarchy. A better 
explanation is to be found in the Hindu concept of kingship.
One of the major functions of the king as a Kshatrya was the
implementation of justice. Dumont wrote,
So far as justice is concerned the classical texts are 
very clear, the king, advised by Brahman specialists in 
the dharma, metes out justice in full sovereignty. It 
may be said that legislative authority belongs to the 
Brahmans, judicial authority and the administration of 
justice, to the king. Generally speaking, the royal 
function appears in the Dharmashastras as the almost 
miraculous solution of a formidable problem, the pivot 
which permits the attachment and coupling together of 
two otherwise irreconcilable universes: force and the 
law, ideal and fact. Thanks to the king in particular 
the Brahman transcends the administration of this 
world, the king's essential function being to preserve 
the system of the varnas by preventing them mixing, he 
quite naturally had authority over the castes.
(Dumont, 1980: 167-8)
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Thus the Brahman determined what proper justice according to dharma 
was, but let the Kshatrya implement it. Each had their role, the 
Brahman interpreted correct behaviour, while the Kshatrya enforced it. 
While both need the other, the Kshatrya was dependent on the Brahman in 
a more fundamental way, for the latter was necessary to make his power 
legitimate. The actual situation was more complex than this, for not 
all of the Kshatrya's power involved upholding the dharma. The king 
also looked after the particular short-term interests of the state, but
6 1
nevertheless these concepts allow a reasonable idea of the relationship 
between religion and power.
Dumont argued that while varna was not an integral aspect of 
caste, it did influence the popular perception of caste. Varna 
provided a model which enabled people to integrate non-ideological 
factors such as power and wealth into the caste hierarchy.
By allocating a high importance to power, varna meant that castes 
with power were conceded a caste rank just below the Brahmans. This 
applied not just to royal castes, but also to landowning castes. 
According to Dumont (1980: 106) these castes replicated in the village 
the function of monarchs.
Varna also helped people to understand the role of the jajman in 
the jajmani system. Just as the landowning caste replicates the 
function of the ruling caste, so too the jajman replicates the role of 
the king. The king rules his palace and his kingdom with the help of 
his Brahmans and his various ritual specialists. The jajman directs 
his house and his farm with the help of the various ritual specialists.
Also of relevance to the jajmani system was Dumont’s views that 
varna implied.the subordination of power in religion. Power and wealth 
were linked. Wealth could be defined in the Indian context as control 
over men. Individuals were the producers of wealth as well as its 
protectors. To discuss the subordination of power to religion was also 
to discuss the subordination of wealth to religion (Dumont, 1980: 
164-6). For Dumont, the jajmani system was the very model of an 
economic system subordinated to religion.
According to Dumont, the jajmani system was based on the 
ideological opposition of purity to impurity. As I mentioned earlier, 
Dumont claimed that the purity-impurity opposition 'underlies the
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division of labour because pure and impure occupations must...be kept 
separate' (Dumont, 1980: 43). The opposition restricted the services 
which castes could perform because they would be polluted by the task 
required or they were too impure to be able to perform the service. 
Thus castes were forced by a religious ideology to obtain necessary 
services from other castes.
Dumont's view that ideology underlay caste specialisation, not the 
advantages of economic specialisation, lay at the basis of his analysis 
of the jajmani system. The jajmani system served to integrate the 
castes into a whole. This was not a 'natural' integration but one 
created by ideology. For Dumont the economic exchanges themselves 
reflected this ideology. This can be seen in Dumont's use of the terms 
prestation and counter-prestation in his definition of the jajmani 
system (prestation and counter-prestation are gifts and reciprocal 
gifts respectively, within a specific social context and with social 
significance).
Dumont defined the jajmani system as,
...the system corresponding to the prestations and 
counter-prestations by which the castes as a whole are 
bound together in the village, and which is more or 
less universal in India. To a large extent it is a 
question of natural as opposed to monetary economy. It 
is also a question of the closed economy of the Indian 
village in which essential goods and services are 
found, or used to be found, either on the spot or in 
the immediate vicinity: this fact corresponds, 
therefore, to what has been called the 'village 
community', in the economic sense of the phrase.
(Dumont, 1980: 97)
Prestation and counter-prestation were terms first used in
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anthropology by Dumont's teacher Marcel Mauss. For Mauss,
prestations were primarily made for social (and religious) reasons, not 
for economic reasons. By exchanging prestations two parties recognised 
each other as legitimate social entities. Such a recognition was a 
necessary pre-condition for more general social relations including
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trade to be carried on. In this sense it was equivalent to the social
contracts of Hobbes and Rousseau which enabled regularised social
i • 40, 41 relations.
Although Hindu society was more complex than the primitive 
societies Mauss was studying, Dumont's and Mauss' analyses had much in 
common. In Mauss' model a number of roughly similar, and usually
neighbouring, groups exchanged with each other. In Dumont's model
#2
exchange occurred between groups or rather castes within a ritual 
hierarchy.
For Mauss and Dumont, prestations created a special kind of 
relationship, one in which the exercise of power had only a minor role. 
Mauss saw prestations as an alternative to anarchical warfare; in 
Dumont's model prestations mediated in relationships where power had no 
part, due to the ideology of purity.
The concept of prestation was central to Dumont's argument that 
Indian society was based on ideology, for prestations represented 
exchange carried out on moral grounds, rather than economic grounds. 
As such, prestations emphasised an interdependence much more profound 
than that of western societies with their complex exchanges of goods 
and services.
However, while prestations were important to Dumont's case, their 
nature differed from those described by Mauss. Mauss' prestations were 
not of fixed amounts as the central reason for exchanging gifts was to 
impress others with one's generosity. There was always the illusion 
that one was making a pure gift, that one could give as much or as 
little as one desired, or indeed did not have to give at all. In 
practice not to have given, or to have given less than was expected, 
would have threatened or even destroyed the relationship established by 
prestations. It would have resulted in a loss of prestige and even war.
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While in India some payments payments of this type did exist, as 
in charitable payments to Brahmans, temples and for certain ritual 
purposes, most jajmani payments were fixed by custom. Nevertheless, 
they were prestations because they were fixed according to ideology, 
the ideology of hierarchical interdependence, and not according to the 
economic mechanism of the market.
Dumont summarised his views of the differences between the jajmani
system and a market economy in the following statement:
In a market economy all buyers and all sellers are as 
such identical, each after his own profit, and needs 
are adjusted, unconsciously, by the market mechanism.
But this is not the case here: not only are the 
majority of the relationships personal, but this is so 
in virtue of an organization which is to some extent 
deliberate and orientated towards the satisfaction of 
the needs of all those who enter into the system of 
relationships. What is effectively measured here is, 
so to speak, interdependence. Whilst directly 
religious prestations and 'economic' prestations are 
mingled together, this takes place within the 
prescribed order, the religious order. The needs of 
each one conceived to be different, depending on caste, 
on hierarchy, but this fact should not disguise the 
entire system's orientation towards the whole. Thus, 
we shall say that distribution on the threshing floor 
is essentially different from a market in that it takes 
place by virtue of the fact that everyone is 
interdependent. If we look closely (43), we see the 
farmer part with a significant portion of his crop for 
the benefit of a whole series of different people, and 
we shall feel in the end that we are not in the world 
of the modern economic individual, but in a sort of 
co-operative where the main aim is to ensure the 
subsistence of everyone in accordance with his social 
function, almost to the extent of sharing out the 
produce of each piece of land. In the one case, the 
reference is to the individual pursuing his own gain, 
in the other, to the hierarchical collectivity. By 
adding to these contrasting cases the claims of m o d e m  
socialism, we obtain three terms which can be arranged 
in a series:
(1) hierarchical collectivity: resources distributed 
more or less consciously;
(2) anarchaic individualities: external and automatic 
regulation;
(3) regulated individualities (or) egalitarian 
collectivity: deliberate regulation.
(Dumont, 1980: 105)
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The term ’hierarchical collectivity’ should be emphasised; while 
the jajmani system stressed interdependence, it did not emphasise 
equality. The orientation of the whole was based on the hierarchical 
opposition of purity to impurity, and the jajmani system reflected 
this. For instance, although everyone was guaranteed a living, they 
were not guaranteed an equal living: thus, the Brahman received more 
for his services than a leatherworker because his service was more 
important in terms of the ideology of purity.
Dumont would nevertheless, have disagreed with Lewis’ assertion
that the jajmani system implied exploitation, which he insisted could
only occur in a modern market economy. Evidently, he regarded
exploitation as being the manipulation of the market (presumably by
those who controlled the means of production including land) to obtain
services at rates regarded as being unfair by society as a whole. This
was not the case in India as, Dumont claimed, rates were fixed,
according to rates representing the ideological value of the services
performed. Dumont asserted that,
...the caste system should be seen as less 
’exploitative’ than democratic society. If m o d e m  man 
does not see it this way, it is because he no longer 
conceives justice other than as equality.
(Dumont, 1980: 105)
Except for the terminology, Dumont's concept of jajmani payments
was very similar to the one advanced by William Wiser. Both claimed
that jajmani payments were determined by principles independent of the
market. Wiser clearly stated his view in the claim that,
the jajman when he makes a cash payment thinks not in 
terms of value for value received, but that the 
payments together with certain concessions will give 
the ’kam-kame-wala’ his livelihood. (Wiser, 1958: 42)
The major difference between Dumont and Wiser on jajmani payments 
was the notion of the ideology of purity, and how this affected 
payments made between jajman and kamin.
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An important implication of the term prestation is that 
prestations create permanent relationships not long-term contractual 
ties. The difference is not so much the difference between social and 
economic ties, though this is implied, but that a contractual 
relationship can be ended, in theory, by meeting its terms through 
acquitting debts and obligations, whereas permanent relationships 
cannot be terminated since prestations and counter-prestations do not 
cancel each other out. Debts are not so much acquitted as exchanged. 
Far from relieving the debt created by prestations, counter-prestations 
create corresponding debts on the other side, thereby strengthening the 
relationship between the two parties. Indeed, as the two sides 
involved are families and not individuals, the ties cannot be ended 
even by death, but were hereditary.
Jajmans, Purohits, Zamindars, and Kamins: Dumont and Parry Compared
The major remaining aspect of Dumont’s jajmani system to be
discussed is the relationship of the jajman and the kamin. Not only
was the jajmani system hierarchical but it was also asymmetrical. The
jajmans needed the services of the kamins, but they rarely provided
caste services in return, as few jajmans carried out their specialist
occupations. While the position of the kamin was the result of the
opposition of purity and impurity, the jajman held a functional
position. The head of every family had to ba a jajman to gain the
benefits of the hierarchical division of labour.
Dumont explained the relationship of the jajman and the kamin by
reference to the etymology of the word jajman:
Those who are part of this system do not always use the 
word jajmani nor even the word jajman. However, the 
latter is very widely used to designate the employer or 
patron with respect to the person he employs. Now this
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is an interesting word. It comes from the Sanskrit 
'yajamana', a particle having reflexive force and 
meaning 'sacrifier' (as opposed to ’sacrificerf): The 
who has a sacrifice performed '. (44) It can be seen 
that etymologically the jajman is the master of the 
house who employs a Brahman as a sacrif icer. The 
religious connotation is important, and is still 
present today, although there is no longer any question 
of vedic sacrifice. A Hindi dictionary gives for 
jajman 'he who has religious (dharmik) rites performed 
by Brahmans by giving them fees, etc' (note the mention 
of the counter-prestation immediately evoked by the 
notion); for jajman: 'the privilege (adhikar) of 
performing the function of domestic priest (purohit), 
barber, bari (a helper) on the occasion of a marriage, 
etc'. Everything in this definition should be 
remembered: it is a question of family ritual, and 
above all, of marriage. It is a privilege to take 
part, even in the capacity of preparing the humble 
ceremonial materials, cups made from a leaf pinned 
together (the bari). I have translated adhikar by 
privilege, but it is also responsibility, and a 
personal asset is involved: each family has its 
purohit, its barber, etc., and neither party is free to 
escape from this relationship, so much so that the 
jajmani in the sense of such an obligation can, for 
example, stand as security for a loan of money (...)
Brit is also used in the same sense. The words may 
vary or be absent, yet the notion is omnipresent.
There are many words to designate the specialists, who 
are more like clients in their relation to a patron 
than employees in relation to an employer, since the 
relationship is a personal one: in Hindi, praja (also 
'creature, descendant, subject'), pauni, kam karnewala 
(workman), etc. Incidently, this whole vocabulary is 
mostly North Indian. (Dumont, 1980: 97-8)
The important point about this etymological analysis of the 
jajman-kamin relationship is that, although the kamin was materially 
dependent on the jajman, the jajman was ideologically dependent on the 
kamin. The kamin provided the jajman with essential services, 
particularly religious services, though secular services were 
incorporated into the system on the religious model. Without the 
kamin, the jajman would have been unable to participate in religious 
life, and in effect without religious status. Therefore, although the 
kamin needed the jajman for the practical concern of making a living, 
the real honour in the jajmani system belonged to the kamin. Dumont 
regarded the jajman's relationship with the kamin as being equivalent
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to the the king's relationship with his Brahman priests. Although the 
king ruled, he acquired his legitimacy from having the Brahmans perform 
sacrifices for him.
This equivalence of the jajman and the kamin to the king and the 
Brahman had many aspects to it. Castes which had the necessary power 
and wealth could utilise the jajmani system to gain status, in the same 
way as the kings gained their legitimacy from the Brahmans. The major 
castes which were in a position to do so were the landowning castes as 
land was the principal source of wealth.
According to Dumont,
...there are two strongly contrasted functions: that of 
patron and that of specialist client, and only those 
who have at their disposal the main source of wealth 
and power, the land, can really display the system in 
all its pomp. In short, it constitutes a device which 
guarantees them the services of the specialists, and 
conversely indirectly guarantees the subsistence of the 
specialists, by giving them limited but real rights 
over the products of the land and the affluence of 
their masters. (Dumont, 1980: 102) (45)
Though the etymological meaning of jajman emphasised the religious
nature of the relationship between the jajman and the kamin, Dumont
argued that all economic relationships between patrons and clients were
jajman-kamin ties. He wrote that,
Whilst religious overtones are in the forefront, the 
word jajman designates anyone who employs someone in 
conformity with the system, and the complementary word, 
let us take praja, anyone thus employed. This applies 
not only to ceremonial tasks; all others are expressed 
in the same language. (Dumont, 1980: 98)
This was part of the subordination of the secular to the religious.
The argument depended upon accepting that the terms jajman and 
praja, or jajman and kamin, were complementary and could be applied to 
all patron-client relationships. Yet the evidence on both these points 
is not convincing. While jajman was defined in terms of religion, with 
reference to sacrifice, its ’complementary' terms, praja and kamin,
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were not. Both kamin and Wiser's kam-karne-wale literally meant 
workman, a term with no suggestion of religion, sacrifice or 
complementarity. Not surprisingly, Dumont preferred to use the term 
praja which meant, according to Dumont, ’creative descendant, subject' 
(Dumont, 1980: 98). While none of these terms suggest the religious 
connotations of the sacrifice, 'descendant' and 'subject' both suggest 
a personal dependence. 'Subject' also suggests political 
subordination. One could interpret this in terms of the relationship
between the king, who had political authority, and the Brahman, his
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religious superior but political inferior, who sacrificed for him. 
Nevertheless, on whether praja is the reciprocal of jajman, the answer 
must remain possible but unproven.
A second aspect of complementarity depends not on etymology, but
on whether the words were complementary in use. Although Wiser used
the terms jajman and kam-karne-wale to complement each other, his
description indicated that both terms were not always used. The term
kam-karne-wale did not apply to the Brahman who was called pandit
(priest) the very person on whom Dumont's etymological explanation
depended. This would seem to be contrary to Dumont's proclaimed
approach of taking:
...lessons from the Hindus, Hindus of today and of 
times past, in order to see things as they do. They 
see them very systematically and it is not impossible 
to isolate the principle behind their view. Indeed, we 
shall realize that they have largely done the work for 
us...on certain points we shall take the liberty of 
completing and systemizing the indigenous or orthogenic 
theory of caste - not without employing empirical 
aspects in a secondary capacity - by postulating that 
men in society behave in a coherent and rational 
manner...and that it is possible to recover the simple 
principle of their thought. Naturally we make these 
modifications at our own risk, the touchstone always 
being what the people themselves think and believe.
There is nothing new in all this, of course: it is what 
the ethnologist or social anthropologist has always 
tried to do. (Dumont, 1980: 37)
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While there is an element of truth in this final sentence, Dumont
went further than most anthropologists would in claiming that an
anthropologist should use indigenous categories to analyse his
ethnographic data. In the case of the jajman-kamin relationship, it is
open to question whether he did not oversystemise indigenous concepts.
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Jonathan Parry’s Caste and Kinship in Kangra (1979) revealed a
district in Himarchal Pradesh in Northern India where people made a
sharp distinction between the patron-client relationship involving a
jajman and one involving a kamin. According to Parry, in Kangra, the
terms jajman and jajmani are used in accordance with their religious
etymology (Parry, 1979: 59). He quoted Dumont for the etymology of the
two terms and added that,
As far as Chadhiar people are concerned a jajman is a 
patron of either a Brahman or a Barber or of a Funeral 
Priest. When he is working as a ritual cook the 
Brahman is a bati to his jajman, but as a priest he is 
a purohit. The Barber, in his capacity as an essential 
functionary at life-cycle rituals, also stands in the 
relationship of purohit to his jajman.(48) None of 
these terms could appropriately be used in the context 
of any other employer-employee relationship.
(Parry, 1979: 59)
Thus, Brahmans and Barbers when they acted in their priestly functions 
were purohits to their patron's role as jajman. The Brahman as bati 
was in a similar relationship to the jajman.
In contrast, kamins were mainly artisans:
It is essentially those who pursue an artisan-type 
profession who are labelled kamin, and this craft 
aspect of their specialization is emphasised by their 
adoption of Viswakarma - the artisan god and architect 
of the universe - as a patron deity. (Parry, 1979: 67)
Parry added that,
The patron of a kamin is probably a zamindar, or 
landowner, but this pair of terms are not reciprocals 
in the strict way that purohit-jajman are. While the 
word purohit is an honourific and implies superiority 
of status, kamin has distinctly derogatory connotations 
and always applies to inferiors. For this reason, it 
is impolite to refer to somebody as a kamin in his 
presence, thought the term will be used freely of those 
who are out of earshot. A kamin is ideally supposed to
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act out his subordination in much the same way as a 
house tenant (...)» and makes identical offerings to 
his patron at the seri festival. Like the pahu, he is 
called to weddings and other major rituals in his 
patron's house, though these' days he is likely to 
ignore the summons since he knows that he will be 
letting himself in for a whole series of menial chores; 
and instead of being fed with the guests he will be 
given a pile of cooked rice to take home to consume 
with his family. (Parry, 1979: 67)
The kamin, then, did not have the prestige of a purohit. Nor did
he have the close relationship with his patron that the purohit had
with his jajman. This latter point is indicated by the fact that the
terms purohit and jajman were defined by each other (as Dumont
maintained that jajman and praja or kamin were), whereas the terms
kamin and zamindar (the kamin's normal patron) were independent.
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Zamindar meant landholder, kamin literally meant worker, though 
artisans were apparently meant in Kangra.
As Parry pointed out, the apparently obvious way to interpret the 
differences between purohits and kamins is to see them as representing 
religious and secular occupations respectively. However, he argued 
that,
While the term 'religious’ retains the habitual sense 
it has acquired in the sociology of India as an 
adjective for anything positively charged with 
status-purity implications, it is grossly misleading to 
characterise the Kangra distinction between purohit and 
kamin as a distinction between religious and secular 
specialists. The inappropriateness of such a 
translation is clear from the fact that the Barbers and 
Leather-workers rate as kamin, although both are (in 
this sense) religious specialists who restore purity to 
their patrons by removing pollution, the Chamars by 
disposing of the carcasses of dead cattle and the 
Barbers by barbering. That, even on profane occasions, 
the barber refused to serve the lowest castes, while 
the patron suffers mild impurity from his ministrations 
and sprinkles his head with water in token of a bath, 
should warn us against viewing barbering as a purely 
technical act devoid of status implications for either 
party. (Parry, 1979: 74)
Parry added that,
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...the Kangra distinction between purohit and kamin 
does not discriminate between 'religious' and (in the 
strict sense) 'secular' specialists but rather between 
those specialists essential to the performance of 
life-crisis rituals and the artisan-type occupations.
(Parry, 1979: 78)
That is, although many kamins performed apparently secular 
services, other kamins performed services which Westerners would regard 
as religious, i.e. services which existed primarily to remove impurity. 
In Kangra, no distinction was made between secular and religious 
activities. All kamins were workers - the aim or motivation of the 
service being irrelevant.
As Parry noted above, what distinguished the purohits from kamins 
was that they served in family ritual: they were 'sacrificers' to their 
jajman 'sacrifiers'. There is a significant distinction between 
providing the conditions in which religious life could take place 
through removing impurity, and actively taking part in the rituals of 
which religious life was composed. It was the kamin's duty to remove 
pollution; it was the purohit's honour to participate in family ritual.
The purohit's tie to his jajman was much stronger that the kamin's 
link to his patron. No doubt, this was because they were partners in 
'sacrifice'. This meant that the purohit played a vital part in the 
ritual unity of the family. It was natural that his link with the 
family was permanent.
Parry noted that,
Between jajman and purohit sub-clans there is a 
relationship which is thought of as permanent. Within 
this alliance an individual jajman household will have 
an hereditary relationship with an individual household 
of the purohit sub-clan, and in theory this 
relationship lasts from one generation to the next. In 
fact the ties between particular jajman and purohit 
households do not have quite this long-term 
immutability, since few of Chadhiar's Brahmans are 
actually priests (...) and since a priest's sons 
frequently take to secular occupations. When a purohit 
dies his jajmans often redistribute themselves among
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the other purohits of the deceased's sub-clan. But, 
during his lifetime, switches are very rare.
(Parry, 1979: 63)
Even incompetence was not sufficient excuse for a jajman to break
with a purohit. Parry explained,
If for any reason it is impossible for a purohit to 
attend to his obligations in a jajman's house, it is 
his duty to provide a substitute, and it would be out 
of place for the jajman to make separate arrangements 
without consulting him. Some purohits are much more 
sophisticated than others in their knowledge of the 
often elaborate and complicated rituals. If an 
hereditary purohit does not know how to conduct a 
particular ceremony, a second purohit will be invited 
to perform it. But it is the hereditary purohit who 
will collect the payment, and he will divide it with 
his colleague by a private arrangement, which is no 
concern of the jajman. (Parry, 1979: 64)
The reference, in the first of these two quotes, to a clan taking
purohits from particular Brahman clans is interesting. A later passage
in Parry's book would appear to indicate that the deities of individual
clans of jajmans could only be honoured by members of particular
Brahman clans. Parry stated that,
In theory, all members of the clan, no matter where 
they live, owe allegiance to a common clan deity, or 
kulraj. The kulraj is propiated by the principal 
celebrants at all important life-cycle ceremonies; but 
there are no rituals at which the whole clan, or even 
the whole of a localized segment of the clan, unites in 
common worship of its deity. In theory too, all clan 
members recruit their kul-purohits (household priests) 
and guru-purohits (spiritual preceptors) from the same 
two Brahman clans. Although few people are aware of 
it, in fact different localized segments of the same 
clan often worship different deities and call on 
different clans of Brahmans as their purohits. _n
(Parry, 1979: 133)
A kamin did not have equivalent rights to a purohit. Parry noted
that,
A kamin does not have the right to serve his zamindar 
in the same way as, a purohit has a right to serve his 
jajman. There is no question of jaddi ('ancestral 
property') here; the term would be quite inappropriate.
Although a kamin may take over his father's clientele 
he will soon find that they go elsewhere if he is not a 
competent craftsman. Either party can terminate the
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contract at will though it is considered only right and 
proper to wait until the crop is in.
(Parry, 1979: 69)
The differences between the two types of relationship, that is
between the kamin and his patron, was even more marked in the system of
payments. Parry commented that,
By way of remuneration the purohit receives a series of 
prestations which fall into the general category of 
dan. Dan also occurs in contexts outside the system of 
customary rewards. A pre-pubescent bride, for example, 
is offered, along with a dowry, as dan to the groom’s 
family. But whatever the context, the morality of dan 
is fundamentally distinct from the morality of a 
commercial payment. It has rather the character of a 
charitable donation humbly offered to somebody of 
superior status, whose condescension in accepting the 
gift allows the donor to acquire merit. Under no 
circumstances may any material return be accepted, for 
a counter-prestation would cancel out the merit 
acquired by the original gift. It is for this reason 
that an orthodox and conservative Rajput will not eat 
at a Brahman’s house, any more than he will eat in his 
married daughter’s house...A respectable man gives as 
much as he can afford in dan, and the bigger the gift, 
the more the merit. The purohit’s takings then, are 
neither rigidly fixed nor subject to bargaining.
(Parry, 1979: 65-6)
In India payments to Brahmans are often in the form of gifts to the 
gods: the Brahmans use what the gods leave.
Payments to kamins were quite different. Parry explained that,
The relationship which links the zamindar and his kamin 
is kalothibadh, and the traditional payment is 
gadi-kalothi. Gadi refers to a sheaf of paddy; kalothi 
to a basket used for storing maize. But due to the 
great shortage of rice-land in Chadhiar, very few 
landholders in the mauza are these days prepared to 
give paddy to their kamins. At the seri crop they give 
maize; at aiai a quantity of wheat, most of it as 
grains but perhaps one or two unthreshed sheaves 
(puliyan) as well.
In return for this payment the artisan is expected 
to provide prompt and efficient service throughout the 
months from the first ploughing until the crop is in.
At sowing time and harvest time the pressure of work on 
the carpenter and blacksmith is extremely heavy as 
impatient farmers, with an eye on the weather, make
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urgent demands that a plough be mended, a new 
ploughshare forged, or a sickle sharpened...
In contrast to dan, gadi-kalothi is explicitly a 
payment. Although the old papers of the village 
accountant list fixed rates for each variety of kamin, 
nobody in Chadhiar takes a blind bit of notice of them, 
and even 50 years ago they do not seem to have been 
observed. The District Gazeteer (1926-235) notes that 
’none of (the kamins) has fixed perquisites, and their 
duties and remuneration vary in different parts’. In 
my [Parry’s] own experience the details of gadi-kalothi 
payments are subject to a good deal of bargaining and 
disputes between artisan and patron are common. The 
general complaint amongst the kamin is that the size of 
the gadi-kalothi payment has diminished slowly steadily 
over recent years. The amount paid corresponds 
roughtly to the amount of work done during the season, 
but it also depends on how large the crop has been. An 
artisan, then, may find that his income varies a good 
deal from harvest to harvest. (Parry, 1979: 67-8)
Parry pointed out that,
All this would seem to have some bearing on the 
striking disparity between those authorities who 
conceptualise the division of labour between castes in 
terms of a harmonious interdependence in which the 
’special privileges' of the low castes are guaranteed 
(e.g., Wiser 1936; Leach 1960) and those who emphasize 
the asymmetrical power relations between patrons and 
specialists and insist that ’any integration possible 
is of a coercive nature’ (e.g., Beidelman 1959: 68).
(51) (Parry, 1979: 74)
Harmonious interdependence would appear to describe the position 
of the purohits and jajmans, whereas coercive integration might be used 
to describe the kamin’s relations with the zamindar. This supports 
Dumont's view that religion can ’impose itself’ on economic relations 
with regard to purohit-jajman relations, but not in terms of 
kamin-zamindar relations.
The sacrifice emphasised the interdependence of castes. To haggle 
over prices or services would have been to besmirch the character of 
the purohit and of his function. The honour lay in giving, not in 
paying. The kamin’s position was quite different. Although many of 
the kamin castes existed only because of the religious division of 
labour, this did not necessarily affect their relations with their
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patrons (except to the extent that they could not perform services for
some castes as it would endanger their purity). In Kangra, relations
between kamin and patron seemed to be marked by a market mentality,
with prices being open to bargaining, and varying according to harvest,
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the amount of labour required and so on. My own field area in South 
India differed from Kangra in this respect only in that all the 
inter-caste ties I found fitted Parry’s model of the kamin-zamindar 
ties, or were arranged for and paid on a casual basis and none fitted 
his model of the purohit-jajmani tie (as discussed below in chapters 
three and four).
Though neither Kangra nor my field area can be representative of 
53
all India, they do show that Dumont had not proven his case that the 
religious ideology of interdependence was reflected in all inter-caste 
economic ties.
This brings me to one final point. Most recent writers, such as 
Parry, dealing with the jajmani system, have restricted their 
discussion to the priestly and artisan castes. Although Dumont called 
these castes the core of the jajmani system, he, like Wiser, regarded 
it as covering all caste services. He included as one such service 
agricultural labour, also known as farm labour.
Agricultural labour is difficult to reconcile with the jajmani
system. It was a utilitarian service with little direct relevance to
the religious division of labour. Dumont accepted that non-religious
activities were generally outside the religious division of labour:
...agriculture - defined as vaguely as this it is more 
a kind of occupation than a true profession - is a 
religiously neutral occupation for the majority of 
castes (though there is a prejudice amongst high castes 
against using the plough in person) and is respectable 
from the non-religious point of view...
(Dumont, 1980: 96)
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Despite the neutrality of agriculture in terms of purity, most 
full-time agricultural labourers were Harijans. The reason given for 
this is that they were connected with activities which were impure. 
The most important labouring caste in both North India and Karnataka 
were the ’leatherworkers’. They were rendered particularly impure as 
their caste occupation involved the removing of dead cattle, and was 
also associated with the skinning of the animals and the eating of 
their flesh.
This explanation of the association of agricultural labour with
untouchability is in keeping with Dumont’s claim that utilitarian
services were absorbed into the jajmani system on the model of the
religious occupations,
’In the last analysis, the division of labour shows not 
a more or less gratuitous juxtaposition of religious 
and non-religious or ’economic tasks’, but both the 
religious basis and the religious expression of 
interdependence. Better, it deduces interdependence 
from religion’. (Dumont, 1980: 108)
Dumont conceded; in a rather condescending tone, that,
Concerning untouchability in general, the modern reader 
will no doubt ask some question such as: why are huge 
castes like the Chamar in Uttar Pradesh, representing 
the bulk of the agricultural labour force, unfree 
labour, considered untouchable? Is this not simply a 
’rationalization’ of their oppression and exploitation?
First of all, we have no idea why the Chamar are more 
numerous than all the other untouchables of the region 
put together. More scientifically, the question can be 
put in this way: what is the relation between the 
religious expression of the condition of the 
untouchable and the general function of these castes as 
labourers close to agricultural serfdom? Without 
exhausting the significance of the fact...it may be 
said simply that the overwhelming religious inferiority 
of these castes in effect expresses and encompasses 
their strict secular dependence on the dominant castes: 
the lowliest suffer the greatest subjection. Or again: 
the hierarchical solidarity between the two highest 
v a m a s  is here reflected in the fact that those who are 
most oppressed materially, are at the same time seen as 
supremely impure. (Dumont, 1980: 137)
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I fail to perceive the difference between simple rationalisation 
and secular dependence, expressed and encompassed by religious 
inferiority. If there is a difference, it would best be analysed in 
terms of the relations between the castes. If the religious status of 
agricultural castes was a rationalisation, their ties with their 
patrons would have been marked by exploitation. If the labouring 
castes’ status reflected religious encompassment it would reflect 
interdependence. Thus, even if the religious division of labour had 
little relevance to people’s actual activity, if intercaste relations, 
nevertheless, reflected religious hierarchy, then the jajmani system 
could be said to exist. However, as I have pointed out, Dumont did not 
prove his case. If it is questionable whether kamin-patron relations 
were marked by interdependence it is even more questionable whether the 
relations of agricultural labourers with their patrons were marked by 
interdependence.
In the following two chapters I will examine intercaste relations 
in a district of South India, with a view to whether they are marked by 
religious interdependence or not.
CHAPTER 3: JAJMANI IN MAYASANDRA
This and the following chapter offer a selective examination of 
the ethnography of a particular region and village focussing on the 
issues which we have been discussing. The first problem under 
investigation is whether the jajmani system existed in this South 
Indian settlement and its surrounding hamlets, Following a brief 
description of the geography, economy and caste composition of the 
villages, it seeks to discover whether they contain the various 
elements which constitute the jajmani system, with particular emphasis 
on the types of payment made for services. I then reconsider the 
definition of the jajmani system. The length of these two chapters is 
due to my belief that the lack of a clear definition of the jajmani 
system and in particular of jajmani payments and services has largely 
been responsible for the indecisive nature of the jajmani debate and 
therefore of the number of assumptions made in the debate. The final 
chapter, the conclusion, summarises the findings of this thesis with 
regard both to the concept of the jajmani system itself and to the 
village republic/community/jajmani system debate. The data for this 
analysis are drawn mainly from my own field work, but where necessary I 
refer to the work of anthropologists, including M.N. Srinivas and 
T.S. Epstein, who have worked in the region. I also discuss 
Jan Breman’s work though he conducted it outside the region, for it 
throws light on aspects of my own data. To provide an historical 
perspective, I refer to three earlier writers who visited the area, 
Mark Wilks, Francis Buchanan and the Abbe Dubois.
80
The Scene: The Geography of the Mayasandra Region
The Mayasandra region is part of the State of Karnataka. The 
area is situated in Tuvukere Taiuk, Tumkur District, 100 kilometres to 
the west of Bangalore, the present State capital, and 100 kilometres to 
the north-east of Mysore City.'*'*
Geographically, the region is located in the great basaltic 
plateau of the Deccan. The land is dotted by granite outcrops, many of 
which, due to their phallic shape, are associated with the worship of 
Lord Shiva. The volcanic soil is fertile provided there is water. The 
population is, therefore, concentrated near tanks."*** The largest and 
richest village of the study area, Mayasandra, is situated next to the 
largest tank.
Mayasandra has a population of about 2,500. Though smaller than
the Indian census definition of a town, it has many urban
characteristics. Mayasandra is the commercial centre for the
surrounding villages and hamlets; it is the location of a weekly
market, a large number of shops, grain mills and other services. The
commercial nature of villages such as Mayasandra seems a modern
phenomenon, but appearances are misleading. Francis Buchanan wrote at
the beginning of last century that at
convenient places in every Taluk there are weekly 
markets, which in good parts of the country may be 
about two or three miles from each other. To these, 
the farmers carry their produce, and sell it, partly by 
wholesale to traders. (1807, Vol 1: 125)
Mayasandra also has a large permanent service sector, including 
tailor shops, barbers, carpenters and washermen, tea houses offering 
meals and beverages, a sugar mill, a rice mill, a reading room, coffee 
grinders and the area's only full-time goldsmith. A touring cinema 
occasionally visits. The village also serves as the centre of 
government services for the surrounding area, having a full post and
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telegraph office, a health centre with a doctor, a veterinary hospital 
and a police station.
Agriculture too is an important component of Mayasandra's economy. 
Having the area’s largest tank means that it has the largest amount of 
wet land. It is, therefore, the area’s principal producer of cash 
crops as most cash crops require irrigation. Most of these cash crops, 
including sugar cane, toddy trees'*^ and rice, are directly irrigated 
from the tank. An exception is the growing of coconuts which are 
irrigated from wells located below the tank walls.
This study also concerns eight other settlements which surround
Mayasandra. They are much smaller than Mayasandra being better
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described as hamlets, both in terms of size and social and economic 
complexity. Their populations range from 50 to about 650 and are 
mainly employed in farming. Indeed, only one or two of the hamlets 
even have shops. For the most part the farms are on dry land which is 
mainly devoted to subsistence crops: for example, finger millet (ragi) 
and sorghum (j owar).
The Castes of Mayasandra
The different economies of the settlements are reflected in their 
social structure and particularly in their caste composition (see 
Table 1). Mayasandra has the most complex caste structure. In part, 
this reflects its size. The bigger a population the greater the 
likelihood that a particular caste will be represented in it. There 
are economic, social and historical explanations too. The commercial 
nature of Mayasandra means that several sectors of the population 
engage in trade including two non-Hindu communities: the Jains and the 
Muslims. In contrast, only one of the hamlets has a sizeable group of 
non-Hindus - Dasihalli is half Muslim.
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By Mayasandra's standards the Jains are wealthy. They own the 
sugar mill, the rice mill, the main tea shop and various other 
businesses. Together with the Brahmans, they own most of Mayasandra’s 
wet land. The Muslims own most of the smaller businesses: small general
Table 1 Caste Composition in Mayasandra and Surrounding Hamlets
MAYASANDRA BOMMENAHALLI DASIHALLI KHODINAGA- KOMBANDE-
SANDRA VANAHALLI
CONDENSED CASTE Households Households Households Households Households
No. % No. % No. % No % No. %
1 Muslim 134 32.4 32 50.8
2 Jain 23 5.6 - - - - - - - -
3 Lingayat 16 3.9 33 68.8 - - - - - -
4 Vokkallga 58 14.0 5 10.4 23 36.5 4 30.8 17 89.5
5 Brahmin 24 5.8 - - 1 1.6 - - 1 5.3
6 Harljan 43 10.4 10 20.8 4 6.3 - - - -
7 Service caste 38 9.2 - - 2 3.2 - - - -
8 Poor peasant and
pastoralist 60 14.5 - - - - 7 53.8 1 5.3
9 Not known 17 4.1 - - 1 1.6 2 15.4 - -
TOTAL 413 100.0 48 100.0 63 100.0 13 100.0 19 100.0
SORAVANAHALLI TIGALARA- TABINAKATE VITTALAPURA TOTAL
PALYA VILLAGES
CONDENSED CASTE Households Households Households Households Households
No. % No. % No. % No. % No. %
1 Muslim . 166 21.1
2 Jain - - - - - - - - 23 2.9
3 Lingayat - - - - - - 2 2.0 51 6.5
4 Vokkallga 44 86.3 - - 26 83.9 80 80.0 257 32.7
5 Brahmin - - - - 5 16.1 - - 51 3.9
6 Harljan - - - - - - 2 2.0 59 7.5
7 Service caste - - - - - - 11 11.0 51 6.5
8 Poor peasant and
pastoralist 7 13.7 48 100.0 - - 4 4.0 127 16.2
9 Not known - - - - - - 1 1.0 21 2.7
TOTAL 51 100.0 48 100.0 31 100.0 100 100.0 786 100.0
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stores, tailor shops and bicycle shops. They also carry out a number 
of traditional crafts, such as fitting cow shoes to cattle and, like 
other communities in Mayasandra, they own some land.
The importance of irrigation farming in Mayasandra is also a 
factor in the complexity of the caste structure. Wet land is largely 
owned by a landlord class and requires a much more organised use of 
labour than dry land; e.g. to rebuild banks, canals etc. Ploughmen 
are hired to guide the buffaloes in ploughing the fields, and other 
workers for various agricultural operations such as planting, 
transplanting and harvesting. It is difficult for wet land farmers to 
stagger their crops to gain the maximum advantage from an exchange of 
labour, as wet land crops in Mayasandra are governed by the release of 
water from the tank to all farmers on the same day.
The system is not inefficient. Wet land crops are grown after 
dry-land farmers have harvested. This system gives dry land farming 
households a source of extra income, and the wet land farmers a source 
of cheap and plentiful labour.
The small landholder has few advantages over the larger landlord 
in the farming of wet lands. The farming family’s own labour is only a 
small proportion of the total labour needed. More important is the 
ability to pay for hired labour, to invest the necessary capital in 
building canals, etc., and the ability to absorb the occasional total 
loss; e.g. the 1982 harvest was a complete loss for the wet land 
farmers due to drought. Although the dry land farmers suffered a 
diminished crop, they did not suffer a total disaster.
What makes wet land farming worthwhile are the high returns it 
provides a well-financed farmer. For such farmers wet land is a 
valuable investment. In consequence, wet land farming is associated 
with a landlord class.
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Dry land is much less profitable and apparently has always been 
farmed mostly by small landholders or tenants as there was little 
profit for the larger landowners in directly farming it. The small 
farmer has two advantages over his larger counterpart household: his 
family supplies most of the labour and he has few difficulties in 
supervising the work and in protecting the crop.
The large landlord can rarely provide all the necessary
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supervision from his own household and is forced to pay for what is 
at best inadequate supervision. In the past landowners overcame this 
problem by leasing land to tenants, who had as much interest in 
ensuring a good harvest as did small farmers. Nowadays land reform 
laws which enable tenants to claim the land they farm have made this 
difficult.
Since the 1960s long term tenants have been granted landownership 
rights. Thus the hamlets where dry land predominates lack the clear 
distinction between a landlord class^^ and dependent castes which 
exists in Mayasandra.
The major communities owning wet land in Mayasandra are the 
Brahmans, Jains, Lingayats and Vokkaligas. The Brahmans probably 
received wet land a thousand years ago as a gift of the king. Land was 
given to Brahmans so as to establish and support centres of religious 
prayer and Sanskritic learning. Such grants earned religious merit for 
the donor and they were also politically expedient, in ensuring the 
support of the Brahmans. Such support was essential, because of the 
Brahmans’ authority among the people, and also because of the Brahmans’ 
vital role in providing a literate class. They were necessary for the 
State bureaucracy and even for village accountantships (necessary for 
collecting land tax). Moreover, the creation of Brahmanical 
settlements had other advantages, as in providing local centres of
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pilgrimage where markets could be encouraged and for serving as centres 
of administration. Wet land grants to Brahmans were common, presumably 
because it was essential that there be an agricultural surplus if the 
aim of creating centres of religion and learning were to be met (Stein 
1980: 344).
The Mysore State Gazeteer for Tumkur District (M.S.G.T.D.) stated 
that Mayasandra was one of the original pancha gramma settlements of 
the Iyengar Brahmans in Karnataka (1969: 88, 591). This indicates that 
Mayasandra has been inhabited by Brahmans since the eleventh century.
The Jains, Muslims, Lingayats, Vokkaligas and many Brahmans have 
acquired wet land more recently, much of it after the present tank was 
built in the last century. These communities acquired wet land because 
of its commercial value.
Associated with Mayasandra’s landlord class are Harijans who 
depend on labouring as their main source of income even if they have 
acquired some land mainly from government grants. Harijans form a 
larger proportion of the Hindu population, and of the agricultural 
workforce of Mayasandra than of the hamlets.
Mayasandra has a number of other dependent castes. These are the 
service castes, a category covering blacksmiths, washermen, barbers, 
potters, etc. These castes are represented to a greater extent in 
Mayasandra than in the hamlets. This is largely because members of 
these castes prefer to live with their fellow caste members. While 
many work in the hamlets, Mayasandra offers a more ’cosmopolitan’ 
atmosphere where they are simply another caste rather than a 
subordinate caste to a single dominant caste. Now that trade is 
becoming more important there are advantages in being in Mayasandra so 
as to offer one’s services to people visiting the market.
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A greater number of high caste families would also increase the 
number of service caste families: for example, Brahmans who have to be 
particularly careful to protect their purity, have a greater need for 
service castes such as the washerman and the barber than do other 
castes.
In contrast to Mayasandra the hamlets under study have a simple 
caste structure. Large 'peasant' castes own and farm most of the land. 
Many of the hamlets have only one caste, and with one exception the 
others have only a small minority, usually Harijans, who do not belong 
to the dominant caste. This is largely a consequence of historical 
accident. As Maine pointed out many hamlets consist of the descendants 
of a single founding family. Even if other families moved into the 
village they had to recognise the founding family's property rights to 
the village's land, as gained through the right of first possession. 
The major peasant caste in the hamlets is the Vokkaliga caste, which 
dominates in five of the eight hamlets.
The three exceptions to this Vokkaliga dominance are Dasihalli, 
Tigala Palya and Bommenahalli. Dasihalli is half Muslim, half 
Vokkaliga. Tigala Palya is inhabited by a single low status peasant 
caste, the Tigalarus. Their caste occupation is market gardening 
(Iyer, 1931: Vol 4: 623) and many of them still follow this occupation 
in the growing of betel nuts. Bommenahali is predominantly Lingayat. 
The Lingayats are interesting for they deny the existence of purity and 
impurity yet they have their own caste system. I will discuss this and 
its implications for the jajmani system below.
Services and Payments: Is There a Jajmani System in Mayasandra?
There is no Indigenous concept in Mayasandra equivalent to the 
term, 'jajmani system', though castes do exchange services, or at least
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some families supply their caste services to families of other castes. 
By itself, however, the exchange of caste services does not justify the 
term 'jajmani system1. If jajmani relations did not differ from other 
economic relations, they would simply be an aspect of the wider village 
economy. The justification for using the term the jajmani system and 
investigating it as being worthy of study lies in the belief that 
jajmani relations and their accompanying system of exchange are 
significant in their own right.
To investigate whether inter-caste ties differ from other ties, I 
will first investigate the system of payment, for these have been 
emphasized in most discussions of the jajmani system. Payments in the 
Mayasandra villages are made in three forms: grain, land and cash. All 
three occur in jajmani relationships.
Hadade: Payments in Grain
Harvest payments are known in Kannada as ’hadade’. Unlike jajmani 
payments, hadade is not restricted to caste linked exchanges. It is 
used to pay both caste specialists: eg. the Blacksmiths, Washerman and 
Barbers, and many but not all priests, and to pay village servants: 
e.g. the Neergunty and the Kulvadi.
The Neergunty is responsible to the village administration for 
opening the water gates to irrigate the field (which he does nowadays 
according to the instruction of the government engineer) ensuring that 
water goes to the right fields, and acting as a watchman to protect 
those fields. The Kulvadi undertakes messages and errands for the 
village administration. Though the offices of Neergunty and Kulvadi 
are normally held by Harijan families, they can be.held by middle caste 
families e.g. Srinivas described a middle caste Neergunty (Srinivas 
1976: 128).
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For Dumont, the Barbers and the Washermen are the classical 
jajmani servants as their very existence results from the opposition of 
purity and impurity. Both remove the impure by-products of the body. 
The Barber shaves and cuts the hair of all his Hindu customers once or 
twice a week (a high caste Hindu would be polluted if he cut or shaved 
his hair). The hadade Barber did this outside the houses of his 
customers - to have done the job inside the houses would have polluted 
them (Barbers must always bathe before they return home). The 
Washerman washes and irons all their clothes about once a week. An 
important part of his or rather his wife's job is to wash menstrual 
cloths which are regarded as being particularly impure.
Blacksmiths are the only artisans currently receiving hadade - 
Potters received hadade formerly. Blacksmithery is one of a number of 
caste occupations carried out by the Achar or Panchala caste. As Iyer 
wrote,
The term Panchalas or Panchavalas implies persons 
making up the number five, and the caste covers five 
kinds of handicrafts, namely, (1) work in gold and 
silver, (2) in brass and copper, (3) in iron, (4) in 
carpentry and (5) in sculpture; so that these artisans 
are all of the same caste known under the general name 
of Panchalas although there are shades of difference 
between them according to the locality and spoken 
language. (Iyer Vol 4: 457)
Within the Pancahala caste there are smaller endogamous groupings but
they are not formed along occupational lines.
Gold and silver working, brass and copper working, and sculpting 
are all carried out by specialist families. Sculptors produce 
religious idols. No sculptors live in the Mayasandra area. 
Mayasandra's copper and brass workers or tinkers, are itinerants who 
spend only a few weeks a year there. These . families are paid on a 
casual basis, though the customer provides the raw materials.
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This leaves the two main artisan occupations, ironworking and 
carpentry. While strictly speaking only the former is hadade the 
distinction is often meaningless as most Blacksmiths also do carpentry. 
The making and repairing of agricultural implements (e.g. sickles and 
ploughs) and larger items (e.g. ox-carts) require the skills of both 
carpentry and the ironworking. Therefore, when a blacksmith is paid 
hadade for the making and repairing of agricultural implements he is 
also being paid for his carpentry.
An analytical distinction can, nevertheless, be made between the 
two crafts as those jobs which require more carpentry than ironwork are 
paid for in cash, whereas those where ironwork predominates are paid in 
hadade. This is because ironwork is primarily important in providing 
agricultural implements. While demand for agricultural implements is 
fairly stable, they must be kept in constant repair, throughout the 
agricultural season. The payment for such services reflects this. The 
delayed reciprocity of hadade payments should ensure that the patron’s 
needs come first. Thus the Blacksmith is expected to give priority to 
the maintenance of the landowner's tools. In theory it ensures that 
the patrons' needs come first. In practice only the powerful patron 
can ensure that his needs are met quickly. A patron who cannot control 
his kamins can be forced to pay cash if he desires prompt service. The 
evidence that I have had from older villagers indicates that this is a 
recent development reflecting the breakdown of the moral and legal 
sanctions linking patron and client, or, as Dumont might say, the 
development of individualism.
Carpentry is associated with larger but less urgent demands than 
ironwork: e.g. the building of a cart or house supports. These demands 
are rarely urgent and are usually left for the off-season. There is no 
need to enter into a relation of delayed reciprocity to ensure the
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provision of such services. Indeed, it would be impractical as the 
demand for carpentry is far from constant. It would be extremely 
unfair to both patron and client if remuneration was also fixed. It 
would also be unfair if the payment for carpentry occurred only at 
harvest time for most carpentry is done during the off season: the 
carpenter would then wait almost a year to be paid, whereas the 
blacksmith waits only a few months.
Carpentry and ironworking also differ in that many non-Panchalas 
practise carpentry, either on a full time basis, or more often for 
their own needs. Iron working, in contrast, is a monopoly of the 
smith. This is due to the greater skill needed to undertake ironwork 
than carpentry, and, relatedly, the smith's innate powers, held to be 
necessary for his w o r k . ^
The Barbers, Washermen and Blacksmiths have special duties to
their customers during life cycle rites: e.g. births, deaths and
weddings, and during village festivals as do a number of castes who
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received hadade in the past, e.g. the potters. Indeed, one reason 
for paying hadade is simply to ensure the provision of these ritual 
services. The washerman for one of the Mayasandra hamlets, 
Sorvanahalli, told me that, while he used to wash for the whole 
village, his principal duty now was to lead a procession to the 
'Kangamma' temple, holding a lighted torch. In light of his reduced 
duties, the village lowered his pay from thirty seers per family to 
fifteen. The demand for washing has diminished following the 
widespread acceptance of vegetable-oil-based soaps in recent years. 
Unlike Europeans, Indians were, for religious reasons reluctant to use 
animal-fat-based soaps.
For their ritual services, caste specialists receive, in addition 
to hadade, a remuneration in the form of a gift. Some other
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individuals with a ritual role but who do not get hadade also receive 
such gifts: e.g. dassapas. A corollary of their ritual services is 
that caste specialists receiving hadade do not serve Harijans.
The three castes, Barbers, Washermen and the Blacksmiths are the 
classical jajmani servants, being easily defined, associated with long 
term relationships and receiving harvest payments. However, there are 
a number of ambiguous groups with some but not all of the attributes. 
The most important of these groups are the priests.
Unlike the Barbers, Washermen and Blacksmiths, it cannot be 
assumed that priests are jajmani servants for not all 'priests’ belong 
to priestly castes, though those priests who receive hadade do. There 
are two types of priest in Karnataka, the purohit and the temple 
priest. The purohit for the higher castes is normally a Brahman. He 
formerly had the hereditary right to serve as the domestic priest of 
his clientele (Srinivas 1976: 74) as Brahman purohits would not serve 
Harijans, they relied upon lower castes ’purohits’. For his services 
he was paid in gifts - the amount given was regulated by custom. 
People still prefer to use the hereditary purohit but are no longer 
under an obligation to do so. There has also been a change in payments 
to cash. Neither of these types of payment is hadade, though the 
purohit has many of the characteristics of a jajmani servant.
Temple priests have hereditary responsibilities for a particular
temple or shrine. Every South Indian village has a number of temples
6 3
and shrines dedicated to deities ranging from high Sanskritic Gods to 
village gods and goddesses. The Sanskritic gods are served by high 
caste priests normally Brahmans and Jangamas (a Lingayat priestly 
caste) though in the hamlet of Dassihalli, where there are no Brahmans 
or Jangamas, the Hanumantha temple is served by an alternative 
specialist priestly caste. In contrast, the shrines of the village
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gods and goddesses are not served by priestly castes, but by priestly 
families, of peasant or lower castes. The temple of Mayasandra's 
village goddess was served by a priestly family of the fisherman 
caste.^* ^  The Harijans have separate shrines, and their own 
priests.
Though non-Brahmans serve in village temples, only members of the 
priestly castes, the Brahmans and the Jangamas, receive hadade. One 
reason locals give for this is that the Sanskritic gods receive daily 
pujas, whereas the village gods are approached only during crises, when 
the suppliant makes a sacrifice, or during the periodic festivals, at 
which time everyone makes a donation.
As Edward Harper has noted, Sanskritic gods are worshipped to 
obtain religious merit - ’Merit affects the worshippers karma, his fate 
after death. (Harper 1959: 229b)’ The village gods are worshipped to 
overcome the periodic crises of this life.
Although, as Harper argued, villagers enter into permanent 
relationships with all deities, Sanskritic gods require a more 
continuous commitment to dharma, both in executing one’s duty in daily 
life and in displays of devotion to the gods. The village gods have a 
more direct relationship to their followers, in that they make it 
clear, by bringing on a pestistence, for example, when they need 
obeisance.
Studies by Srinivas and Epstein indicate that a number of other
castes in Karnataka once received harvest payments. Srinivas noted,
Formerly, in Rampura, it was customary for two 
families, one belonging to the upper caste and the 
other to the Untouchable caste, to be linked in a 
master-servant relationship.(66) The servant was 
called the halemaga (old son) of the master. The 
servant family had certain duties on ritual and social 
occasions, e.g., at a wedding in the master's family, 
the servant had to present a pair of sandals to the 
bridegroom. The servant family was paid a quantity of 
paddy and straw at the harvest. In addition, it had
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the right to the carcass of any cow or bullock which 
died in the master’s house.(67)
Nowadays, Untouchables are beginning to refuse to 
perform these and other tasks as they are considered to 
be degrading. But the upper castes want the practice 
to continue and there is friction.
Formerly, it seems that entire sub-castes occupying a 
very low position in the hierarchy were attached as 
halemagas to certain sub-castes occupying a relatively 
high position. Thus we find a man of a high caste 
saying that "formerly such and such sub-castes were 
halemagas to us. They are no longer so!"
(Srinivas, 1960: 28)
Epstein referred to such payments as still occurring in the 
village of Wangala, both during her 1955 study (Epstein, 1962) and in 
her 1970 revisit (Epstein, 1973: 217). She argued that in return for a 
small amount of grain the halemaga families had to work for their 
patron when required (for which they received an additional daily 
remuneration): for example, during the busier parts of the growing 
season. This provided security for both farmer and halemaga (Epstein, 
1962: 181). ---
This was a quite different view of halemaga from that of Srinivas.
According to him the halemaga provided a restricted range of ritual
services closely tied to his caste occupation. Epstein, however,
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included agricultural labour, an occupation open to all castes.
The difference between Srinivas and Epstein may be that halemaga 
still existed in Wangala, but not in Rampura. One wonders, however, if 
Epstein did not idealise her field data. While Epstein still found 
halemaga in Wangala in 1970, Srinivas, a very precise fieldworker, 
found no trace of it in 1948. Although Epstein’s views were supported 
by one writer, Iyer, one might note that Iyer’s work was published in 
1931, and his project, the compilation of a caste and tribe gazetteer 
was started some years earlier. When he stated that halemaga still
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remained in some rural areas, he was referring to the 1920s and quite 
possibly earlier.
Srinivas was of the opinion that halemaga had not been an 
important institution since before World War I (Srinivas, 1955: 27). I 
have no evidence of halemanga in the Mayasandra region; nor do the 
older people say that they remember such a system. The Harijans admit 
to having removed the carcasses of cattle from the houses of higher 
castes in the past. They expressed this in general terms - that they, 
as Adi Kamatakas (A.K.s) or Adi Dravidas (A.D.s) (the two Harijan 
castes), were responsible for removing all dead cattle, rather than 
having to do so for a particular master. For them, the responsibility 
to remove dead cattle was not just an obligation, it was also a right. 
They had rights to the skin which was used for leather working, and to 
the meat (hence the A.K.s traditional name Madiga - leatherworker - 
more generally Harijans are known as scavengers). In return they would 
have to present the cow's owners with some remuneration, e.g. a pair of 
sandals made from the leather. Apparently, this right was given up, 
under pressure from social and religious reformers. In Mayasandra the 
A.K.s say an A.K. holyman persuaded them to give up beef (the 
scavenging of beef from carcasses is closely associated with the 
Harijans' low position). This may have been the occasion when the 
removing of carcasses was relinquished. My data is scanty and 
incomplete because the practice terminated some years ago and there is 
great confusion over the details: e.g. the landowners claim to have had 
greater rights over the carcasses than the Harijans allow.
Wangala might have been a very 'traditional' village but 
nevertheless I suspect that Epstein exaggerated the strength of 
halemaga in Wangala, in contrasting it with the more progressive 
village of Dalena. Mandya District, in which the villages of Wangala
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and Dalena were situated, was the site of a major irrigation project in 
the 1930s. Epstein noted that residents of Wangala, whose land was 
irrigated by this project, benefitted by it without being forced to 
change their ways. In contrast the residents of Dalena, whose land 
remained dry were forced to adapt to the new conditions, by going out 
and acting as entrepreneurs in wet villages, if they were to receive 
the project's benefits. One might note, however, that in Srinivas' 
Rampura, halemaga had broken down in the period following the 
introduction of irrigation.
Although it is against my intuition and the evidence of Srinavas' 
Rampura, the impact of irrigation may have resulted in an exaggeratedly 
conservative society being developed. Epstein argued that irrigation 
failed to alter the basic social and economic relations thus allowing 
older institutions to survive. It is possible, however, that 
irrigation caused a greater need for such an 'ancient' institution as 
halemaga giving it a new importance and even leading to It changing its 
nature. Irrigation would have increased the seasonal demand for 
labour. For hard pressed farmers it would have become more important 
than it ever had been to be able to train labour when necessary. 
Farmers might have been willing to pay for this privilege. Despite my 
doubts, halemaga, at least as described by Srinivas, presumably did 
once exist in the Mayasandra area.
Inam: Payments in Land
Inam is the main non-monetary alternative to grain payments. 
Polly Hill defined inam as 'any official grant made by the government 
for religious or charitable purposes or to individuals in respect of 
services rendered for any other reason' (Hill, 1982: 257). The 
religious reasons included helping poor Brahmans, aiding Brahman
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scholars in their studies and devotions and supporting temples (and 
indirectly their p r i e s t s ) . ^
A wide variety of secular services were paid in inam. In North 
India, under the Mogul rulers, governors and generals received inam in 
return for providing their services, men and materials to the State. 
Inam was also granted to encourage village development. Buchanan cited 
such a case,
When a rich man builds [a reservoir] in order to 
acquire a name and reputation, it is customary to give 
him and his heirs, free of rent, one-tenth part of the 
land which the reservoir waters, and also for every 
candaca of watered land thus formed, he obtains free of 
'rent, six Seers sowing of Ragy-land, which amounts to 
about 146 acres of dry field for every 1,000 acres of 
that which is irrigated. So long as he enjoys these, 
he is bound to keep the tank in repair. If the 
reservoir be very large and expensive, the man who 
builds it and his heirs have over a fourth of the land 
which it waters; but then they get no dry-field. When 
the family of the original builder becomes extinct, the 
government resumes the free lands, and keeps the tank 
in repair. (Buchanan, 1807, Vol. 1: 279)
More commonly, inam land was given to village servants and
artisans who worked in the village. Buchanan commented,
In every village there are some free-lands that pay no 
rent. In this district there are free-lands to the 
annual value of seventy-eight Pagodas, which formerly 
belonged to the Panchangas, or village astrologers; but 
since Tipoo' s death they have been given to Vaidika 
Brahmans. They formerly had many villages entirely 
belonging to them, which were reassumed by Tipoo, and 
have not yet been given back. The same is the case 
with the lands that formerly belonged to the temple.
The Talliari of each village, who is a kind of watchman 
and beadle, has as pay, from twenty to thirty Farnams 
worth of land free from rent. Here this officer 
performs the annual sacrifice to the village gods...The 
hereditary banda [village headman] and iron smith had 
each a portion of land, for which they paid only half 
rent. The full tax was imposed on these lands by 
Tipoo, and is still continued.(71) 7_
(Buchanan, 1807, Vol. 2: 110)
In Karnataka, until recently, the government recognised five
village officials as village servants. They were paid in a mixture of
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inam and ’jjotgi’ . According to the Tumkur Gazetteer,
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Until a few years ago, the village establishment in the 
old Mysore area consisted of five hereditary offices, 
i.e. those of Patel (village headman), Shambhogue 
(village accountant), Talari (village scout), Hioti 
(village watchman) and Nirgunti (distributor of water 
from irrigation tanks). The remuneration of the Patel 
and the Shanbhogue consisted of Inam lands subject to 
jodi of full assessment and cash allowances called 
potgi on the basis of the land revenue demand. The 
other village servants received a certain quantity of 
grain from each cultivator and certain cash payments 
from non-agriculturalists in addition to the 
remuneration by rent-free or lightly assessed lands.
These hereditary offices were, however, abolished by 
the Mysore Village Offices Abolition Act, 1961, which 
came into force throughout the state on 1st February 
1963. Under the provisions of this Act in the place of 
Shanbhogues, Village Accountants have been appointed as 
full-time Government servants on a salaried basis.
They are required to perform such other duties also as 
may be entrusted to them by the Tahsildar or the Deputy 
Commissioner. The present incumbents of the post of 
Patels and other village offices are, however, being 
continued for the time-being without hereditary rights.
The Patels get an annual remuneration equivalent to the 
potgi which they were receiving prior to the abolition 
of their hereditary offices. (M.S.G.T.D.: 340)
This is a description of village officers as codified by the 
British. It is noteworthy that Wilks' description of village servants 
written prior to 1874, made no distinction between village officials 
who worked for the government and artisans who also received inam land. 
Government codification tends to obscure the fact that both types of 
village servant received their inam grants from the village headman. 
This latter point is expressed by Janet Benson (1977: 24) and Paul 
Hiebert (1971: 92) with regard to Karnataka's eastern neighbour, Andhra 
Pradesh. Benson (1977: 248) added that 'land may also be granted by 
large landlords'. Hiebert and Benson were describing villages in the 
old Hyderabad Princely State, a notoriously conservative State. The 
codification which occurred in Mysore State (in 1874 under British 
rule) may never have occurred there.
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According to Paul G. Hiebert, service caste recipients of inam
land, had to execute services for the village administration. This
system was called begar, and the workers concerned were called begaris.
Leatherworker begaris attend government officials 
passing through on duty. When an official camps 
outside the village, the begaris show up to draw his 
water, collect firewood, and, in general, serve his 
needs. At his departure they carry his luggage to the 
next village. They also carry chains for the survey 
teams and perform tasks for the local government.
These services entitle them to the use of seventy-five 
acres of gift land. Twenty-three Weaver families 
currently share beggar rights as village watchmen and 
messengers. One or two men sleep before the houses of 
the village officials at night while others patrol the 
village and report disturbances to the police patel.
Passing officials use them to summon individuals for 
private audiences or to announce public meetings in the 
village square. In the past other caste services were 
needed: Washermen to launder the clothing of passing 
officials, Barbers to cut their hair and trim their 
lamps, Potters to provide cooking utensils, and 
Ironsmiths and Carpenters to furnish the necessary 
furniture and tools. These, too, have gift lands.
(Hiebert, 1971: 93-4)
Inam grants also helped to ensure that the village had access to
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the full range of services deemed necessary for a proper 'community'. 
Here again inam was used to encourage development.
In theory, inam only involved usufruct rights, normally for the 
period during which specific services were carried out, but as Srinivas 
pointed out,
...after the lapse of a generation or two such property 
tends to be treated as the private property of the 
donee. The village priest of Rampura, for instance, 
sold a portion of his land a few months before I 
started work in the village. And it is very common, if 
not universal, for such property to be divided, like 
any other property of a joint family, among the heirs 
of the deceased person. (Srinivas, 1955: 12)
The most distinctive feature of inam land was that it was subject 
to either little or no tax. When land was more easily available and 
taxes were higher, this was probably the major attraction of inam.
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I have referred to inam in the past tense as the legal position of 
inam has changed in recent times. The Zamindari Abolition Bill 
abolished the larger inams (Hill 1982: 259), by removing their tax-free 
status and redistributing their land (M.S.G.T.D.). Village Servant 
inams were abolished by the Mysore Village Offices Abolition Act of 
1961. This replaced the hereditary village servants with government 
appointed officials. In return they (the hereditary village servants) 
were given full rights of ownership to their land, as were all tenants 
under the various tenancy and land reform bills.^
Non-inam payments in land also occurred. Srinivas noted that 
occasionally a faithful servant was given land (for the duration of his 
service) (Srinivas, 1955: 11). Srinivas also noted, as being 
intermediate between grain payments and payments in land, 'the payment 
of a crop growing on a piece of land’ (Srinivas, 1955: 11). Although I 
do not know of such payments still occurring in Karnataka, I am told 
that they are still common in neighbouring Tamil Nadu. Here there is a 
type of farm servant (farm labourers employed on a permanent basis) 
called the adiyal. Adiyals are given the produce of a third of an acre 
of land in return for which they have to present themselves to work 
whenever their employer demands it. On these days they are paid four 
rupees and are provided with two meals. On days when their services 
are not required by their employer they are free to work elsewhere. I 
will discuss farm servants and their remuneration further.
Payments in Money
The third form of payment is money. Cash is used extensively for 
ad hoc payments. Traders normally work in cash, though they will 
sometimes accept grain. Similarly, artisans like the goldsmith who are 
not paid in grain, are normally paid in cash. Even many Barbers,
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Washermen and Blacksmiths will nowadays work for ad hoc payments in
c a s h . ^  Nor is this a recent phenomenon for, as Chris Fuller^ pointed
out, though taxation could be paid in grain, Indian governments
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following the Moghuls preferred to be paid in coin. To raise this 
cash farmers had to sell up to fifty percent or more of their harvest 
to merchants.^
In addition to ad hoc payments in cash, 'gift payment', as I noted 
before, can also be made in cash or kind. Furthermore, cash payments 
can be used in some longer term ties. The most important of these 
involves 'jita servantship'.
Most agricultural labourers are employed on a casual basis and are
paid daily. A minority known as farm servants, however, are employed
on a long term basis. Unlike halemaga servants, they are normally paid
in cash, nowadays. The simplest way of paying farm servants and the
one adopted for most adult workers, is monthly payments. However, the
master is expected to make loans or advances if they are desired. Even
when farm servants receive regular payments they can be and often are
paid in advance. In this case credits and debits may be entered on a
ledger. The loans are symptomatic of the patron and client
relationship involved, serving to express and maintain that
relationship. In its more highly developed state, this relationship
takes the form of jita servantship, the type of farm servantship
dominant amongst juveniles. A detailed description of jita servantship
was given by Srinivas,
'Jita servantship' may be termed "contractual" 
servantship, to mark it off from traditional 
servantship.(80) Under it a poor man contracts to 
serve a wealthier man from one to three years. The 
terms of the service, including the wages to be paid by 
the master, are usually reduced to writing. The master 
advances, at the beginning of the service, a certain 
sum of money to the servant or his guardian, and this 
is worked off by the servant. Usually no interest is 
charged on the advance unless the servant tries to run
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away or otherwise break the contract. The sum paid is 
exclusive of food and clothing which it is the master’s 
duty to provide. Frequently, before the period of the 
service runs out, the servant or his guardian borrows 
another sum of money and thus prolongs the' service.
Formerly it was not unknown for a man to spend all his 
working life between ten and seventy years of age in 
the service of one master. In one case a servant lived 
with his joint family, numbering over a dozen in the 
house of his master, who was also an agnatic kinsman.
On the death of the servant the corpse was accorded the 
honour of a burial in the master's land, near the 
graves of the master's ancestors.
Some members of most castes in Rampura are involved in 
contractual servantship, either as servants or as 
masters. In 1948 there were fifty-eight servants in 
Rampura. These servants came from every caste except 
the Brahman and Lingayat castes, and included fourteen 
Untouchables. Masters were found in every caste 
excepting in the Untouchable caste, which ranks at the 
bottom, and in the Smith castes, whose members are 
assisted at their work by relations and customers.
Hindus and Muslims are bound together by contractual 
servantship, for Muslim masters invariably employed 
Hindus as servants while Muslim servants served only 
Hindu masters.
The bond between master and servant is intimate. 
Contractual servantship is often only one of the bonds 
prevailing between the two families. Sometimes a 
master employs a man as tenant on condition that he 
agrees to having his son or younger brother work as 
servant in the master's house. (Srinivas, 1955: 27-8)
The key term in this statment is 'contractual'. In theory, to use 
Maine's terminology, jajmani relations are based on status, but jita 
servantship is based on contract.
For families without capital, particularly land, jita service is 
one of the few ways to raise loans, e.g. to buy food, or to pay for a 
marriage. A boy may be contracted out either to pay for his own 
marriage costs, including bridewealth or to pay his sister's including 
her dowry (in recent decades there has been a change from paying 
bridewealth to dowry: in the lower castes where jita servantship is 
most prevalent bridewealth predominated until very recently). Jita 
servants who work for a-number of years for a master, expect him to 
help arrange their marriage and to help pay for it. Although the
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master is often of a different caste than his jita servants, he usually 
has better contacts. Furthermore, he will be in an influential 
position with many families which have eligible daughters.
In the past, the reverse could operate. If a debt had not been 
paid and an adult jita servant without sons died, the master could give 
the servants’ daughters away in marriage, and receive the presents that 
are usually given on such occasions, unless these should exceed the 
amount of the debt’ (Buchanan, 1807, Vol. 1: 124-5) (in the last thirty 
years dowry has replaced brideprice in Karnataka - for Harijans this 
change has occurred only in the last ten years). The reliance of 
landless families on jita servantship has increased, as the breakdown 
of most forms of patron-client relationship has meant that patrons are 
increasingly reluctant to lend large amounts of money to their clients.
Another economic reason for jita servantship derives from the
system of payments for daily labour and helps to explain why most jita
servants are juveniles. In the Mayasandra region daily wages are fixed
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for each sex (jobs are largely segregated), irrespective of age or 
ability. This means that those who are less productive will only be 
employed when there is a strong demand for their services. Jita 
servantship overcomes this because the jita servant’s remuneration is 
fixed by agreement between patron and servant (or by the servant's 
father). It is generally renegotiated every year, usually with a new 
master. The remuneration is less than daily labour but it is secure 
and it comes with board, clothing and other help; for example, help 
with marriage costs, in return for which the servant will have to work 
longer for his master.
I can illustrate this by giving the example of an A.K. man living 
in the Mayasandra hamlet of Vittalapura. He started working at 10 
years of age. For his first year he was paid 30 rupees plus two sets
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of clothing each year, three meals a day, and shelter. The next two 
years were spent with a new landlord who paid him 50 rupees annually, 
two sets of clothing per year, three meals daily and shelter. For the 
next five years he worked for a landlord who gave him 60 rupees plus 
his previous benefits. His last employer paid him for the first two 
years 150 rupees plus previous benefits. For his last year he received 
the same payment and benefits but he stopped living at his master’s 
house. This was because he had married. He said that he had changed 
masters purely to increase his wages. Prior to his marriage the money 
was taken in advance by his father. His master had helped in his 
marriage by advancing 400 rupees; 600 had been raised by his father 
selling land; while 1,000 was raised through the parents’ savings. So 
the jita servant’s marriage cost his parents more than the earnings 
that he had contributed to them.
From the master’s point of view there are two advantages in jita 
servantship. These are that he obtains cheap and more importantly 
’flexible’ labour. As the jita servant is virtually a member of the 
master's household he can be used for tasks which normal labour could 
not or would not undertake: for example, he may be sent on an urgent 
errand in the night, or a young boy might be sent out all day to look 
after the cattle. Furthermore, he can generally be trusted to a 
greater degree than ordinary labour (after all he has more to lose if 
he does not behave correctly). Therefore jita servants are used to 
help in the supervision of others.
The third party for whom jita servantship has advantages is the 
jita servant's parents. It allows them to control their son, through 
his earnings, as they receive the 'loans’ involved. Furthermore, the 
discipline imparted by the master would be regarded by most parents as 
being no bad thing. This is a further reason why few girls and adults
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are jita servants. Being under the control of other people means that 
a jita servant lacks the full status of an ’independent' adult. For 
adults this is demeaning. For girls, jita service would render them 
open to accusations of immorality, particularly as jita servants live 
in their master's house. However, an equivalent informal status does 
sometimes exist for girls. If women in a household desire domestic 
help, they can employ a girl, usually a poor relative (her father will 
probably be paid something, perhaps 50 rupees). A girl of a low caste 
cannot be employed as she would pollute the house and particularly the 
kitchen in which she worked.
The point that arises clearly out of the two preceding paragraphs 
is that the ’contract’ of jita servants is not purely economic. 
Epstein characterised jita servantship as serf labour. The jita is a 
bond ’expressed in an idiom of indebtedness’ (Epstein, 1962: 75). That 
is the bond is more important than the loan itself.
That an economic relationship should provide a cover for a social 
relationship is reminiscent of Dumont’s use of the term prestation for 
jajmani payments. The jita servant owes his master a debt, just as 
according to Dumont the jajman and kamin through their asymmetrical 
exchange continually try to recompense each other. However, the 
essence of a prestation is the fact that neither side can ever truly 
acquit its debt to the other side. Prestations and counter-prestations 
cannot be equivalent. Equivalence implies a market which judges their 
value, a market which in fact does not exist precisely because of the 
social nature of the relationship involved. There is always a residue 
of unacquitted debt in the relationships which is precisely what 
cements the social ties of the two parties involved. Unlike 
prestations, jita payments are part of the market economy. They are 
negotiable between the servant and the master willing to pay the
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highest price. The relationship between master and servant involves a 
payment not a prestation. Though the jita tie is a long-term 
relationship, it is not permanent. Prestations involve permanent 
relationships because they cannot be acquitted. Since loans can be 
acquitted, a long-term relationship only is formed, which, in theory, 
may be terminated at any time.
However, while jita implies contract not status today, this was 
less true in the past. Then, there was little pretence of a simple 
economic contract between jita servant and patron. The use of a bond 
obscured a status relationship. This type of jita, I shall call 
’bonded labour' to distinguish it from the modern more contractual form 
of jita. As bonded labour proper was outlawed in 1915 (Epstein, 1962: 
75), descriptions of it rely upon historical accounts (all types of 
jita servantship were outlawed in Karnataka in 1975 - this has not 
ended it, but it has discouraged it in the bigger villages like
Mayasandra).
82
Dubois noted at the beginning of the nineteenth century,
well-to-do cultivators always employ men of this class, 
and, in order to keep them in perpetual bondage, they 
lend them money either on the occasion of a marriage or 
for other purposes. The poor wretches find themselves, 
on account of their small wages, quite unable to pay 
back their capital thus advanced, and in many cases 
even the interest, which soon exceeds the original 
loan, and are therefore reduced to the necessity of 
working, with their wives and children, until the end 
of their days. From the time this happens their 
masters look upon them as actual slaves, and refuse to 
grant them manumission until they have repaid both the 
principal and interest of the sum which they or their 
fathers borrowed perhaps twenty or thirty years 
before.(83) (Dubois, 1928: 82)
Dubois treated bonded labour as though it were the result of 
unscrupulous landowners entrapping gullible or desperate men into 
unpayable debts. Yet, although bonded labour did result in a loss of 
freedom for the landowner, it is unlikely that the relationship between
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the patron and the bonded labourer can be attributed to the loan
itself, rather the loan reflected or even was symbolic of the
relationship involved. Buchanan described a system of bonded labour
where the loan ’underlying’ the bond was unrelated to payments made to
the client. It was merely a token payment which operated as an
expression of the relation involved.
The hire of farmers’ labourers at Seringatam, and 
generally within two miles from the city, when employed 
throughout the year, is 10 Sultany Fanams, or 6s. 8$d. 
a month. The servant lives in his own house, and it is 
customary for the master, on extraordinary occasions, 
such as marriages, to advance the servant money. This 
is not deducted from his wages by gradual instalments; 
but it is considered as a debt, that must be repaid 
before the servant can leave his place. In case of the 
servant’s death, his sons are bound to pay the debt, or 
to continue to work with their father’s master, and, if 
there be no sons, the master can give the daughters 
away in marriage, and receive the presents that are 
usually given on such occasions, unless these should 
exceed the amount of the debt.
(Buchanan, 1807, Vol. 1: 124-5)
This form of bonded labour is strikingly reminiscent of halemaga 
as described by Epstein. The client was obliged to provide his patron 
with labour when the latter needed it. The loan represented this 
relationship between the client and the patron. It would be 
interesting to know whether this relationship like halemaga was caste 
specific.
Epstein has also commented on bonded labour. Unlike Buchanan, she 
described a form of bonded labour where the bond was directly tied to 
the payments,
the poorest peasants borrowed money from the wealthier 
and, if they were unable to pay even the interest on 
the debt, they had to work off their debt by service to 
the creditor. There was no fixed salary for 
’jeeta’(84) servants, which made them cumulatively more 
and more indebted to their patrons so that generations 
of ’jeeta’ servants in Wangala, though there is still 
the practice of working off one’s debt, but nowadays 
servants are paid a fixed wage.
(Epstein, 1962: 75)
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For Epstein, like Dubois, the bonded labourer had been enticed 
into bondage through the offer of a loan, but with the added duplicity 
by the landlord who by refusing to pay fixed wages made it impossible 
for the labourer to have any chance of paying off his debt. However, 
this is taking the analogy of contemporary jita servantship too far. 
Non-fixed payments indicate an entirely different relationship between 
the landlord and the bonded servant. The relationship involved was a 
tight patron-client relationship where the client contributed his 
services and in return depended upon the protection of his patron. 
This type of relationship has been analysed most succinctly by Jan 
Breman (1974) for hali, the prevalent form of bonded labour in Gujarat.
Although Breman accepted that halis lack independence, he 
questioned whether it was uncontrolled debt which had led to their 
circumstances. He argued that in pre-modern India, economic scarcity 
meant that a hali was better off than an unattached labourer.
Breman argued that far from the hali attempting to end his
servitude by paying off his bond, he (and his patron) regarded his
borrowing as his income. Therefore, the hali attempted to increase his
debt, not reduce it. It was the patron who tried to keep the loans to
a 'manageable' level. The master, of course, did not keep an accurate
record of the debt owed to him. No doubt this acted to bond the hali
more securely to his patron, but this would have been unnecessary as
the halis regard the bond as being in their interests. It did,
however, allow the master to act as patron by exaggerating his
benificence and thus to emphasise the hali's dependence. As Breman put
it, it allowed the master 'to behave like a patron' (Breman, 1974: 60).
It is...more than doubtful that the hali strove to end 
his attachment. His being coerced to work is usually 
inferred from the condition that the servant was not 
allowed to leave his master as long as he was indebted 
to him. But the debt was rather fictitious in 
character and, if only for this reason, the term of
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debt slavery applied to this form of servitude is not 
very felicitous. Not only was repayment merely 
theoretical on account of the hali’s minimal 
remuneration, but it was not envisaged by either of the 
parties.
For the master the expense involved in the beginning of 
the service relationship was an investment he had to 
make in order to obtain the services of a farm servant.
He did, however, try to keep this debt within 
reasonable limits, as he well knew he could not recall 
it. The hali, on the other hand, did his best to 
maximize it, and tried to get something out of his 
master as often as he could. That his dependence thus 
increased did not trouble him in the least. In view of 
his slender chances of finding work as an unattached 
labourer, repayment of his debt in order to end his 
bondage was the last thing he wanted. In short 
servitude was sought rather than avoided by Dublas.(85)
So much was labour compulsion regarded as fundamental 
to bondage that some authors found it surprizing that 
the halis were in no way inferior to the other Dublas.
Not only were they not held in contempt, a Dubla was 
even gratified if his daughter married one. Only then 
could he be sure she was provided for.
The option held by a master on the son of his farm 
servant also applied the other way around. Continuance 
of the tie from generation to generation was contingent 
upon the approval of the hali and his descendants. For 
them it was as much a right as a duty to succeed their 
fathers as farm servants. The initiative to begin the 
relation was taken by both parties, and it was in the 
interest of both to maintain it. (Breman, 1974: 44-5)
The hali received a regular wage from his patron only when there 
was work. At other times he depended upon the ’generosity' of his 
patron.
The master did not have employment for his servants 
throughout the year, certainly not for all of them.
When there was little or no work for a hali he was 
allowed to work for someone else and keep his earnings.
Yet it was precisely in the slack period that other 
landowners needed little extra labour. At first the 
hali lived on the credit he had saved up, withdrawing 
only so much grain from his daily allowance as he 
really needed for food. The rest remained to his 
account, but he could never save enough to bridge the 
whole of the slack period. When his reserve was 
exhausted - and it did not last long, the master being 
the only one who kept book - he was allocated a 
quantity of grain, an advance payment which was now 
called khavati (literally, to eat). At the end of the 
rainy season the account was made up and the balance he
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owed was added to his total debt. Illness and other 
accidental circumstances caused the servant to be even 
more deeply indebted to his master, and repayment was 
obviously out of the question. (Breman, 1974: 42)
Breman compared a hali’s borrowings to a kamin's livelihood:
...the hali could claim total though extremely sparing 
support from his master. As a kamin received his grain 
allowance irrespective of the service he had performed, 
so the hali was not remunerated on the basis of his 
merits but on that of his needs, which were rated low 
indeed. There being no contractual agreement related 
to a market situation, the allowance of the farm 
servant was not very flexible. This allowance - a more 
accurate term than ’wage ’ - was paid largely in kind 
and remained at the same minimal level throughout the 
last century. (Breman, 1974: 59)
The hali did not receive an economic wage from an employer but the
protection of a patron,
providing for the material needs of his farm servant 
was not the only obligation of the master. The 
protection offered by the Anavil to his hali reached 
far beyond giving him a living: he had to guarantee his 
existence in a much wider sense. This meant that the 
master should defend the social interests of his 
servant and that he was held responsible to some extent 
for all the actions of his subordinate. Consequently, 
the hali of a prominent Anavil(86) patron was assured 
of a reasonable amount of security and protection. For 
his part, he had to behave loyally, that is, do nothing 
that might provoke the displeasure of his master.
Should conflicts arise, he was expected to take his 
master's side, even if it meant opposing his fellow 
caste members, the Dubla clients of the other Anavils.
(Breman, 1974: 60)
Though Breman’s study was confined to Gujarat, it helps to explain 
the bond of bonded labour In Karnataka. Furthermore, it suggests an 
explanation for Epstein's claim that bonded labourers did not receive 
fixed wages: they were receiving an allowance not a wage. Conversely 
it suggests an explanation for Buchanan’s statement that the loan was 
separate from the bonded servant’s wages. The hali too received a 
separate wage when they were working. It was when they lacked work 
that they became indebted. Far from describing different types of 
bonded labour, Buchanan and Epstein may have been discussing different
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aspects of the same bonded labour, respectively when work was available 
and when it was not.
Bonded labour (in its older and more complete form) then, had many
of the characteristics of the jajmani system, in practice if not in
theory. As in the jajmani system payments were removed from, at least,
the direct influence of the market. Relations between patron and
client were governed, as Maine might have said, by the status of the
two sides rather than by a contract between them. Although in theory,
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bonded labour did not have the 'permanent1 relationship of jajmani 
where both sides were obliged to continue the tie, in practice it often 
had the characteristics of it. The bonded servant could not easily 
withdraw from the relationship even if he so wanted. The relationship 
could not be ended by paying off the loan. Similarly the master was 
expected to carry on his patronage of his client.
Nevertheless, the kamin is part of a permanent relationship with 
a recognised position vis-a-vis the jajman. He has very specific 
rights whereas the bonded labourer is dependent upon his patron's sense 
of 'noblesse oblige'.
Furthermore, neither the bonded labourer nor the jita servant gave 
his services as a representative of his caste. Though bonded labour 
was most common among low castes as was indicated by Buchanan's 
statement that 'by far the greater part [of the Whalliarus, a Harijan 
caste] are yearly servants or Batigaru (Buchanan 1807 Vol.l: 314)' 
(Buchanan used the term battigaru for bonded servants), they could 
come, as Buchanan also remarked, from all communities barring Brahmans 
and Muslims (Buchanan 1807 Vol.l: 298). Thus, while bonded labour 
reflected a society where status rather than contract was basic, it 
could not be explained in terms of the caste system.
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Hadade, Inam and Money Payments Compared
The 'customary’ payments of hadade and land are used for a much 
wider range of services than just the 'jajmani' services performed by 
castes. Conversely, many caste services are paid for in cash. That 
is, the form of the payment does not neatly correlate with the nature 
of the services being remunerated.
Grain, land and cash serve as equivalent payments for many 
purposes. Even today grain can be substituted for cash: for example, a 
pot might be bought with a measure of grain or a day's labour might be 
paid in grain. Even grants of land can be equivalent to payments in 
cash. Srinivas' example of devoted farm servants receiving the use of 
land is a relevant case for farm servants are normally paid in cash or 
kind.
Similarly, government grants of inam land are more like grain 
payments than they appear at first sight. Payment in land was formerly 
a convenient way to pay for services. Villages lacked central 
graineries or treasuries as these would have required an unnecessarily 
complex organisation. Land payments by the village were simpler than 
making each farmer pay village servants separately. Furthermore, land 
payments served to emphasise ties with the village administration, for 
which the village servants were working. It is symptomatic that the 
modern bureaucratic State has replaced payment in land with cash wages. 
For the State, cash is more convenient and facilitates direct control 
over village officials. Wage payments manifest the officials' 
dependence on the State.
Village servants who did not work for the whole village were often 
paid separately by those landowners who needed their services. 
Neerguntees, for instance, could either be paid in inam land from the 
village or in grain from wet land farmers. Some areas have moved from
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paying Neerguntees in land to paying them in grain. When the 
government replaced the old system of hereditary village servants with 
directly paid functionaries, it failed to replace the lower village 
servants including the Neerguntees. In areas where the Neergunty was 
paid in land some landowners have started paying them in grain. Other 
landowners have relied on the moral obligation of Neerguntees to supply 
their services free (deriving from their occupation of ex-inam land). 
This moral pressure is encouraged by social and economic pressures from 
the landowners.
In contrast to the case of the Neerguntees, it would have been 
impracticable for farmers to pay kamins and village servants in land. 
Farm servants rarely received land either as a reward or to ensure 
their services.
There are few major differences between payments in land, grain or 
cash. Land and grain payments offer more security than cash payments. 
Land payments offer security because they involve direct control of the 
principal resource, land. Individuals are still subject to the 
vagaries of the harvest, but at least they have control over what 
produce there is. Grain offers less but still valuable security, for 
during famines, when the little that it obtainable is available only at 
exorbitant prices, grain is preferable to money. Srinivas noted that 
payments in land and grain were much more prestigious than payments in 
cash. This presumably reflected the degree of access to land and the 
resultant security.
The major difference between the three types of payment, grain, 
land and cash, is not that land and grain payments are associated with 
jajmani ties but that they are associated with permanent ties. Dumont 
noted,
for the usual tasks, repayment is in kind: it is not 
made individually for each particular prestation but is
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spread over the whole year, as is natural for a 
permanent relationship in an agricultural setting: a 
little food may be provided each day, and there is 
always the right to a fixed quantity of grain at 
harvest time, and finally there are obligatory presents 
(often of money) on the occasion of the main festivals 
of the year and, above all, at the major family 
ceremonies, which are advantageous occasions for the 
praja of the house. (Dumont, 1980: 98-9)
A permanent relation is a type of long-term tie, involving
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open-ended relations between two parties (in this case families). 
Permanent relations differ from other long-term ties in that they are 
more institutionalised, with strong rights and obligations on both 
sides. In jajmani relations this is expressed by the obligatory 
presents on festival occasions.
Long-term relations like permanent ties do not require payments in 
harvest grain or land. Such a tie can be established by a bond. 
Nevertheless, long-term ties are suited to payments, which involve 
rights to produce for an extensive period of at least one season. 
Grain payments are also suited to Dumont’s concept of prestations. The 
farmer gives his product, grain, in return for the skills of the 
artisan.
Despite the impression given Dumont, permanent relations were not 
restricted to jajmani relations. Village servants such as Neergunties 
who were not kamins also had permanent relations, either with the 
village administration or with other villagers. Furthermore, Dumont’s 
(1980: 98-90) assertions about grain payments apply equally well to 
many long-term arrangements: for example, farm servants can be paid in 
harvest grain (or in land).
This raises the question as to whether the existence of payments 
in harvest grain proves the existence of jajmani relations. The short 
answer is that they do to the extent that long-term ties are associated 
with harvest payments, and jajmani relations are one type of such ties.
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To equate grain payments directly with jajmani ties is misleading for 
the reasons outlined above. Many writers nevertheless had reasons for 
doing so. A writer who used a particularly narrow definition of 
jajmani payments was Epstein. She wrote that in the jajmani system, 
'rewards are paid annually in the form of fixed quantities of farming 
produce' (Epstein, 1967: 230). Epstein's definition of jajmani 
payments was more restricted than most for she was attempting to 
analyse the economic rationale behind jajmani payments. To do this she 
ignored many characteristics which for Wiser and Dumont were evidence 
that the jajmani system was contrary to strict economic rationalism. 
There are other reasons for the recent more restricted definition of 
jajmani payments. One is that grain payments are the most obvious 
phenomenon to investigate as an indication of the existence of jajmani 
relations. A second is that the abolition of zamindari tenure means 
that many of the other characteristics which Wiser attributed to the 
jajmani system are now absent. Harvest payments nevertheless do not 
prove the existence of jajmani ties.
115
CHAPTER 4: THE SEARCH FOR A SYSTEM
The key question becomes what precisely were the distinguishing 
characteristics of jajmani payments, and jajmani relations. The 
receipt of gift payments by kamins is one distinctive characteristic of 
many jajmani ties. Nevertheless, such ’gifts’ are not unique to 
jajmani relationships. These payments are also made to Dassapas and 
others. Thus ’gifts’ cannot be used to define jajmani payments.
Livelihood and the Denial of the Market Economy
The concept which distinguished jajmani relations from other 
economic ties was, for Wiser, ’livelihood’. The concept explained what 
he, as well as Lewis and Dumont, regarded as the chief characteristic 
of jajmani relations, the lack of a normal economic contract.
For Wiser jajmani payments were independent of market forces,
being affected by social and ideological considerations more than
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economic considerations.
Wiser outlined his concept of livelihood in the following passage,
The daily, monthly, bi-yearly, piece-rate and special 
occasion payments represent the fixed cash and kind 
payments made in the village. They cannot be compared 
with payments made for similar kinds of work outside of 
the jajmani system. They are not sufficient in 
themselves. They are in addition to certain 
concessions which will be discussed further on. The 
jajman when he makes a cash payment thinks not in terms 
of value for value received but that payments together 
with certain concessions will give the ’kam karnewala’ 
his livelihood. (Wiser, 1958: 42)
Lewis commented,
It is a characteristic of this system to operate 
without much exchange of money. For it is not an 
open-market economy, and the ties between jajman and 
kamin are not like those of employer and employee in a 
capitalistic system. The jajman compensates his kamins 
for their work through periodic payments in cash or 
grain, made throughout the year or on a daily, monthly 
or bi-yearly basis. Kamins may also receive benefits
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such as free food, clothing, and residence site, the 
use of certain tools and raw materials, etc. To Wiser 
these concessions represent the strength of the system 
and are more important than the monetary payments.
(Lewis, 1958: 56-7)
Four characteristics of jajmani payments arguably had the nature 
of a livelihood rather than of a purely economic contract.
Firstly, payments were made not when services were performed but 
at times dictated by custom. Such occasions coincided with the 
agricultural activities of the village and with the ritual life of both 
the village and the families concerned.
Secondly, payments were made in the form necessary for a 
livelihood. The kamins received grains and various items suitable for 
a livelihood.
Both these observations would also apply to any long-term 
relationship, though the emphasis on ritual of the first point supports 
Dumont's stress on the religious basis of jajmani relationships.
Thirdly, according to Wiser, Dumont and others, a jajmani 
relationship differed from a simple economic contract because the 
jajman had to supply a fixed payment and the kamin had, in return, to 
supply a fixed service (or ensure that it was supplied) irrespective of 
the market forces of supply and demand. Wiser claimed that the 
position of each was protected not by the market place, but by 
tradition, religion and village law as supported by village and caste 
councils (Wiser 1958: 43).
Unfortunately, fixed payments were not restricted to jajmani
services. Many services independent of caste also received fixed
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payments. Thus the distinction between jajmani relations and other 
relations remains ambiguous.
There would seem to be little to distinguish fixed payments of 
this kind from other fixed payments, even those made in other parts of
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the world: e.g. wages and salaries. A distinction might be made if it 
could be shown that jajmani payments were permanently fixed whereas 
other fixed payments were subject to periodic adjustment. However, in 
the Mayasandra area residents attested that adjustments were also made 
to jajmani payments. This may be a modern day adjustment to changing 
real prices, but it is evidence that no fundamental problem was 
involved.
Even if the jajmani payments were fixed there is a question of 
whether they were fixed as a quantity or as a proportion of the crop. 
The orthodox position held by Wiser (1958: 44-6), Lewis (1958: 60-2) 
and Dumont (1980: 98) was that it was fixed in quantity. Epstein used 
this position as a premise to argue that the jajmani system provided 
kamins with a minimum subsistence in a bad season, in return for giving 
windfall profits to the farmers in a good season (Epstein, 1967: 
249-250).
The alternative view was forcibly advanced by Henry Orenstein. He
claimed that in Poona District (Maharastra) people were paid a
proportion of the total crop,
Most informants agree that each group is paid a 
different proportion of the total crop and that each 
village has its own standards. However, even within 
the same village, variation among informants is very 
great with regard to the proportions appropriate to 
each group. Hence we can say that payment is probably 
based, in a rough way, more on production than service 
rendered... (Orenstein, 1962: 305)
He stated that jajmani,
is one of the few economic systems, possibly the only 
one, in which payment is usually gauged not only with 
regard for the goods or services rendered, but also 
with regard for the amount of goods produced by the 
'purchaser'. (Orenstein, 1962: 302) (91)
Thus, opposite traits are cited as characterizing the jajmani 
system: that payment was constant irrespective of the farmer's 
production and the quantity of work needed (payments were determined by
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factors such as size of landholding, or the number of ploughs held by 
the farmer), or, alternatively that payment varied according to the 
farmer’s production. For Wiser, Epstein et al. fixed payments made the 
jajmani exchanges unique for they were in defiance of the market. For 
Orenstein proportional payments meant that jajmani payments were the 
only payments to take account of the goods produced by the purchaser 
and not only the goods and services rendered. Both positions raise 
certain difficulties for proponents of the jajmani system.
The notion of jajmani payments as a proportion of the crop seems 
at first sight more in keeping with the notion of the village community 
which Wiser regarded as lying behind the jajmani system. Surely all 
members of the village community should share the benefits of their 
work in a good season even if this meant doing without in a bad season? 
It seems implied by the notion of the village community that everybody 
by contributing to the community, either materially or spiritually, is 
also contributing to the product of that community. A good harvest 
requires not just the skill of the farmer but also the material 
contributions of the blacksmith, carpenter, etc., and equally the 
contributions of the priest, the barber and the washermen in creating 
the right spiritual climate for the harvest. Thus, if jajmani payments 
were proportional, it could be argued that jajmani payments were not 
compensation for the kamin’s services but his right to a share of the 
harvest. The implication is that the farmer is not really the 
proprietor of his land, but he is looking after it in the interests of 
the community. This would be in keeping with Mukerjee's notion that 
the village community was descended from Dravidian communalism.
While such an argument has its attractions, it has its 
difficulties in that it can also be argued that proportional payments 
are in keeping with a market economy. In busy years when labour was
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short, and the farmer had more to pay the kamin, he would be paid
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more. Such a connection - between jajmani payment and market forces 
- would be contrary to WiserTs concept of a livelihood as a payment 
made not as remuneration for a service but simply to ensure his 
welfare.
Fixed payments also raise problems for the jajmani theorists in
having similarities to payments in the West, in particular to salaries
and wages. According to classical economics, profit is the
proprietor’s return for taking risk. That is, in return for giving his
employers a wage, the owner has the right to the entire profit (minus
tax) as well as the responsibility for loss. This is virtually
identical to Epstein's position on the jajmani system. The one
difference is that wages in the West (even in bureaucracies which do
not exist to make a profit) are theoretically affected by the market -
at least in the long run. However, as I have noted for Mayasandra even
the assertion that jajmani payments were absolutely fixed is open to
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question.
That aspects of jajmani payments were similar to other payments 
does not challenge the distinctiveness of jajmani payments provided it 
can be shown what their distinguishing trait is. When, however 
opposite characteristics are cited as such a distinguishing trait then 
one must wonder how distinctive jajmani payments really are.
Parry (1979: 76) noted that both systems occurred in various parts 
of India. Neale (1957: 225-6) argued that both systems could exist 
together: a kamin would receive some grain as a fixed payment and some 
as a proportion. This assured the kamin a minimum living even in a bad 
season while enabling him to share some of the benefits of a good 
season.
Buchanan like Orenstein, noted the great variety of payments used,
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In almost every village (Grama) the customs of the 
farmers, especially in dividing the crops, are 
different. The Shanaboga, or village accountant, keeps 
a written account of these customs.
(Buchanan, 1807, Vol. 1: 299)
In a second comment, Buchanan showed how even where grain was paid
in fixed amounts there was often a degree of flexibility,
This estimate is made on the supposition that the heap 
of grain contains at least five Candacas. If it should 
contain forty Candacas, it pays no more, bit of less 
than five Candacas there is a deduction made from the 
allowances that are allocated to different persons.
Twenty Candacas may be considered as the average size 
of the heaps. (Buchanan, 1807, Vol. 1: 265-6)
In Mayasandra a fixed quantity, rather than a fixed proportion was
paid. The question of whether jajmani payments were absolutely fixed
or were proportional raises the question whether jajmani relations were
a type of patron-client relationship. Patron-client relationships were
an important part of any economic relationship in the past and they are
often so today. As would be expected they would also be an important
part of jajmani relations.
A central aspect of patron-client relationships must be the 
provision of help when needed, including help during shortages: for 
example, famines. If the jajmani relationship is genuinely a 
patron-client relationship, rather than just a relationship associated 
with patron-client relations then this should be true of it too. A 
proportional payment would not imply this, unless it was accompanied by 
a minimum f ixed payment.
I have not discussed patron-client relationships, partly because 
of the terminological problem of precisely who is the patron and who is 
the client (in a sense the jajman is the client for the kamin's 
services). More importantly, if the jajmani relationship is a 
patron-client one, it is one of a peculiar and distinctive kind. I 
will discuss jajmani and patron-client relationships later.
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Village Concessions - Proof of Livelihood
WiserTs fourth feature was the one which he regarded as most 
clearly indicating that jajmani payments provided a livelihood and were 
not ’market based’ payments. It was that the kamin received his major 
’reward’ through village concessions, not direct payments. These were 
granted to all members of the village community, provided they met 
their village obligations, including their caste duties. People were 
rewarded not directly for their services but for participating in the 
village community. Among the concessions were usufruct rights to 
rent-free land, house sites and access to fuel, grazing rights, etc. 
(Wiser, 1958: 71-84).
The concept of village concessions and indeed the very concept of 
a livelihood were natural consequences of Wiser’s belief that, ’The 
Hindu Jajmani System was a disintegrated form of the ancient Village 
Commune’ (Wiser, 1958: 108).
Wiser explained the jajmani system by quoting Mukerjee’s argument
that the jajmani system ultimately derived from the communal society of
the primitive Dravidians. The Aryan invaders superimposed a
family-based structure, creating a mixture of communal and family
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rights.
Strictly speaking, in the statement quoted above Mukerjee was 
discussing land tenure, but Wiser added that, following the Aryan 
conquest,
...in each village there grew up a staff of officials, 
artisans, and employees who became hereditary and 
served the village, not for payment by the job (such a 
thing, of course, was unknown) but for a regular 
remuneration, paid in kind, chiefly by a fixed share in 
the harvest. (Wiser, 1958: 109)
These two statements by themselves do not adequately explain the 
development of the jajmani system. It is unclear why a change in land 
tenure would have led to the creation of a staff of officials, artisans
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and employees. Mukerjee apparently associated it with the development 
of a division of labour following the creation of separate property. 
However, the important point was not why such a staff emerged but that 
many of the characteristics of the supposed earlier communal society 
remained. These characteristics were reflected in the system of 
payments.
Wiserfs adoption of Mukerjee's position implies that to establish 
the existence of the jajmani system it is necessary only to show 
whether kamins receive ’concessions’ from the village. Although kamins 
did in the past receive inam payments in land from the village 
administration, such ’concessions’ were not specifically associated 
with caste services. Village ’concessions’ in land were made to all 
village servants, and not just to kamins.
This position would not have worried Wiser, for it assumes that 
village servants and kamins were separate categories. As Wiser’s usage 
of Mukerjee's quotations above indicates, he did not distinguish 
between village servants and jajmani servants. For Wiser, the jajmani 
system was the village community. That which fell outside the 
definition of the jajmani system was extraneous to the village 
community.
This concept of village servant excluded many people who were 
regarded as being village servants in South India. In particular, it 
excluded most of those who worked for the state, both as ’village 
officials’ (for example, the headman, accountant) and in more minor 
capacities (for example, the Neergunty) for few of these worked in a 
caste capacity.
In his general study of Karimpur society, Behind Mud Walls, Wiser 
noted the existence of village ’agents’. Agents were representatives 
of outside authority, particularly state authority in the village. As
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such they were roughly equivalent to those village servants who in 
South India worked for the state. They did not include artisans, who 
performed services which remained within the village. Wiser did not 
regard agents as being village servants as they were not kamins.
Wiser's view of agents reflected his concept of the state. Wiser 
followed Mukerjee in regarding the modern state as being a foreign 
institution contrary to the spirit of the village community (according 
to Mukerjee, the Hindu state was a federation consisting largely of 
village communities themselves consisting of interdependent guilds 
whereas the modern state was a power-hungry institution inimical to the 
interests of the village community). Characteristically, in The Hindu 
Jajmani System, Wiser only mentioned the existence of the state as a 
modern factor encouraging the disintegration of the jajmani system 
through its law courts etc., after he had discussed the jajmani system 
as an ideal model. In this book he did not even mention the existence 
of ’government agents'.
If village servants are defined as people who work for the village 
and are rewarded by the village, then Wiser’s distinction between 
agents and village servants seems artificial as applied to South India. 
Both agents and other village servants receive inam land from the 
village headman in the name of the government. However, this was not 
true of Karimpur. According to Wiser's sole reference to the 
remuneration of agents, police watchmen received a small honorarium in 
cash (Wiser, 1971: 103). This distinguished them from kamins who were 
paid in a mixture of harvest grain, land and gifts.
Karimpur’s sharp distinction between officials and jajmani 
servants may have been more apparent than real. Prior to the Moghuls, 
taxes in North India were collected in grain (Fuller, n.d.). The state 
would have paid its village agents a proportion of this grain as it did
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until much later in South India. Thus their payments would have been 
almost indistinguishable from those going to kamins.
For this discussion a more important distinction between village 
agents and kamins was that the former did not receive the concessions 
of rent-free land which the latter did. Considering my earlier 
discussion this is a surprizing distinction for in South India tax-free 
concession of land to kamins identified them as being ’village agents'. 
The headman acting in the name of the state gave land to kamins in 
exchange for 'free' begar services to government officials and jajmani 
services to families willing to pay in grain for these services (Benson 
1977: 24). The reason for the difference is, I believe, that Karimpur 
had zamindari tenure. Unlike South India, it was not possible for the 
state in Karimpur to pay its servants in land.
In ryotwari regions, waste land, that is land which was not under 
cultivation, was the property of the State. Thus the State's 
representatives, the village authorities, could use this wasteland to 
pay workers. In Karimpur this was not possible for waste land was 
controlled by the zamindar.
This did not stop the village headman from giving land to obtain
the services of kamins. It merely meant that, when he did so, he was
granting the land in the name of the zamindar not the state. This land
was not inam land - only the state could rescind taxation. However, it
was rent-free, for the rent was the zamindar's share of the 
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revenue.
It is interesting to note that, unlike Wiser, Dumont saw land 
grants purely in terms of village administration rather than as 
constituting part of a livelihood. He noted from Wiser's description 
of rent-free land in Karimpur that, while the grants of land were very 
small, they indicated 'the official function that these people have in
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the village, and such arrangements occur very widely' (Dumont, 1980: 
99) . One might question what official function these people have in 
the limited sense as members of the village community. Presumably, 
people who are paid by the zamindar have no obligations to serve 
visiting officials, unlike the situation in parts of the South. It is 
possible that Dumont was applying his experience of other parts of 
India, principally Tamil Nadu, indiscriminately to Karimpur.
Wiser's assumption that the zamindar's rights once belonged to the 
village is consistent with a theory of the village community predicated 
on the belief that the zamindars had been created by Muslim and 
British rulers. Thus, differences in land tenure gave rise to the 
anomalous situation where payment in land was evidence of government 
service in South India and of the jajmani system in Karimpur.
Many characteristics, then, which Wiser associated with the
jajmani system were attributable to his concept of the village
community and not directly to the caste system. Wiser's historical
model implied that castes were not central to the development of the
village community but were guilds, which only developed later out of
village servantship. If this were so, then harvest payments were tied
to caste to the limited extent that most village offices were
caste-specific and received grain payments. However, Wiser's
historical model was improbable. He provided no convincing historical
or other evidence for it. Nor did his model explain the strong
religious connotations of caste and particularly its connection with
concepts of pollution. If castes preceded the village community or
just developed separately from it, then Wiser failed to explain
convincingly any connection between caste and payments in land and
grain. If Dumont is correct that grain payments were associated with
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jajmani relations because they involved permanent ties. * This
126
statement can be rephrased by stating that Wiser failed to provide any 
adequate explanation of why permanent relations existed between castes. 
One might add that he did not even attempt to explain why jajmans and 
kamins behaved as they did within the system.
Nor does Wiser's concept of livelihood help to demonstrate that 
jajmani payments were fundamentally different from non-jajmani 
payments. Each of the various payments which Wiser claimed were 
uniquely characteristic of jajmani were features of some non-jajmani 
payments as well. This does not invalidate outright the concept of 
livelihood. It is conceivable that the concept of livelihood may apply 
to non-kamins as well as kamins, though Wiser himself did not argue 
that this was so. Nevertheless, one must have doubts about a concept 
which is so hard to define and for which the principal justification is 
based on a misreading of the ethnographic evidence.
Dumont and the Satisfaction of Needs
Though Dumont did not use the term ’livelihood’ he too asserted
that kamins were rewarded according to their perceived needs:
an organization which is to some extent deliberate and 
oriented towards the satisfaction of the needs of all 
those who enter into the system of relationships. What 
is effectively measured here is, so to speak, 
interdependence. Whilst directly religious prestations 
and 'economic' prestations are mingled together, this 
takes place within the prescribed order, the religious 
order. The needs of each are conceived to be 
different, depending on caste, on hierarchy, but this 
fact should not disguise the entire system's 
orientation towards the whole.(101)
(Dumont, 1980: 105).
Considering the weaknesses of Wiser's proof for his concept of
livelihood it is not surprising that it is similarly difficult to prove
Dumont's assertion that kamins were rewarded according to need.
Although Dumont supported his argument by quoting Wiser's description
and definition of the jajmani system (Dumont 1980: 105, 375) he
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rejected Wiser’s principal proof of livelihood, the granting of 
rent-free land, saying that it merely indicated ’the official function 
these people have in the village’ (Dumont, 1980: 99). If jajmani 
payments were according to need as determined by hierarchy, then, it 
should, in theory, be possible to compare the ’real’ utilitarian value 
of a kamin’s services with the value of his remuneration. In practice, 
the absence of a properly developed market for services means that it 
is difficult to calculate the value people place on services, 
especially ritual services. Dumont’s real proof was based on showing 
how his concept of the jajmani system fitted in with his interpretation 
of the caste system. He did not prove that the jajmani system was 
oriented to the whole, only that it should be.
Village Concessions: Rights and Privileges
Oscar Lewis, like Wiser, regarded village concessions as proof 
that jajmani payments were not based on the value of services received 
but on the kamin’s needs. Lewis differed from Wiser in asserting that 
the kamin's needs were determined by the jajman and not by custom. 
According to Lewis, concessions were under the control of landowners. 
Normally, all kamins enjoyed such privileges which they could lose by 
opposition to the will of the jajmans. This is a substantial 
modification to the view of Wiser who held that concessions were rights 
protected by the forces of tradition and village law.
The contrast between Wiser’s and Lewis’ positions on concessions 
was not just the result of their theoretical dispositions, for it was 
evidently affected by ethnographic contrasts between the different 
villages each studied. The most important contrast was in land tenure.
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Unlike Karimpur, which was a zamindari settlement, Rampur,
where Lewis worked, was a 'modified pattidari' village (Lewis, 1958:
91). This meant,
that part of the village is owned in common and part by 
individuals whose rights can be traced genealogically. 
Baden-Powell coined the term 'joint village' for a type 
of North Indian village in which the land is assessed 
by the government as though it were one estate, the 
entire village being held accountable for the revenue 
payment in a lump sum. Rampur is a 'joint village' of 
this type, having, among other characteristics of the 
ideal 'joint village1, an area of wasteland owned in 
common by the proprietary group.(103)
(Lewis, 1958: 91)
Families from three Jat clans owned Rampur's arable land severally, 
that is by individual proprietorship, and its wasteland jointly. Other 
castes either worked for the Jats or leased land from the Jats.
Thus, whereas in ryotwari Mayasandra common land was owned by the
State, and in Karimpur by two zamindari overlords, in Rampur it was
owned jointly by a Jat 'brotherhood'. As village concessions
themselves were made from this common estate the concessions themselves
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were under the control of the local landowners. Thus, concessions
could be used to extort subservience from kamins. In this respect 
zamindari Karimpur had more in common with ryotwari Mayasandra than 
with pattidari Rampur, for only in the latter did the families in 
control of cultivation have control over common land.
The abolition of zamindari tenure also destroyed pattidari tenure, 
for the State made settlements directly with the landowner, rather than 
with an overlord or a brotherhood, and it also assumed control of 
common land. In so doing, the zamindari abolition bill ended the 
landowners' control of concessions. This, in Lewis' view, had played 
an important role in the decline of the jajmani system.
On another level, the difference between Wiser's and Lewis' 
position on concessions was related to a more theoretical difference in
129
the relationship between jajmani relations and caste. Although Lewis 
nominally accepted Wiser's definition of the jajmani system as the 
exchange of caste services (Lewis, 1958: 55-6), in fact he treated the 
jajmani system as merely the means by which the landlords extracted 
labour from their dependents.
Lewis apparently assumed that the exchange of services and 
payments involved was organised on a caste basis, but he did not 
clearly state whether this correspondence was more than coincidental. 
Lewis quoted with apparent approval (Lewis 1958: 56) Cox’s assertion 
that caste grew out of specialised groups, a concept reminiscent of 
Mukerjee’s g u i l d s . T h i s  could be interpreted as suggesting that 
castes existed so as to ensure the provision of services to the 
landowners. Lewis did not commit himself on this statement, though it 
would have been in keeping with his argument that jajmani relations 
were a means of ensuring cheap and secure labour for the landowners. 
The important point, though, is that the jajmani system either existed 
independently of, or prior, to the caste system.
Lewis’ treatment of jajmani relations as being incidental to caste 
was in line with his lack of distinction between caste and class. By 
treating relations between jajman and kamin as differing only in degree 
from relations between other landowner patrons and their clients, Lewis 
was treating inter-caste relations as inter-class relations. Both were 
relations based on p o w e r . I f  inter-caste relations were 
essentially identical with class relations, then 'the jajmani system' 
loses any claim to being unique. Many societies have or have had 
landowning elites who use their power and wealth to control any number 
of dependent clients.
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Lewis' identification of caste with class is at variance with the
view held by many anthropologists including Dumont, and less overtly
Wiser, that ideology distinguishes caste from class. Their position
was put most strongly by Edmund Leach who distinguished between class
based on competition and caste based on interdependence. He asserted,
Caste ideology presupposes that the separation between 
different named castes is absolute and intrinsic.
People of different caste are, as it were, of different 
species - as cat and dog. There can therefore be no 
possibility that they should compete for merit of the 
same sort. (Leach, 1971: 7)
This argument seems extreme; power is surely a factor in any 
relationship. Nevertheless, it is another thing entirely to suggest 
that any relationship can be reduced to power without any reference to 
ideology. While this might be true of some relationships it is not 
true of others: for example, it would be a tremendous simplification to 
see a mother and child or husband and wife relationship simply in terms 
of power.
Although Wiser accepted that power now affects jajmani relations, 
he evidently regarded this situation as a perversion of the historical 
jajmani system. Jajmani relations had been 'isolated' from the effects 
of power by the force of tradition and village law. The British 
government's recognition of private property and the development of a 
monetarised economy had led to a situation where jajmans and kamins no 
longer felt constrained to carry out their traditional duties. The 
situation was developing where both sides attempted to use the power 
they possessed to influence their relations with those who were 
increasingly becoming their opponents, instead of their partners. In 
essence, competition was replacing cooperation, class was replacing 
caste.
Lewis argued power had always underlain jajmani relations. All 
that had changed was that power was now explicit not implicit. In the
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past the kamins would not have dreamed of challenging the jajmans. In 
the years prior to independence, political legal and economic changes 
encouraged kamins to challenge the jajmans thus causing the latter to 
demonstrate their strength.
Once again the difference between the two writers may not be 
entirely theoretical. I have stated how, for ethnographic reasons, 
power affected village concessions more strongly in Rampur than in 
Karimpur. In a more general sense, Rampur’s caste relations may have 
been closer to class relations than were those of Karimpur. In Rampur 
the major landowning caste was the Jats; in Karimpur it was the Brahman 
caste. One would expect that a Brahman landowning caste would have 
been particularly conservative, specially in caste attitudes. In 
contrast, the Jats have long had a reputation for progressiveness, at 
least where economic matters such as agriculture are concerned, and 
also a relative lack of concern about caste purity.
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Lewis did not discuss the Jats’ reputation for progressiveness
but he did note the region's reputation for a lack of class
consciousness, a reputation which he played down,
Some writers [he wrote] have stated that the caste 
system is weaker in the Punjab(109) than in other parts 
of India, that rules governing untouchability are 
weakly observed there, and that the influence of 
Brahmans is slight. But these generalisations apply 
more particularly in West Punjab, where the numbers of 
both Brahmans and 'untouchables' like the Chamars have 
long been lower than in the eastern part of the region.
(Lewis, 1958: 3-4)
He concluded, noting the influences of the Muslims, Sikhs (and he might
have added its proximity to Delhi),
It is striking that, in spite of this history, and in 
spite of Rampur's numerous ties with the world outside 
the village, it still remains conservative in so many 
respects. (Lewis, 1958: 4)
I believe that Lewis was confusing conservatism with exploitation. 
The Jats use of power suggests a lack of the nobless oblige which would
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be more in keeping with an old fashioned caste conscious 'aristocracy*. 
To this extent Wiser may have been closer to the truth than Lewis. The 
apparent differences between Karimpur and Rampur were limited, and by 
themselves insufficient to explain the different conclusions of Lewis 
and Wiser. They nevertheless were enough to support the preconceptions 
of Wiser and Lewis in their analysis.
Even if Wiser's and Lewis' interpretations of the jajmani system 
were affected by their ethnographic data, the problem remains which, if 
either, interpretation of the jajmani system is correct. To determine 
whether either is correct requires knowing whether anything would be 
left if it were possible to remove power from a jajmani relationship. 
If there were, then there must be an ideological component to jajmani 
ties. The obvious point of departure for such an analysis is that the 
jajmani tie is a permanent relationship, for this is the one thing that 
all writers agree is part of the jajmani system.
While Wiser and Dumont regarded the permanency of jajmani
relations as being due to the ideology of interdependence which
recognised the mutual dependence of the jajman and the kamin, Lewis
claimed that jajmani relations remained permanent because jajmans
exercised power over the kamins to obtain their services freely and
cheaply. Lewis commented,
A major function of the jajmani system is to assure a 
stable labour supply for the dominant agricultural 
caste in a particular region by limiting the mobility 
of the lower castes, especially those who assist in 
agricultural work. If a kamin leaves the village, he 
must get someone to take his place, usually a member of 
the same joint family. This does not usually involve 
sale, and the jajman is not likely to object as long as 
the position is filled. n n
(Lewis, 1958: 57)
This explanation of permanency in jajmani relations rested heavily 
on the jajmans' need for agricultural labour. Yet agricultural labour 
per se is n o t . the ostensible reason for any caste-linked permanent
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relationship. Jajmani relations as defined by Wiser exist for the
purpose of exchanging caste services, but no caste is defined as having
agricultural labour as its caste occupation. Lewis avoided this
apparent difficulty by, in effect, redefining caste occupations as
including any service done for landowners. He noted that in Rampur
most agricultural labour was performed by the Camar caste, and that
leatherwork is only one of the Camar's traditional 
tasks. Ibbetson has described some of their duties in 
the Karnal tract, not far from Rampur: 'The Camars are 
the coolies of the tract. They cut grass, carry wood, 
put up tents, carry bundles, act as watchmen and the 
like for officials; and this work is shared by all the 
Camars in the village. They also plaster the houses 
with mud when needed. They take the skins of all the 
animals which die in the village except those which die 
on Saturday or Sunday, or the first which dies of 
cattle plague. They generally give one pair of boots 
per ox and two pairs per buffalo skin so taken to the 
owner...
Camars were formerly required to perform begar, 
including compulsory service for government officials 
who visited the village. In general, their position 
has always been a very low one, but recently they have 
been making efforts to raise their status, and have 
discontinued some of their traditional jajmani 
obligations and services. (Lewis, 1958: 72)
Although nominally a kamin might have had a permanent relationship with
a jajman for the purpose of performing his ostensible caste duty, he
would at the same time be undertaking his subsidiary caste occupations.
When a kamin ensured that his 'caste occupation' (for the Camars
leatherwork and scavenging) were carried* out, he was also ensuring that
his subsidiary services were performed too (in the Camars' case
agricultural labour).
However, Lewis' own evidence gives rise to questions on how much 
of Rampur's agricultural labour was performed according to permanent 
relationships. Lewis distinguished between ordinary and extraordinary
services. The Camar caste performed five ordinary tasks, work without 
payment for officials (begar), repairs of jajman's shoes, work in
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extraordinary situations (illness or death, etc.)» help in harvesting, 
and removal of dead cattle. Extraordinary service meant full-time work 
in the kharif crops^^ (Lewis, 1958: 73).
The distinction between ordinary and extraordinary crops was
apparently the difference between what a Camar was obliged to provide
as a member of his caste and that which he provided as the result of a
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specific contract between the labourer and the landlord. As such,
extraordinary services could not have been part of a permanent 
relationship.
This did not mean that ordinary services were necessarily part of
a permanent relationship either. Lewis did not provide adequate data
to establish with certainty whether they were or were not. What he did
provide was suggestive. He included as an ’ordinary service' work
without payment for officials (begar).
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Begar was the reverse side of concessions. People provided 
begar because if they did not they would lose their village rights. 
Lewis noted,
All the village land, including the house sites, is 
owned by the Jats; the other castes are thus living 
there more or less at the sufferance of the Jats. It 
was the crucial relationship to the land, with the 
attendant power of eviction, which made it possible for 
the Jats to exact begar service from the Camars in the 
past and still enables them to dominate the other caste 
groups. (Lewis, 1958: 79)
I noted earlier Hiebert’s comment that in Konduru certain families
provided begar services in return for various concessions including
inam land (Hiebert, 1971: 92-4). Begar in Lewis’ Rampur had had a much
more prominant role than this. The Jats’ control of waste land
(including house sites) under pattidari tenure, meant that they had
been able to extort begar not only to aid government officials but also
to ensure they had help themselves when labour was short.
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The ending of the landowners' control of village waste land had
led to the disappearance of begar, and for Lewis the weakening of the
jajmani system,
Since the passing of zamindari abolition bills, the key 
of power of landowners may have been curtailed in 
certain areas. Majumdar and his colleagues, for 
example, report that in the village they studied near 
Lucknow, where zamindari abolition has taken place,
Camars now refuse to perform begar, while the barbers 
refuse to draw water for the Thakurs and will not wash 
their utensils or remove their leaf plates any more.
(Lewis, 1958: 82)
Begar in Rampur also differed from that in Hiebert’s Konduru in 
that it applied to the Camars as a caste and not to individual 
families. As the Jats had held the entire waste land jointly they were 
able as a block to extract begar from all the Camars. To the extent 
that a permanent tie was involved it was between the Jat community and 
the entire Camar community, and not between individual jajmans and 
kamins. It is questionable, however, whether this was a true permanent 
relationship for no evidence was provided by Lewis that a Camar had to 
provide a replacement for begar services - only that while he accepted 
the village concessions (which as a member of the village he was 
obliged to simply to obtain a house site) he had to undertake begar. 
This leaves open the question of why only the Camars had to perform 
begar, rather than all the families who depended on the Jats. Lewis' 
writings indicate that every dependent caste was obliged to perform 
some duty for the Jats. One might note Lewis' reference to how in a 
village near Lucknow, east of Rampur, barbers refused to draw water for 
the Thakurs (the local Rajput landlord caste) and would not any longer 
wash their utensils or remove their leaf plates (Lewis, 1958: 82) (cf. 
Majumdar, 1959: 37). The only difference between the Camars and the 
other castes was that the Camars had to undertake agricultural labour. 
The identification of agricultural labour with the Camars is a more
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difficult problem. Clearly, for some purposes caste was treated as 
class ( or perhaps more accurately as varna); that is, secular 
attributes were added to the ideological attributes of caste. In this 
respect, however, Rampur differed from Mayasandra where, although 
there is a general identification of agricultural labour with the lower 
castes, members of all castes (with the exception of the Brahmans and 
Jains) work as agricultural labourers.
Begar was in keeping with Lewis' argument of jajmani as a 
mechanism for obtaining cheap, secure labour. The problem is, if begar 
did this, how can the association of jajmani ties with permanent 
relationships be explained? The answer to this must be that, contrary 
to Lewis' claims, permanent jajmani relations existed for ideological 
reasons, or alternatively that the existence of caste monopolies meant 
that a permanent relationship was necessary if a landlord was to obtain 
all the services he needed. The latter case can be illustrated by a 
village which requires a caste service. If a family of the relevant 
caste were in the village they might be coerced into providing a 
service but, if they were not, the village would have to attract a new 
family. This could be done by offering in addition to a grant of inam 
land the security and guarantee of a permanent relationship,
Neither of those alternative explanations for permanent jajmani 
relations is entirely satisfactory. The first, that the permanent 
relations could not be explained simply as providing labour, rendered 
not only Lewis' explanation of jajmani relations inadequate in failing 
to explain all types of jajmani relations, but it indicated that his 
treatment of caste as class was mistaken. If the second is correct, 
that permanent relations existed to overcome problems created by caste 
monopolies, Lewis' explanation of jajmani relations might have been 
right in part, but it would not have explained why caste, and in
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particular caste monopolies, existed. Earlier, I noted that Lewis 
seemed to favour Cox's idea that caste grew out of specialized groups. 
The implication being that castes existed to ensure the provision of 
services to the landowners. Such an explanation of caste would be 
contrary, however, to an interpretation of permanent relations as 
existing to overcome caste monopolies.
Lewis' discussion of begar raises the issue of bonded labour. If, 
as he argued, the jajmani system was primarily a means of recruiting 
labour, the question is how did it do so in agricultural areas which 
lacked the all-enveloping begar of Rampur, as did all of South India. 
The answer might be bonded labour. Like begar, it tied agricultural 
labourers to landlord patrons. It is interesting that Lewis did not 
describe bonded labour in Rampur. It is as though a village might have 
either the complex begar of Rampur, or bonded labour, but not both.
Bonded labour like Lewis' model of the jajmani system provided 
landholders with secure labour, while also giving an element of 
security to the labourers. As noted earlier, Breman stated that for 
the Dubla caste of Gujarat, bonded labourers had greater prestige than 
their free brothers. The labourers' desire to be bonded was due, 
precisely, to their lack of access to land and the other means of 
production. This is a classical patron-client relationship where the 
client for economic and institutional reasons (that is, his lack of 
economic and legal rights) is forced to rely upon a patron. Similarly, 
in an agrarian society where people were at the mercy of the seasons, 
and where individual and property security was low, it was advantageous 
for the patron to have clients too.
That bonded labour had advantages for. the landholder in providing 
labour and security does not, however, reinforce Lewis' model of the
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jajmani system. It merely emphasizes that Lewis’ failure to explain 
convincingly the role of caste in jajmani ties meant that he had also 
failed to explain the distinctive characteristics of jajmani ties.
Lewis' failure to provide a plausible explanation for all jajmani 
ties must make one question his definition of the jajmani system. This 
is especially the case as he failed to explain the relationship which 
Wiser regarded as central to the jajmani system, the permanent tie and 
its relationship to caste. Besides, the obligation of labourers to 
provide labour can be better explained by specific concepts like 
patron-client ties, the power of landholders over labourers, than by 
including all such relationships into a single amorphous concept.
The answer as to whether the jajmani system can be defined is 
probably that there is not a single 'jajmani system'. Jajmani ties, 
however, can be studied as a series of relationships with a number of 
distinctive traits. The task remaining is to identify and explain 
these traits. The most interesting is the apparent association between 
inter-caste services and permanent ties.
Why Do Permanent Ties Exist?
One way of approaching this problem is to examine who is or was 
actually involved in permanent jajmani ties (see Table 2). For this I 
will examine the Mayasandra region using hadade as a proxy for jajmani 
payments. The reservations outlined earlier about equating harvest 
payments and jajmani payments should be kept in mind. In the 
Mayasandra region some communities are much more likely to pay hadade 
than others. In part, this is explained by the concentration of 
certain communities, such as the Vokkaligas, in the hamlets, where the 
factors contributing to the decline of the jajmani system were weakest:
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e.g. the cash economy, education, and urban influences. Nevertheless, 
even accepting this, there is still much to be explained.
Table 2 Farmers who make annual grain payments for services 114
To To To To To To any
Total Priests Washermen Barbers Dassapas Blacksmiths service 
No. of caste
Farmers No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % No. %
Mayasandra 117 32 27 38 32 29 25 32 27 11 9 72 62
Bommenahalli 36 15 42 13 36 23 64 8 22 9 25 28 78
Dasihalli 47 40 85 18 38 20 43 11 23 20 43 41 87
Khodinagasandra 16 16 100 13 81 11 69 12 75 9 56 16 100
Kombandevanahalli 17 11 65 15 88 16 94 8 47 11 65 16 94
Sorvanahalli 39 21 54 32 82 19 49 15 38 12 31 34 87
Tigalarapalya 29 8 28 19 66 22 76 6 20 5 17 28 97
Tubinakatte 26 17 65 22 85 17 65 6 23 3 12 24 92
Vittalapura 66 22 33 61 92 59 89 13 20 • 44 66 64 97
Source: As noted in table heading, the source is f.n. 114 where Table 3 is 
located. The data in Table 2 are derived from Table 3.
Certain communities are not involved in permanent relations simply 
because they do not receive jajmani services from the caste 
specialists. Harijans, for example, cannot enter into permanent 
relations with Barbers and Washermen because the latter would be 
dangerously polluted if they were to do so. Besides, according to the 
ideology of purity, it would be of little benefit to the former as they 
are irredeemably polluted. To a lesser extent the same applies to
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relations between Harijans and Blacksmiths. Blacksmiths are reluctant 
to supply services to the Harijans because they believe their ability 
to perform their craft depends on the preservation of what purity they 
have.
Non-Hindus rarely enter into permanent ties of any kind. They do 
not need Barbers and Washermen to remove their pollution. They prefer 
to do these services themselves. Even when they do use specialist 
castes such as the Blacksmiths they rarely enter into a permanent 
relation with them. Seemingly, this evidence supports Dumont’s 
contention that the permanent jajmani tie reflects the ideology of 
purity. However, such a case is not supported by the example of the 
Lingayats, a "Hindu" sect.
Originally the Lingayats were opposed to caste but they are now 
divided into several endogamous castes. They are, nevertheless, much 
less likely to make hadade payments than other similarly placed castes 
such as the Vokkaligas. The reason for this is that like non-Hindus 
they do not believe in the ideology of purity, or, at least, according 
to Dumont, they do not believe it applies to themselves Dumont 1980: 
191). Dumont argues that Lingayat castes are* divided not by their 
relative purity but by their exclusiveness. He suggests that 
Lingayatism (strictly speaking, the Lingayats’ religious beliefs are 
known as Veerashavism) is a sect of renunciation. Their ’caste 
hierarchy’ is arranged according to the degree of renunciation.^-^  
Though I believe that Dumont is correct in his analysis, it does not 
explain why the resultant castes are hereditary. Dumont would 
presumably attribute this to the influence of the surrounding Hindus.
Thus, though the Lingayats do have caste, they do not have the 
ideological need for the services of those castes who perform a primary 
role in removing pollution. This is reflected in the small numbers of
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Lingayats who pay hadade to Washermen. However, even though they do 
not regard long hair and beards as being polluting, many Lingayats pay 
hadade for the services of barbers.
The existence of hadade, albeit at a low level amongst the 
Lingayats, has two possible explanations. The first is that it is due 
to the influence of Hindu society on the Lingayats. The second, and 
more convincing explanation is that, while ideology may encourage 
Hindus to pay hadade, there are also practical reasons too for so 
doing: e.g. the lack of cash and the easy availability of grain means 
that payment in kind is preferred, and the permanent tie ensures the 
provision of needed services.
Non-Hindu groups such as the Jains and the Muslims are less likely 
to pay hadade than Lingayats. Most Muslims and Jains live in the large 
commercialized village of Mayasandra where they combine farming and 
merchandising and so have easy access to cash and are less at risk in 
times of difficulty.
But is is not simply the case that Muslims and Jains do not pay 
hadade because they lack Hindu beliefs about permanent ties, for the 
Lingayats who also lack such beliefs have such ties. The solution is 
that the non-Hindus have an active dislike of permanent ties which 
overcomes any practical advantage it confers. The Muslims, in 
particular, have a strong egalitarian ethic which bridles at being in 
bond to another, particularly a Hindu, or having another in bond to 
them. Added to this, is a reluctance to indulge in what are regarded 
as Hindu practices - one Muslim told me, 'We do not have hadade, that 
is a Hindu practice'. This ideology is reflected I believe in the 
greater mobility of Muslims. Muslims are more likely to have come from 
another village or to have parents who did in pursuit of better
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opportunities. This is partly because many are merchants, but it is 
mainly, I believe, because they are not tied to patrons.
Surprisingly, Brahmans are less likely to pay hadade than the high 
peasant castes, and, in particular, the Vokkaligas. From talking to 
Brahman landowners, I believe this is only a recent phenomenon. The 
older Brahmans say that they paid hadade until the last generation or 
two. They say that they have given up hadade becase of the development 
of the cash economy, greater contacts with the cities, and changing 
demands.
As noted earlier, the development of trade and the intrusion of a 
fully fledged cash economy into rural India, has led many patrons and 
clients to prefer cash payments to hadade. In the Mayasandra area, the 
concentration of Brahmans in the largest, most commercialized village, 
and in commercial wet land farming, means that they are in a better 
position to pay cash to their clients, and that they have reasons for 
preferring to do so. This is primarily because, as commercial farmers, 
they are in business to make a profit. They can afford to carry an 
occasional loss if there is a greater profit to be made in the long 
run. Paying cash on an ad-hoc basis carries a certain risk but it 
means farmers do not have the cost of supporting clients.
Brahmans also have greater contact with the cities. This largely 
derives from the Brahmans’ high level of e d u c a t i o n . T h i s  has given 
them great access to new occupational opportunities, particularly in 
India’s considerable bureaucracies. The effect of this has been to 
re-orientate Brahmans who are left in Mayasandra away from village life 
and towards the city.
Education has also had a more direct influence on this 
re-orientation. Brahmans now read newspapers and periodicals from the 
city. These urban-orientated Brahmans are less concerned with gaining
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power and status in the village by maintaining patron-client ties. Now 
they are more interested in educating their children and in giving 
their daughters the large dowries necessary to marry educated 
’sons-in-law1 so as to gain access to the status and security of having 
relatives with government jobs in the towns.
When using the services of the specialist castes, Brahmans 
nowadays are much more likely to make ad hoc payments in cash. Thus, 
permanent jajmani ties have broken down along with other patron-client 
relationships.
However, the new influences have not simply undermined the 
permanent tie of most jajmani services; they are also reducing the need 
for the service itself. Education has had an important role here, by 
redefining Hinduism.
Brahmans have a less direct role in ritual activities in which 
village gods are involved as distinct from the higher Vedic gods where 
they have a major role. Modern education has encouraged this tendency 
by emphasizing a concept of religion which is in keeping with western 
models. Greater stress has been placed on devotion to the higher Vedic 
gods who are concerned with more spiritual matters such as rebirth and 
moksha^^ and a lesser emphasis has been placed on village gods who are 
concerned with the more mundane material matters of this world. One of 
the effects has been to reduce the Brahman's dependence on the service 
castes, particularly on the Barbers and the Washermen who play a major 
role in the ceremonies of the village gods.
The Vokkaligas have been the mirror image of the Brahmans. As the 
region’s dominant caste, they have been much more involved in the rural 
social order. Though they are imitating Brahmans by educating their 
children, they are still concerned with maintaining their status and 
power in their own villages.
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This examination of hadade payments shows that permanent ties are 
not essential to the performance of jajmani services. The Brahmans who 
still use services provided by specialist castes but no longer pay 
hadade are an example of this.
Secondly, it shows that permanent jajmani ties cannot be solely 
explained by the ideology of purity and impurity, as is demonstrated by 
the example of the Lingayats. The precise role of ideology in a 
permanent jajmani relationship is a very difficult matter to define. 
Certainly, arguments which attribute the permanent tie to ideology are 
attractive. It is arguable that jajmani ties are consistent with caste 
ideology. In an institution like the caste system, where each person’s 
rank and duties are prescribed, it is logical that their rewards should 
be so too. This would prevent competition which could undermine 
Dumont's "orientation to the whole".
Parry’s data from Kangra showing that purohits and jajmans are 
tightly bound together in permanent ties supports this assertion. A 
jajman felt compelled to use his hereditary purohit even if the latter 
was incompetent. Parry, however, noted that such ties were not 
characteristic of the great majority of jajman-kamin ties, what he 
called zamindar-kamin ties. In the Mayasandra region, Parry's 
jajman-purohit relationship does not exist, but, according to Srinivas 
(Srinivas 1976: 74), Brahman priests in Karnataka once had permanent 
ties with jajmans.
Nevertheless, though such arguments may be attractive, jajmani 
ties can be explained more simply as a patron-client relationship. In 
a largely subsistence society where it is important to avoid risk, 
assured services are more valued than ad hoc ones. Permanent ties are 
not an ideological necessity for the Lingayats but they are a practical 
necessity. Even the apparent exception of the priests supports this
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view. The early breakdown of the priest-jajman relationship in the 
Mayasandra area indicates that ideology is not central to the 
relationship. The logical explanation for the breakdown of the system 
is that priests are not used on a regular basis but only for occasional 
life cycle rites. The practical advantages of a permanent tie do not 
apply to priestly services to the same extent that they do to some 
other permanent ties and thus the ties have not survived changed 
circumstances.
The main influence of ideology is, I believe, an indirect one in 
ensuring a demand for permanent ties. The concept of pollution creates 
a need for certain services, like barbering, while restricting who can 
supply them. In the circumstances, the best way of ensuring the 
services is by making it the responsiblity of the kamin to provide the 
service in return for a guaranteed income.
For the jajman a permanent tie also had the virtue of giving him 
some control over the kaminfs general behaviour. It becomes the 
kamin's responsibility to protect his own purity by not serving 
Untouchables. Equally, the jajman would be expected to protect his own 
purity and not be outcasted.
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CHAPTER 5 : CONCLUSION
This summary of the nature and place of jajmani ties in Indian
society leads us to require a more general conclusion. The major theme
of the earlier part of this thesis was the origin of the concept of the
jajmani system. The concept of the jajmani system was shown to be a
logical evolution of the concept of the village community, itself a
development of the village republic. The three concepts constitute
part of a continuous discourse. At the beginning of the discourse, the
village republic was conceived of as a purely political and economic
unit but increasingly emphasis was placed on the village as a
community. This shift has involved a change in interest away from how
India could be remodelled along Western lines to interest in India as
an alternative and contrasting model to the West. The village
republic, as perceived by Wilks, revealed that, though India's
institutions were different from those of the West, they could be used
to remodel India in accordance with the West. By making a permanent
settlement with the village republics, it was possible to provide an
incentive to Indian farmers to improve their land, and to create a
concept of thrift. Later writers, such as Maine, Mukerjee, Wiser and
Dumont, saw the village community or jajmani system as fundamentally
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opposed to Western society. The increasing focus on caste was a
natural part of this trend. Caste clearly distinguished India from the
West. Mukerjee and Wiser saw it as providing the framework underlying
the village community. It was this that led Wiser to rename the
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village community the jajmani system.
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Village Community: Reality or Artefact?
An important theme throughout the history of the discourse was 
that the village community was similar to the original state of 
society. Social theorists, from advocates of the social contract on, 
have been interested in the conditions in which early society 
originated. One point on which they were agreed was on the small size 
of such societies. The social contract, it was believed would have 
been viable only in a small population. Similarly, Maine’s assertion 
that society originated in the patriarchal family also emphasized small 
origins. Durkheim’s "primitive" society dominated by a collective 
conscience could exist, according to Durkheim, only in a small 
homogeneous community. Darwin’s theory of evolution, where the 
"higher", more complex forms of life developed from the smallest and 
simplest organisms, seemed to support the concept of small origins. 
Such societies were presumably to be found isolated from progress in 
remote valleys, forests, deserts or even islands.
Indian society had many traits associated by anthropologists with 
such communities yet apparently it was characterized by its large size 
and heterogenity. Thus, for instance, India had many traits which 
Durkheim associated with the collective conscious although he asserted 
that mechanical solidarity based on a dominant collective conscious 
could only exist in small homogeneous societies.
For social scientists like Mukerjee and Wiser, the village
community was a godsend. It enabled the anthropologist to adapt
existing models of non-western societies to India, withoug facing the
deeper question of whether the simple correspondence of "primitive"
traits with small scale societies was warranted, by allowing them to
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treat India as a mass of small homogeneous communities.
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The question which occurs here, is to what extent was the village, 
a village community. The village republic as such never existed. 
Though industrialization, motorized transport, schooling etc. have 
reduced the isolation of the village, it has always been affected by 
outside forces. As Metcalf (1979: 3-16) noted, even village elites 
were often of recent origin. Successful rulers reinforced their 
position by ensuring that their supporters, often of the same caste or 
community, controlled the principal means of production, land. 
Similarly, although succession to the office of village headman was 
usually hereditary, the ruler retained the right to appoint a new 
headman if he so desired. Economically too, the village lacked 
independence in that it had to pay heavy taxes and if the taxes were in 
cash it had to sell its products to outside markets to pay for them. 
Villages were rarely self-sufficient in caste services either: e.g. 
Mayasandra was dependent upon travelling families of tinkers to make 
and repair metal pots.
Nevertheless, the Indian village had and still has a greater
degree of autonomy than any comparable unit in industrialized
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societies. Thus, for example, though a ruler could appoint his own 
headman, a cautious ruler did so with discretion, usually choosing a 
man from the main landowning community, since a headman without the 
support of the dominant caste would have had little authority. Indeed, 
while the ruler, in theory, had complete authority over the village, 
his representatives often identified with the village elite and 
protected their interests. Frykenberg (1969: 227-248) noted how, in a 
village in Guntur District, Andhra Pradesh, the headman and the 
accountant understated village revenue so as to reduce the land tax on 
landowners in general and on their own lands in particular. The 
village had autonomy in other ways too. It was, for instance, the
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responsibility of the village council to ensure the provision of 
village services by village servants: e.g. the waterman, watchman etc., 
and by jajmani servants, giving land in return. Despite trade to pay 
for taxation, most food and other products consumed were produced 
locally within the village. In this sense, each member of the village 
had something vital to contribute to the economic welfare of that 
village. Most social ties too were within the village.
Though the village community concept may have exaggerated the 
degree of autonomy possessed by the village, this was hardly more than 
anthropologists were prone to do anyway. After all, anthropologists 
were interested in the village community precisely because they wished 
to study an isolatable unit. It was an artefact of anthropology's 
participant observation methodology that anthropologists concentrated 
on the social relations of a single locality. As far as studying 
inter-caste relations is concerned, the village was quite a suitable 
unit as most such ties were within the village. Indeed, as far as the 
Mayasandra region is concerned, Wiser was quite correct that harvest 
payments are best preserved in the more isolated smaller hamlets where 
the most important social relations are still within the village. Few 
anthropologists are interested in the village community as such 
nowadays. This probably owes less to evidence linking villages to the
outside world than to a loss of interest in evolutionary models of
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society.
From the Community of Understanding to the Ideology of Purity
The major influence of the village community debate on the jajmani 
system was not, I believe, the village as the autonomous village 
republic, but was the village as a community of understanding. For 
Mukerjee and Wiser, the village was a community not just in the sense
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that it was a group of people living in a single locality, not even in
the sense that it had joint political, economic, and social
institutions. A community was also created by the sharing of a common
ideology - what Durkheim called a collective conscious. In the Indian
village community this ideology involved the subordination of the
individual to the whole. People performed services not through choice
or because they had made contracts with other individuals to do so, but
because they had been born into a caste which had the attributes
necessary to perform a particular occupation. That they had these
attributes had been ordained by the gods, dharma, and their actions in 
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previous lives. Similarly, they were paid by the whole village, to
perform these services and not by individuals.
The community of understanding as a concept exaggerated the 
differences between the 1communalistic’ societies of the East, and the 
’individualistic’ societies of the West. Wiser understated the 
importance of achievement in Indian society, and of ascription in 
Western society. One effect of this was to make Wiser's model of the 
jajmani system inflexible. Ascriptive models which completely ignore 
achievement are static. If everyone's role is predetermined, it is 
difficult to see how the society can adjust to externally induced
changes. Thus Wiser saw recent changes not as a challenge to the
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jajmani system but as a threat.
In recent years, most anthropologists have shown little interest 
in the jajmani system. This is not because anthropologists have 
disproven the jajmani system, for few who have commented on it have 
attempted to do so, but because anthropologists have been turning away 
from all-inclusive, all-explaining models such as those of Durkheimian 
functionalism used by Mukerjee and Wiser. They have argued that such 
models stereotype societies, understate variation, fail to explain
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change etc. They have preferred to study society at the level of 
individual institutions. In particular, they have rejected 
stereotyping Indian society as ascriptive and Western society as 
achieving. In all societies there is both ascription and achievement 
though undoubtedly in India more relationships involve the former than 
is the case in the West. For this reason, anthropologists have 
preferred to study ascription and achievement in individual 
relationships rather than characterizing whole societies as being 
ascriptive or achievement based.
The exception has been Louis Dumont. Dumont admitted the 
existence of achievement and ascription in all societies but this did 
not overly concern him. Dumont, unlike Wiser, recognised that his 
model of the jajmani system, like his model of the caste system, was 
simply a model of an institution in terms of the logic of a particular 
ideology: i.e. the ideology of purity. Though achievement was an 
integral aspect of Indian society, it was not central to this ideology. 
When it occurred, the changes wrought were incorporated into the model 
as if they were the status quo e.g. occasionally low castes gained 
power. Eventually, they were recognized as having the right to claim 
higher status. New geneologies and mythologies soon appeared 
supporting such claims. Dumont’s recognition that the jajmani system 
was a model meant that his concept was not inflexible in the way that 
Wiser’s was, for he was not describing what actually happened but what 
people believed to have happened as determined by ideology. Although 
Dumont was interested in how ideology incorporated "reality”, the 
minutia of actual behaviour was of secondary interest to him.
For Dumont the jajmani system was important in proving that the 
caste hierarchy involved the subordination of the individual to the 
whole. It did this by showing that the economic system associated with
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caste, i.e. the jajmani system, was not based on the market as in the 
west but on the community: kamins were paid according to their position 
and participation in the whole and not according to a market. Dumont 
asserted that there was no market because its very existence was 
predicated on the "individual", a concept specific to Western ideology.
Unfortunately, though Dumont's argument that the jajmani system 
was an economic system oriented to the whole, his argument remains 
unproven for he did not prove that the characteristics of the jajmani 
system were attributable to the hierarchy of caste. Each of the 
factors involved in jajmani ties can be explained in other ways. In 
the absence of a developed monetary economy, it is logical that farmers 
should make payments in grain and that they should make them once a 
year. It spread risk and provided security. Even the permanent rights 
held by the kamin, can be explained as being necessary to overcome 
shortages of essential services caused by caste monopolies.
Indeed, one can go further than this: jajmani payments are not 
even essential for caste services. I noted how in Mayasandra payments 
are often made in cash on an ad hoc basis. Similarly, harvest payments 
are not confined to jajmani services. Thus, though, for reasons 
outlined earlier, jajmani payments do seem to be in keeping with the 
ideology of the caste system as Dumont says, they are not conclusive 
proof of Dumont's argument.
What cannot easily be explained by purely economic causes is caste 
itself. It is perhaps for these reasons that discussion of Dumont's 
theories has tended to avoid his analysis of the jajmani system and 
concentrate on his much more powerful analysis of the caste system, for 
that is where his analysis stands or falls.
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The Jajmani System: Two Investigations
Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the jajmani debate is the 
disjunction between jajmani theory and the ethnographic evidence. In 
the title I refer to the thesis as being an investigation of the 
jajmani system, but in reality it is two investigations. The first is 
an investigation of jajmani theory in its historical context, the 
second an investigation of the jajmani system in its ethnographic 
context. My argument is that the theory of the jajmani system as it 
developed in its historical context involved various assumptions which 
were contrary to the ethnographic evidence, and that those traits which 
were cited as proof of the jajmani system were either illusory or could 
be explained more simply.
I have referred in the thesis to a number of traits which I think 
are essential to any definition of jajmani system. The first of these 
is that it involves the provision of caste services. The provision of 
caste services by itself is not, however, an adequate definition of the 
jajmani system. The nature of the services and the way in which they 
were provided must in some way be distinguishable from services 
unrelated to caste.
Wiser said that one way in which jajmani ties were distinguishable 
from non-jajmani ties was that those involved were in turn servant and 
master. This was not, however, as Wiser admitted, the situation even 
in Karimpur, nor despite Wiser’s speculations is there any evidence 
that it was ever true, anywhere.
A more meaningful trait claimed for jajmani ties was the concept 
of livelihood. This was that contrary to the mentality of the market 
economy, individuals were not directly rewarded for their services. 
These they supplied as members of the village community, and in return, 
as members of the community, they received a "livelihood". This
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livelihood was not commensurate with the value of the services but was, 
rather, according to Dumont, in accord with the "status" of the 
provider.
The problem is that, while the concept of livelihood accords well 
with the concept of the village community, it was not supported by 
Wiserfs own data from Karimpur, nor by data from elsewhere in India. 
The various payments such as harvest grain and inam, which Wiser 
regarded as proof of a livelihood, were true of non-caste linked 
services too. In Mayasandra, for instance, the village headman was 
formerly given inam, and the village waterman, the Neerguntee, and the 
village watchman, the Kulvadi, are still paid in grain. As I have 
argued, there are good reasons why in a semi-monetarized society where 
famine was always a danger, people preferred payments in grain and 
land.
This raises an additional problem with the concept of 
"livelihood". If jajmani ties do differ from non-jajmani ties, there 
must be an explanation. Wiser assumed that both caste and livelihood 
derived from the village community, but he offered no explanation why 
this should be so, or historical evidence that it was so. In the 
absence of evidence supporting Wiser1s assertions, it is preferable to 
assume that anything which distinguishes jajmani ties from non-jajmani 
ties must be due to caste itself.
Writers since Wiser have concentrated on permanent ties as 
distinguishing jajmani relations. Though it is true that many jajmani 
ties are permanent, the permanent tie is not unique to jajmani 
relations, nor are all jajmani ties permanent. In Mayasandra, for 
example, the Kulvadi and the Neerguntee also have permanent ties with 
their patrons. Similarly, many jajmani services do not involve 
permanent ties. The goldsmith, for example, supplies his services to
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any customer in return for an immediate payment in cash or grain. The 
evidence from Mayasandra is that this has always been the case, largely 
because there is no regularity in transactions with goldsmiths.
Thus any correspondence between jajmani and the permanent tie is 
not absolute. An explanation of such a correspondence should also 
account for why some non-jajmani services involve permanent ties and 
why some jajmani ties are not permanent.
The simplest explanation is that permanent ties are logical where 
the need for security of both payment and service is paramount. The 
evidence from Mayasandra clearly demonstrates that it is those services 
for which demand is constant, and which cannot be delayed until a more 
suitable time, that involve permanent ties. In these cases the 
permanent ties assure the performance of services even when there is a 
demand for labour, notably agricultural labour, elsewhere. This 
applies just as much to Neerguntees as to Blacksmiths.
The Mayasandra evidence also casts doubt on explanations of the 
jajmani system which relate it to caste as a religious phenomenon. The 
most important of these theories is that of Dumont who explained the 
jajmani system as the expression of purity and impurity between the 
castes in economic relations. The ethnographic evidence of Mayasandra 
does not support this argument. The Lingayats who do not believe that 
purity and impurity applies to themselves, are nevertheless involved in 
permanent ties. In contrast, Brahmans, who, in theory, have great need 
for jajmani services, are nowadays unlikely to enter into permanent 
relations. The communities and castes who are likely to enter into 
permanent ties are those in the smaller hamlets, whereas such ties are 
much less likely in the larger villages and towns. The difference 
reflects, I believe, the hamlets’ lower level of monetarization, 
greater dependence on agriculture, fewer contacts with the cities, and
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lower educational levels. These factors mean that life in the hamlets 
is more precarious than life in Mayasandra. People are dependent on 
what they earn in farming, have little money to support themselves when 
conditions are bad, have few contacts in the towns who might help out, 
either directly in cash or food, or indirectly through help in getting 
a job. Lower levels of education have a similar effect, as in most 
town jobs it is preferable to have some education. Similarly, 
education is useful in obtaining help from government, the better 
educated are more able to find out what government programmes they are 
eligible for, can understand and fill out forms, and are more confident 
in dealing with officials.
For all these reasons life in the hamlets is less secure than life 
in the larger villages. In the absence of effective institutional 
support, people were forced to depend on personal ties for support. 
For this reason, the patron-client ties, like jita servantship, were 
important. Patron-client ties were "effective" where the client was 
more depent on the patron than the patron was on the client, as was the 
case with agricultural labour. But where the adequate provision of 
services was vital, especially services needed during the agricultural 
season, when there was competing demand for labour, there were reasons 
for farmers to enter into permanent ties. These assured the farmers of 
the services while at the same time guaranteeing the providers of the 
services of their "livelihood". Arguably my investigation of jajmani 
ties in Mayasandra is misleading, for I can only describe the present, 
and clearly there have been great changes. Hadade payments were much 
more common in the past than they are today. Many jajmani services 
which now are permanent on an ad hoc basis would then have involved 
permanent ties. Many more non-jajmani services, however, would also 
have permanent ties. There have been other changes too. Inam has been
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abolished. Bonded labour has been abolished. The question is, then, 
what is the sum effect of these changes.
It is probably fair to say that society has become more 
"individualistic", or, in Maine’s terms, that it has moved from status 
to contract. The reasons for this are probably the ones listed above 
as distinguishing the larger villages from the hamlets. The greater 
degree of monetarization links to the cities and education and the 
influence of government. The difficulty here is that these changes 
themselves may reflect the influence of individualism.
Nevertheless, though clearly there have been major changes, there 
is little evidence that the reasons for paying hadade were any 
different in the past than they are today. However, the various 
factors which cause people to pay hadade today were more important in 
the past, and therefore hadade too was more common. While it is 
arguable that religious concepts such as purity and impurity may have 
played a more important role in the past, there is little evidence to 
support this contention.
I was surprized to find that historical accounts of South India, 
and even Robert Knox’s (see footnote 74) account of seventeenth century 
Sri Lanka, had more in common with my experiences of Indian village 
life than do many anthropological accounts. It is arguable that this 
is because they, and I, have failed to see the essence of Indian 
culture, and have perceived it purely in terms of preconceived 
prejudices. I believe, however, that the explanation for this lies in 
the use by many anthropologists of the historic present. Most accounts 
of the jajmani system describe it not as it actually is but as they 
believe it might have been in the not too distant past. The danger 
with such an approach lies in idealizing the system. I have noted how 
Wiser was aware that Karimpur was not as he pictured it to be in his
158
account of the jajmani system but he put down the differences between 
reality and his model of the jajmani system to recent events. I 
believe that by relying on unsubstantiated historical explanations to 
account both for differences between reality and theory, and to account 
for the system itself, Wiser failed to address adequately evidence that 
conflicted with his model. That is he did not have to explain what 
distinguished jajmani relations from non-jajmani ties, for, in Wiserfs 
historical model, by definition, all economic exchanges were jajmani 
exchanges.
These criticisms apply equally to Dumont simply because he used 
Wiser’s data as his primary evidence for the jajmani system. Indeed 
Dumont never discusses the jajmani system, and rarely discusses the 
caste system, in anything but "ideal" terms.
Past writers, such as Buchanan, Knox and to a lesser extent Wilks, 
never discuss payments in grain, and the relations accompanying them, 
in anything but practical terms. As such relations can be explained 
practically I see no reason not to do the same.
Thus, to restate, firstly, a convincing definition of the jajmani 
system should show what distinguishes jajmani ties from non-jajmani 
ties. Secondly, this distinction if it’ exists, will almost certainly 
owe something to the nature of caste. Thirdly, if caste is religious 
in nature, jajmani ties will reflect its religious basis. Each of 
these points is challenged by my data from Mayasandra. In Mayasandra 
there is no evidence to suggest that jajmani ties are to be 
distinguished from non-jajmani ties. Nor is there any evidence that 
permanent ties, associated by many writers with jajmani ties, should be 
explained by caste; certainly they cannot be explained simply in terms 
of religious belief.
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Why Continue the Jajmani Debate?
As regards the relevance of my discussion of the "jajmani debate" 
to anthropology in general, I can give a negative answer and a positive 
one.
The negative one is simply the demonstration of what the jajmani 
system does not do or rather does not prove. It is arguable that an 
understanding of the jajmani system would contribute to an 
understanding of the Indian village economy, and thus those factors 
that affect rural economic development. If, as I believe, jajmani ties 
were logical and that they have begun to break down with changing 
conditions, then the remnants of the jajmani system neither hinder nor 
promote development. This is particularly so, as the jajmani system at 
its height never covered more than a minority of services. It did not 
even cover agricultural labour, the most important service performed 
within the village.
This is not to say that caste does not hinder economic 
development. I believe that caste monopolies and, more importantly, 
concepts of purity which prevent individuals from performing 
occupations have affected economic development in India, but these 
relate to the caste system and not to the jajmani system per se.
The jajmani system has also been used by Dumont and others to 
analyze the caste system. A convincing demonstration of its use, for 
instance in supporting Dumont's model of the caste system, would 
certainly be of great value. In terms of the study of Indian society, 
caste is obviously of major importance in any study, as it is in terms 
of anthropological theory.
Dumont used the jajmani system to bolster his argument that caste 
was an example of the more overt importance of ideology in traditional 
societies in general, and in India in particular, than in Western
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societies (an argument strikingly similar to Durkheim's on the relation 
of morality to mechanical solidarity and organic solidarity). He 
followed Weber in arguing that caste reflected ideology whereas class 
reflected power and money. This led him to assert that caste's 
ideological basis would be reflected in the economic relations of the 
castes. Thus, Dumont used the jajmani system to support his contention 
that ideology was an independent factor in society, separate from 
economics and power, and indeed from the individuals who believed in 
it. Though the views Dumont held about the caste system may have been 
valid, the jajmani system did not support them as he failed to 
demonstrate that it had an ideological basis.
The more positive answer to the question of the relevance of my 
discussion of the jajmani system to anthropology is that it is an 
excellent example of what Foucault (1980) and Said (1978) have called a 
discourse, an on-going debate building on the ideas and 
pre-suppositions of previous writers. Several strands link the debate. 
There is the concept of the closed self-sufficient community 
independent from the outside world. There is also the role of the 
castes providing the village essential services, with the village as a 
whole, or the farmers, representing the village, rewarding them. The 
main change during the period is that, while originally the village 
republic was emphasized as an administrative unit with its own 
institutions of government and justice, later the jajmani system was 
emphasized stressing the role of the community in giving the village 
unity.
The on-going village republic, village community, jajmani system 
debate influenced its participants in several ways. An obvious point 
is that it was very ethno-centric or, to be more precise, Euro-centred 
in its content. All the writers were implicitly or explicitly
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comparing India with Europe, usually to the former's disadvantage. For 
the early writers like Wilks, Europe was the example of what India 
should be. Later writers generally used India, in terms of an 
evolutionary hierarchy, as an example of what Europe had once been. 
What was European was regarded as being more advanced than what was 
Indian. Two writers who did not regard India as representing a stage 
of development prior to European society were Mukerjee and Wiser. Even 
these two writers employed an evolutionary framework but they 
postulated that the village community was an alternative and not an 
early stage of development. Evolutionary models have been less 
important for the development of the theory of the jajmani system than 
they were for the village community, partly because most 
anthropologists have lost interest in such models and partly because 
the role of caste in jajmani ties means that it is difficult to compare 
the jajmani system with early European stages of development. 
Nevertheless, Louis Dumont has tried to do precisely this.
It is logical that writers should compare India with Europe since 
most of them come from that culture and even those who were not 
European were writing in the context of a debate dominated by European 
writers who made the comparison, but this did have the effect, as noted 
earlier, of stereotyping the village community as being a backward 
static community-based society.
The stereotyping of the village community is also related to the 
extreme use of didactic argument by many of the participants. Few of 
the writers were interested in studying the material at first hand, 
being mainly interested in using the village community for promoting 
their own beliefs as to the nature of society. In this regard, the 
jajmani system debate suffered less than the village community debate.
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Such didacticism is not in all ways a disadvantage. By focussing 
attention on the problem, it forced people to outline clearly their 
approaches to it. In this case, the problem was the nature of the 
economic ties of caste and caste's relationship to the other 
institutions of society. Unfortunately, such a debate often obscures 
more than it reveals. In the village community and jajmani system 
debates this didacticism meant that many writers were willing to accept 
the premises of a debate without proper examination if the premises 
fitted their argument.
At the risk of making my own generalization, one can say that 
’discourses’ occur when people try to prove overarching claims, make 
wild generalizations, and advance theories at the expense of the facts. 
While such a debate may seem to encourage all points of view, the 
participants using the same premises for quite different ends, in fact 
all the participants in the debate, accept its basic assumptions. 
Those who do not accept these assumptions are outside the discourse. 
In the end, such a debate can only advance knowledge by being accepted 
by all or ignored totally.
As to the future of the ’jajmani system’ in the Mayasandra region, 
hadade is still being paid in the hamlets surrounding Mayasandra, but 
only to a limited extent in Mayasandra itself. Nevertheless, with 
increasing commercialization, and the reduced isolation of the hamlets, 
hadade can be expected to disappear there too. Already, features which 
many writers associate with the jajmani system, such as inam 
concessions and bonded labour have disappeared, or are disappearing. 
There is, as yet, little evidence that the caste system is similarly 
likely to disappear. This, I believe, reflects the much greater 
importance of ideology in caste relations than in ’jajmani relations’.
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FOOTNOTES
1. This work is based on research carried out, during the late 
1920s, by Wiser and his wife, Charlotte, in a village which they 
referred to as Karimpur. Karimpur is situated in the North 
Indian State now known as Uttar Pradesh which at that time was 
named the United Provinces.
2. Originally the village republic, the concept became in the course 
of time the village community.
3. As the East India Company acquired large tracts of Indian 
territory, the burden of taxation shifted from excise taxes to 
land taxes. A land tax was the only tax that could have met the 
required revenue needs.
4. The term ’permanent settlement’ was not Adam Smith's but the 
concept was (Ambirajan 1978: 155).
5. The farmer could utilize this rent directly by farming the land 
himself or indirectly by letting it out to tenants and receiving 
the rent in cash or kind.
6. This was prior to Peel's abolition of the British corn laws.
7. As Neale has noted, 'For British thought at this period, "the 
improving landlord" assumed the role which, for some economists 
today, is assumed by Joseph Schumpeter's entrepreneur’ (Neale 
1969: 11).
8. A treatise advocating the rights of the sovereign, The Husbandry 
of Bengal, put the two arguments. ’On the subject of the rights 
of Zamindars the reasonings continued for years in extremes. On 
one hand it was asserted that the Zamindar had been merely an 
officer or collector of revenue; on the other, that he had been a 
feudatory prince of the empire. It has required the most 
laborious investigation to discover the fact, viz that the Mogul 
was the lord superior or proprietor (terms equivalent in their 
meaning) of the soil; that the Zamindars were officers of 
revenue, justice and police in their districts, where they also 
commanded a kind of irregular body of militia; that this office 
was frequently hereditary, but not necessarily so; that on the 
failure of payments of the rents, or of fulfilling the other 
duties of his office, he could be suspended or removed from his 
situation at the pleasure of the prince, that the rents paid to 
him were not fixed, but assessed, at the will of the sovereign 
and that the ryot or cultivator of the soil, though attached to 
his possession, and with the right to cultivate it, yet was 
subjected to payments, varying according to particular agreements 
and local customs; that, in general he continued on the spot on 
which his labours were directed to raise the means for his own 
subsistence, but that the proportion to be paid to the State was 
assessed by the Zamindar; that the rights of the ryot had been 
gradually abridged, and the proportions he paid increased, during 
the successive revolutions through which his country had to pass 
before and after the fall of the Mogul empire’ (The Husbandry of 
Bengal-cited in Wilks 1810, Vol.l: 115-116).
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9. According to H.R.C. Wright, the settlement with the zamindars had 
little to do with theory. Practical circumstances left 
Cornwallis no choice (cited in Arnbirajan 1978: 149). From my 
point of view, this is not of primary concern as we are 
interested in the theories used to justify British policy.
10. Munro's views were supported by Mark Wilks in the following 
statement, ?It may be permitted more than to doubt whether we 
should not as this day have witnessed lighter taxes and more 
ample revenue, if a less rash and ambitious haste for 
unobtainable perfection had left improvement to be the offspring 
of knowledge, and the landlord’s rent to have enriched the real 
proprietor of the soil, instead of pampering the hereditary 
farmer of revenue1 (Wilks 1810 Vol. 1: 171). Munro's views were 
mostly found in unpublished East India Company reports to which 
Wilkes had access. Hence in the treatment here Wilkes is used as 
the cited source for the materials he quoted and analyzed.
11. Mark Wilks supported Munro’s contention that the ryots were the 
true owners of the land on two grounds. Firstly, they were 
recognized as such by the ancient Hindu authorities. Secondly, 
they had the inherent rights of landowners, that is they could 
buy and sell land, mortgage it, and they received the rent from 
the land.
Wilks quoted numerous passages to demonstrate that the ryot 
was the landowner. For instance, he quoted Manu as saying 
’cultivated land is the property of him who cut away the wood, or 
who first cleared and tilled it’ (Wilks 1810 Vol.l: 122). Wilks 
believed that this established ’the existence of private property 
in the days of Manu (Wilks 1810 Vol.l: 122). Manu also stated 
that, ’Property is equally divested by the voluntary act of the 
owner in sale as in gift, and it occurs a hundred times in 
practice’; which for Wilks established his second condition of 
private property, that land can be bought and sold, though he did 
modify this by saying that, according to Manu, only land which a 
man had acquired himself could be given or sold at his pleasure. 
Inherited land ’cannot be alienated without the consent of the 
heir, or heirs (that is, all the sons equally), who ’have a lien 
equally in the, immoveable heritage, whether they be divided or 
undivided’ (Wilks 1810: 125). Wilks’ main argument that ryots 
and not zamindars are the land owners is based on the concept of 
rent. This is what Wilks called ’the proprietor's share’, that 
is the income that the landowner gets for the value of the land. 
Wilks says 'The occupants and Meerassdars.. .are far from being 
mere nominal proprietors; they have a clear, ample, and 
unquestioned proprietor's share, amounting, according to the same 
authority, to the respectable proportion of twenty-seven per cent 
of the gross produce, a larger rent than remained to an English 
proprietor of land who had titles and land tax to pay, even 
before the establishment of the income-tax' (Ibid., 179). Wilks 
argued that Zamindars, like kings, only received tax from land, 
not rent. He based this on the proportion paid to them, and on 
the belief that they were not responsible for improving the land. 
Wilks argued that the Zamindar, far from receiving the major 
share of the rent, only received a fraction (one-tenth is one of 
the figures quoted) of that handed on to the king, itself, a low 
figure and thus obviously a tax (Wilks 1810 Vol.l: 192).
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’In advertising to the incessant revolutions of 
these countries, the mind which has become 
accustomed to consider the different frames of 
polity which have existed in the world as one of 
the most interesting objects of intellectual 
enquiry, will be forcibly struck with the 
observation that no change in the form of 
principles of government was the consequence 
either of foreign conquest, or successful 
rebellion; and that in the whole scheme of 
polity, whether of the victors or the vanquished, 
the very idea of civil liberty had absolutely 
never entered into their contemplation, and is to 
this day without a name in the languages of Asia’
(Wilks 1810 Vol.Is 21-2).
Wilks said that the political instability in India could be 
related to a belief held by both Hindus and Moslems that 
attributes all authority to divine will. He wrote that
'the broad and prominent distinction between the 
characters of eastern and western polity, between 
despotism and regular government, seems to 
consist in the union, or the separation, of the 
divine and the human code; in connecting in one 
case by inseparable ties the ideas of change and 
profanation, or admitting in the other the legal 
possibility of improvement; the permission to 
practise, as well as to learn, the lessons which 
are taught by the experiences of ages. The 
sacred code of the Hindus, like the Koran of the 
Mohammedans, is held to be all-sufficient for 
temporal as well as religious purposes; they have 
adopted the regal government, because such is the 
will of God; they have been passively obedient to 
this emanation of the divine power so long as no 
competition has appeared; and they have embraced 
with facility the cause of rebellion and civil 
war because like, the Mohammedans, they believe 
that kingdoms are the immediate gift of the 
Almighty, and that victory is a manifestation of 
the divine will’.
Wilks' conclusion was: 'To the general injunctions of the sacred 
codes may be ascribed the undeviating continuance of regal 
government, and to a subordinate branch of the same doctrine the 
incessant revolutions of the East. (Wilks 1810 Vol.l: 26).'
Thus one of the causes of European prosperity has been the 
separation of the temporal and the divine, so that the west had 
been willing to learn by experience. One example of this was 
royal succession. While the East had no commonly agreed form of 
succession the West has learnt by experience the advantages of 
primogeniture. This had little justification in natural right, 
but had by its existence
12. Wilks stated,
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'contributed more than any other cause to the 
growth of civilization in European monarchies - a 
rule, of whatever kind, which defines the right 
of succession, and has been matured by time and 
popular opinion, palsies the arm of faction, 
leaves to the monarch no motive of cruelty, and, 
with the hope of permanence, gives to the subject 
the leisure and the incitement to improve his 
condition. (Wilks 1810 Vol.l: 26).'
13. Wilks' position is reminiscent of that of Edmund Burke, who in a 
House of Commons debate on the powers of the East India Company, 
stated that,
'All political power which is set over men 
and...all privilege claimed or exercised in 
exclusion of them, being wholly artificial, and 
for so much a derogation from the natural 
equality of mankind at large, ought to be some 
way or other exercised ultimately for their 
benefit...such rights, or privileges...are all in 
the strictest sense a trust; and it is the very 
essence of every trust to be rendered accountable
(Beaglehole 1964: 2)
14. This was written at a time when only a small minority had 
substantial property and hence the right to vote.
15. While India has suffered grievously from despots, for Wilks it 
had one advantage over medieval Europe, it did not have feudal 
landlords. This may be why Wilks was so opposed to the use of 
feudal terminology in India, and also to the creation of a 
zamindari class. This had allowed a wide range of simple trades 
to develop among the village servants.
16. Eg. Knox in Sri Lanka (see quote on cover page). For Karnataka, 
Francis Buchanan gives several lengthy descriptions of sharing 
grain to client service caste families.
17. Those who believed in social compacts used them to justify widely 
different ideologies. Hobbes believed that in the compact men 
had permanently alienated their individual rights, thus 
legitimizing an authoritarian government. Rousseau believed that 
such rights could not be alienated, thus men always had the right 
to withdraw from the compact if the state was acting contrary to 
their wishes.
18. The influence of the rationalists on Wilks is evident in his 
views on subjects other than the village republics. For 
instance, in his argument that the East was subject to 'despotic 
government' due to the fact that Hindus and Moslems believed that 
government should reflect the will of God rather than that of the 
people, a belief which reflected the fact that they did not 
distinguish between ' the divine and the human code' (Wilks 1810 
Vol.l: 26) (see footnote 12). By this statement, Wilks was 
drawing attention to the distinction drawn in the Western world 
between the church and the state, a distinction which was unusual 
in the world. It was a distinction which had arisen more through
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accident than through theology, as is shown by the long struggle 
for power over matters both ecclesiastic and secular between the 
Papacy and the monarchs of Europe. The division had really only 
been accepted since the Enlightenment with the dissemination of 
rationalist arguments that the world could be examined 
independently of God. In the course of time this justified 
reducing religion to an even smaller role. Thus Wilks’ 
distinction between the divine and the human codes did not so 
much reflect Christian views as those of secular society.
On the basis that the East lacked the Western distinction 
between religious and civil spheres, Wilks concluded that the 
East did not have any concept equivalent to the Western idea of 
improvement. He claimed that this was because, in the East, 
religious texts were regarded as the source of all knowledge, and 
therefore the accumulation of secular knowledge was dismissed as 
being meaningless. Indeed, change itself was dismissed as being 
profane, because, in a religious society, change was virtually, 
by definition, away from the ideal as created by God.
19. To be boycotted by the barber and the washerman laid the 
individual open to pollution.
20. Pharma is a much more complex concept than this, with many 
different meanings, many of which to the novice seem 
contradictory. I am not competent to discuss its more esoteric 
meanings in detail (see Zaehner 1966: 102-124). >
21. This view of dharma has much in common with the more recent views 
of Louis Dumont. Dumont has also described Indian society in 
terms of the subordination of the individual to the whole (e.g. 
1980: 105). However, whereas Dumont regarded dharma as an 
ideological concept specific to India, Mukerjee treated dharma as 
meaning little more than status. Mukerjee's avoidance of dharma 
as an ideological concept may be due to its association with the 
caste hierarchy. While the execution of all caste services 
earned religious merit, some services were more meritorious than 
others. By emphasising a sociological explanation, Mukerjee was 
able to claim that dharma was really an ideology of functional 
interdependence. Hierarchy was only a later and -superficial 
accretion. According to Mukerjee, castes were originally open. 
People could freely change caste and occupation as they wished. 
It was only in order to preserve their societies from invaders 
that castes became exclusive - a fact which Mukerjee does not see 
as being bad in itself, because it can be justified in terms of 
economics (1923: 102-3). Later, immigrant groups (presumably 
conquerors) became exclusive groups superior to those already 
there (1923: 72).
22. However, this argument was not a fair representation of the 
position of political economists such as Adam Smith. Smith did 
not see the profit motive as central to all societies but (like 
Maine in regard to law) as true only of progressive societies 
(see Smith [1970: 488] where he discusses societies in which 
profit was accorded a low priority). The profit motive was not 
universal but it was something that should be nurtured by 
governments desiring to develop their nation’s wealth. It is a 
fair comment in that macro-economics has had a tendency to ignore 
the influence of social factors in favour of overall supply and
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demand, thus implying that all economies are essentially the 
same.
23. One writer whose views should be mentioned in this context is 
Karl Marx. Although Marx preceded Wiser by many years, his views 
are relevant, both in terms of his great interest in the village 
community, and in terms of the above debate between the economic 
determinists and what one might call the ideological 
determinists.
Even though Marx's ideas were explicitly determinist he came 
to radically different conclusions from the economic determinist 
writers to whom I have so far referred. These writers viewed 
caste as being merely an exaggerated form of class. They claimed 
that jajmani payments differed from normal wage payments only to 
the extent that payment in kind acted to reduce the independence 
of the kamins vis-a-vis the higher castes.
In contrast, Marx's view of caste was very similar to that 
of Wiser and Mukerjee: the caste system was a very rigid guild 
system. For Marx, this meant that the village community did not 
have the exploitative relations of capitalism, as in such a rigid 
guild system there was no role for capital.
Marx argued that capitalism could only arise in an economy 
with a highly developed division of labour. At first this 
division of labour developed as craftsmen exchanged commodities. 
Eventually a new development in the division of labour occurred 
when the expansion of trade enabled the creation of the workshop. 
In the workshop, men specialised in a single process of a 
product. Marx said that what distinguished their work from that 
of craftsmen was that they did not produce a commodity that could 
be sold separately (1976: 475). Thus they were effectively under 
the control of capital - of those who owned the workshop (1976: 
461-480) . It was at this point that exploitation could truly be 
said to have occurred when the worker was separated from his 
product.
This could not occur according to Marx in the village 
community for two reasons. Firstly, the products of the village 
community were produced for the village's own consumption. The 
only surplus that the village community produced went to the 
State as rent in kind (1976: 478) (this, of course was a type of 
exploitation). This meant that there was no opportunity for a 
well developed division of labour to arise.
Secondly, the caste system meant that people worked in their 
own trade. Merchants were prevented by the system of guilds from 
investing in workshops. (This comment was made in connection 
with European guilds but from its context it can be extended to 
India [1976: 477, 479]).
A third factor which one might add to these two is the fact 
that, according to Marx, the major productive resource of the 
village community, land, was held in common (1976: 477). Indeed, 
Marx refers to the village community as having paid rent for the 
land to the state, thereby implying that the state owned the land 
(1976: 477). This meant that nobody could exert control over 
other members of the village community through their control over 
property. Furthermore, the payment of a heavy rent to the state 
would have reduced the amount of capital to be Invested in 
workshops.
Marx referred to village servants as being 'maintained at 
the expense of the whole coipnunity1 (1976: 478). This is not the
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same thing as saying that they were paid employees as they were 
craftsmen in charge of their own commodity. One might add that 
Marx, like Maine, did not admire the village community. He wrote 
that these
idyllic village communities, inoffensive though 
they may appear, had always been the solid 
foundation of Oriental despotism, that they 
restrained the human mind within the smallest 
possible compass, making it the unresisting tool 
of superstition, enslaving it beneath traditional 
rules, depriving it of all grandeur and 
historical energies. (1973: 306)
Of course, it is not entirely fair to compare Marx's 
writings of the mid-nineteenth century with the writings of more 
recent economic determinists. Marx may well have changed his 
conclusions had his data on India been better. Marx's writings 
on India mirror those of Maine, Mukerjee and Wiser because they 
were all drawing on the same body of ideas, the village republic 
debate.
24. Though Thomas 0. Beidelman has been quoted as much as Lewis I am 
restricting myself to a discussion of the latter's views because 
Beidelmanfs work was essentially a lengthier development of ideas 
that Lewis had already presented more succinctly. Beidelman, a 
student of Lewis, wrote his study of the jajmani system without 
any experience of India, a disadvantage which he seemingly 
attempted to disguise by the sheer didacticism of his work. His 
work has been extensively quoted, but often as an easy target for 
the opponents of the 'exploitationists'; for example, 
Louis Dumont devoted a large part of the section of the jajmani 
system in Homo Hierarchicus to deriding Beidelman's views.
25. Lewis did his major work in Mexico. His most famous field study 
was his revisit to the Mexican village of Tepoztlan, originally 
studied by Lewis' father-in-law, Robert Redfield. Redfield saw 
Tepoztlan as a folk community, with its own traditions. It was a 
communal society whose social and economic relations reflect 
mutual trust and co-operation, contrasting strongly with the 
tensions of his native Chicago. However, Oscar Lewis found it to 
be highly factionated with deep conflicts along economic lines. 
This is not such a surprising view considering that Tepoztlan was 
in the centre of the Mexican Revolution, and that insurgents 
under Zapata were operating in the area not long before 
Redfield's visit. In Lewis' claim to have seen through 
Redfield's idealistic model, one can see parallels with his 
re-analysis of the jajmani system.
26. This was a legacy of the Indian Mutiny, which impressed upon the 
British government that it was safer to accept village law as the 
basis of the Indian legal system.
27. The Camars or Chamars were the leather-worker caste. They were 
also the major caste of agricultural labourers in North India.
28. The timing of events in this quote are questionable though their 
sequence is probably correct. Independence occurred in the
period after the war. Presumably it was the shortages caused by 
the War which had improved the position of the Camars and not 
changes caused by independence. The effects of independence, 
both legal and ideological would have been long term rather than 
short term.
It is remarkable how many of the ethnographic studies, in India, 
have been carried out within an easy commuting distance of a 
large city.
In India, it was preferred that the members of high caste 
families, particularly the women, should not soil their hands 
with farm work.
Indology is the study of ancient Indian culture, history and 
literature.
The failure to do this had created problems for western 
'empiricists’, even in defining caste. The empirical approach 
tended to see castes as being corporate units, similar to 
lineages, which would be easy to define. Such a unit, the 
sub-caste, did exist. Prior to the period of intensive ’village 
studies’, a number of sociologists had indeed proposed the 
sub-caste as being the true caste, even though it was not 
regarded as such by the villagers. Dumont regarded the Sanskrit 
scholar Senart as being,
...the first to pose the problem.. .Senart was 
concerned with the starting from a precise idea 
of the modern state of affairs. He realised that 
it was not the caste but the sub-caste which in 
reality bore some of the most important 
characteristics ordinarily attributed to caste: 
you do not marry just anywhere within your caste 
but usually only within your sub-caste, and it is 
also the sub-caste and not the caste which has 
judicial institutions: it meets as an assembly 
covering a definite locality, and can 
excommunicate its members. Hence, Senart 
concluded, it was the sub-caste, the endogamous 
unit and framework or organ of internal justice, 
which was the fundamental institution and which 
in all logic ought to be called scientifically 
the true caste. (Dumont, 1980: 61)
Ghurye, the doyen of Indian sociology, according to Dumont, 
expressed the distinction between caste and sub-caste very 
clearly. He wrote,
Stated generally, though, it is the caste which 
is recognised by society at large, it is the 
subcaste which is regarded by the particular 
caste and individual,
and he concluded:
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There is ample reason why, to get a 
sociologically correct idea of the institution, 
we should recognise subcastes as real castes.
(Dumont, 1980: 62)
That is, the sub-caste was the real unit that could be 
sociologically verified by observation: the caste was merely a 
popular concept.
Dumont cited the example of Mrs Karve, whom, he said, went 
even further in emphasising the importance of sub-caste than 
Ghurye. Mrs Karve reversed the notion that sub-castes were 
divisions of caste by arguing that castes were the aggregation of 
sub-castes. Thus, she took what Dumont referred to as ’the 
terminology plunge and says ’caste" for the sub-caste and 
"caste-cluster" for the caste itself’ (Dumont, 1980: 62). Dumont 
pointed out that this was:
.. .a serious innovation for it is tantamount to 
saying that there is no caste of washermen of 
such-and-such a kind (subcaste). This is 
evidently absurd so far as the overall system 
goes and can only be justified from the limited 
viewpoint of an author interested exclusively in 
the origins, particularly customs and racial 
composition, of groups which doubtless constitute 
the material of which the system is made up at 
the empirical level, but certainly do not 
constitute the system itself. (Dumont, 1980: 62)
Dumont also referred in Homo Hlerarchicus to the willingness 
of certain authors to ignore indigenous beliefs, with reference 
to Stevenson:
For this writer [Stevenson], the caste is not a 
real group, and consequently it is characterised 
by a certain arrangement of groups distinguished 
analytically by the sociologist and considered 
real: endogamous group, commensal group, etc.
The result is a complicated description in which 
the stress is transferred from the indigenous 
categories to those of the observer, with no hope 
of synthesis. (Dumont, 1980: 350)
According to Dumont, this was an extreme view. Other 
sociologists soon pointed out the weaknesses of this view. Blunt 
rejected Senart’s conclusion on two grounds: firstly, endogamy is 
less rigid at the level of the sub-caste than at that of the 
caste (this is in Uttar Pradesh where intermarriage is sometimes 
tolerated in certain directions between different sub-castes); 
secondly, one must adapt to the ideas of Hindu society’ (Dumont, 
1980: 62).
Few post-war anthropologists held such extreme views as 
Senart, Karve and Stevenson, if simply because ’caste’ was the 
level of occupational specialisation. In general, they were 
interested in caste, as part of an hierarchical (in the Western 
sense) social order. Most anthropologists avoided the problem by 
defining caste by restricting their analysis to a village: in 
most villages there occurs only one sub-caste out of the many
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that may belong to a caste. Other anthropologists, such as 
M.N. Srinivas, argued that the only difference between caste and 
sub-caste was one of scale. Srinivas argued that sub-castes were 
the result of caste fission (Srinivas, 1962: 3-4). They were 
castes in the process of formation. (This tied into Srinivas1 
theory of Sanskritisation. According to this theory, although 
people could not attain individual social mobility within the 
caste system, whole castes could. It was a difficult process 
and, in order to do so, occasionally a segment of a caste found 
it advantageous to splinter off from the rest of the caste, 
normally on the pretext of increasingly specialised occupations.) 
Presumably, the reason why the sub-caste were perceived as being 
different by members of the castes but not by the whole community 
was simply the reluctance of the community to accept the 
pretensions of the new castes.
Probably, the difference between caste and sub-caste was 
more complex than Srinivas suggested. If sub-castes were merely 
the result of caste fission, they, like castes, would be based on 
occupation. In fact, while castes were defined by and named 
after their occupations, sub-castes were defined and named after 
their localities.
Dumont pointed out that the sub-caste was the unit of 
endogamy, and of caste justice, whereas caste was the unit of 
occupation. As Adrian Mayer established, people referred to 
individuals outside their caste in terms of the ’caste’ of those 
individuals, not their ’sub-caste’. This was because occupation 
was the major distinguishing feature between families. Indeed, 
it was occupation which determined the caste’s approximate 
position in the caste hierarchy. However, it was sub-caste which 
delineated the community of people with which the individual had 
something in common. It was within the sub-caste that an 
individual had kin and affines. Moreover, it was the sub-castes’ 
caste panchayat which regulated his behaviour.
Thus, in functionalist terms, there would appear to be two 
different entities under discussion. A cultural concept in which 
castes were seen as part of a hierarchical order, and a social 
unit, the sub-caste, which was an endogamous corporate 
institution. A  functionalist would probably accept that caste 
relations should be treated in terms of ideology, on the basis 
that they were cultural concepts, but undoubtedly he would argue 
at the same time that sub-caste relations were a part of the 
social system, and should be treated in terms of power relations.
33. Dumont wrote:
We have said that we shall be concerned first and 
foremost with a system of ideas and values. We 
have also in passing acknowledged territory or 
locality as an example of a factor which, while 
not figuring directly in ideology, intervenes at 
the level of the concrete manifestations of the 
caste system. It is as well to throw some light 
on this duality. First let us note that the two 
kinds of aspects are perceived in different ways, 
so that the distinction between them expresses 
our position in relation to the object. On the 
one hand, it is the indigenous theory which 
provides us with the name: when we say ’caste’ we
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are more or less translating an indigenous 
concept (jat, jati, a word of Indo-European root 
but which is probably encountered everywhere); if 
we were to speak of 'social stratification' we 
would introduce the following arbitrary 
judgements: (1) that caste and social class are 
phenomena of the same nature; (2) that hierarchy 
is incomprehensible; (3) that in the Indian 
system the separation and the interdependence of 
groups are subordinated to this sort of 
shame-faced hierarchy. On the other hand, in so 
far as we are able to detect in the facts a 
dimension other than that contained in indigenous 
consciousness, this is thanks to comparison, 
thanks first and foremost to the implicit and 
inevitable comparison with our own society.
(Dumont, 1980: 36-7)
34. Dumont praised Claude Lévi-Strauss for introducing into 
anthropology a strict definition of structure, from phonology. 
As Dumont pointed out:
A phoneme has only the characteristics which 
oppose it to other phonemes, it is not something 
but only the other of others, thanks to which it 
signifies something. We shall speak of structure 
exclusively in this case, when the 
interdependence of the elements of a system is so 
great that they disappear without residue if an 
inventory is made of the relations between them: 
a system of relations, in short not a system of 
elements. Dumont, 1980: 40)
35. Termed by Srinivas the 'dominant caste'.
36. According to Hindu theology, the caste ranking, and also 
happiness of an individual in this life is a direct result of his 
or her actions in past lives.
37. These oppositions are not particularly clear-cut. They may be 
more clearly comprehended in the historical context. Dumont 
suggests that the three highest varnas originally corresponded to 
the Indo-European tripartition of social functions into the 
priesthood, the imperium, and the clans or people. The Shudras 
'seem to correspond to aborigines (...) integrated into the 
society on pain of servitude' [Dumont, 1980: 68].
38. Dharma was in this usage the moral order which determined the 
proper relations of the gods, castes, and individuals.
39. One might note Mauss' own interest in India; he was in Dumont's 
words a 'Sanskritist - cum - anthropologist' (Dumont, 1980: xxv).
40. Mauss noted of Trobiand Island exchange,
as these gifts are not spontaneous so also they 
are not really disinterested. They are for the 
most part counter-prestations made not solely in
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order to pay for goods of services, but also to 
maintain a profitable alliance which it would be 
unwise to reject, as for instance partnership 
between fishing tribes and tribes of hunters and 
potters. Now this fact is widespread - we have 
met it with the Maori, Tsimshian and others.
Thus it is clear wherein this mystical and 
practical force resides which as once binds clans 
together and keeps them separate, which divides 
their labour and constrains them to exchange.
(Mauss, 1969: 71)
41. Mauss believed that in the most primitive societies, prestations 
were central to the regulation of social relations. Indeed, as 
Marshall Sahlins noted (Sahlins, 1972: 149-82), for Mauss the 
prestation was a kind of original social contract. Whereas 
Hobbes (1981: 223) had argued that 'original anarchy' had been 
ended by the creation of the State, Mauss saw such anarchy as 
being ended by the development of prestations. He wrote,
It is by opposing reason to emotion and setting 
up the will for peace against rash follies of 
this kind that people succeed in substituting 
alliance, gift and commerce for war, isolation 
and stagnation. (Mauss, 1969: 80) (46)
One might note that this had occurred prior to the State:
All the societies we have described above with 
the exception of our European societies are 
segmentary. Even the Indo-Europeans, the Romans 
before the Twelve Tables, the Germanic societies 
up to the Edda,. and Irish society to the time of 
its chief literature, were still societies based 
on the clan or on great families more or less
__ undivided internally and isolated from each other
externally. (Mauss, 1969: 79)
In essence in the earliest most primitive societies, . 
prestations combined economic, political and social 
relationships. Mauss defined prestations in this situation as 
being total prestations:
In the systems of the past we do not find simple 
exchange of goods, wealth and produce through 
markets established among individuals. For it is 
groups, and not individuals, which carry on 
exchange, make contracts, and are bound by 
obligations; the persons represented in the 
contracts are moral persons - clans, tribes, and 
families; the groups, or the chiefs as 
intermediaries for the groups, confront and 
oppose each other. Further, what they exchange 
is not exclusively goods and wealth, real and 
personal property, and things of economic value.
They exchange their courtesies, entertainments, 
ritual, military assistance, women, children, 
dances, and feasts; and fairs in which the market
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is but one element and the circulation of wealth 
but one part of a wide and enduring contract.
Finally, although the prestations and 
counter-prestations take place under a voluntary 
guise they are in a sense strictly obligatory, 
and their sanction is private or open warfare.
We propose to call this the system of total 
prestations. (Mauss, 1969: 3)
42. Or to be still more precise between families of different castes.
43. Dumont was referring to an imaginery ’threshing floor in 
traditional India’ (Dumont, 1980: 104).
44. A sacrificer is the person, normally a priest, who carries out a 
sacrifice. A sacrifier is someone who causes the sacrifice to be 
carried out, that is, he is the patron who organizes and pays for 
the sacrifice. The terminology is borrowed from Hubert and Mauss 
as translated by W.D. Halls (Dumont 1980: 371). One might note 
that for Mauss, sacrifice and exchange were closely connected,
The connection of exchange contracts among men 
with those between men and gods explains a whole 
aspect of the theory of sacrifice. It is best 
seen in those societies where contractual and 
economic ritual is practised between men.
(Mauss 1969: 13).
Mauss pursued his argument by claiming that,
sacrifice presupposes institutions of the type we 
are describing, and conversely it realizes them 
to the full, for the gods who give and repay are 
there to give something great in exchange for 
something small. (Mauss 1969: 15).
45. The importance of the landowners as patrons is vividly expressed 
in the following passage:
There are two kinds of castes: those who hold the 
land, and those who do not. In each village the 
land is held by one (or several) castes.. .This 
caste is thus the 'dominant' caste, enjoying 
economic power since it controls the means of 
subsistence, and political power, allowing for 
its subordinate position with larger territorial 
units, say, its subordination to the king whose 
function it reproduces at the level of the 
village. For such castes, the relation between 
caste and profession is vague. For, in the last 
analysis, their function can be acquired by 
force: that which is reserved for the Kshatrya 
varna in the classical ideology is in practice 
shared among a large number of castes.
All the other castes are dependent. Roughly 
speaking, their members obtain direct or indirect 
access to the means of subsistence through
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personal relationships with the members of the 
dominant caste, in virtue of the functions which 
they are fit to perform and which the dominant 
caste requires. (Dumont, 1980: 106-7)
46. It is interesting to note McKim Mariott’s comment on the 
custom of calling kamins by the name of the court:
Hocart pointed out that many of the kinds of 
ritual relationships which exist among Indian 
village castes today may be regarded as the 
result of a ’degradation of the royal style'.
(Eocart, 1950: 155)
If the king has a royal chaplain or a royal barber in his 
retinue, then no peasant home can afford to be without one. Even 
a poor householder in Kishan Garhi today retains six or seven 
servants of different castes mainly to serve him in ceremonial 
ways demonstrative of his own caste rank. Householders and their 
servants formally address each other by courtly titles. Thus the 
Brahman priest is called ’Great King’ (Maharaj) or ’Learned H a n’ 
(Panditjl) , the potter is called ’Ruler of the People’ 
(Prajapat) , the barber ’Lord Barber’ (Nan Thakur), the carpenter 
’Master Craftsman’ (Mistri) , the sweeper ’Headman’ (Mehtar) or 
’Sergeant’ (Jamadar) , etc. (Marriott, 1955: 190).
47. Kangra is a Himalayan district to the north of the Punjab.
48. In India, the barber has an important ritual role. In South 
India this is true of the washerman as well.
49. Parry used zamindar to mean landholder (Parry, 1979: 321). It is 
not a precise equivalent to Wilk’s zamindar.
50. These references refer only to the position of Brahmans. While a 
barber was in some situations a purohit, he was ’not part of a 
permanent alliance between clans' (Parry, 1979: 73).
51. Beidelman expressed similar sentiments to Oscar Lewis (see 
above).
52. The distinction between purohits and kamins made in Kangra has 
much in common with Dumont's explanation of varna. If, like 
Dumont, one takes varna to be based on function, rather than to 
be strictly analogous to the caste system, then the varna Brahman 
can be interpreted as being equivalent to the purohit. Thus, 
when the barber is performing as a purohit, he is equivalent to 
the varna Brahman; when he is working as a barber, he is a 
Shudra. What Dumont had to say about the jajman-kamin 
relationship was entirely in terms of the Brahman-Kshatrya 
relationship. The Shudra merely served them both. This is not 
to argue that Indians see castes as being equivalent to different 
v a m a s  according to situation, but then Dumont was not arguing 
that all landowners were perceived as being Kshatryas. He was 
arguing that it served as an almost subconscious model for 
relations between castes.
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53. Kangra would appear to have been representative of the Himalayan 
districts. Berreman working in the Himalayan areas of Uttar 
Pradesh, also noted a very restricted use of the term "jajman". 
It was applied only to those using the services of Brahmans and 
occasionally others carrying out priestly functions. Even in the 
Gangetic Plain where its meaning could be extended, Berreman 
suggested that this was no more than an analogy. He wrote,
'When Sirkanda villagers use the term "jajman", 
they refer to one kind of exchange: that of the 
Brahmin's ritual services to his clients 
(jajmans) in exchange for traditional "gifts" 
paid in grain or other goods. This is in 
accordance with widespread usage of the term 
among villagers in North India and with its 
etymological meaning: one who asks another to 
perform worship and offers a gift to him in 
return.
Sirkanda villagers also understand, though 
they do not themselves normally use, the term 
jajman to refer the traditional arrangement 
whereby an artisan or service caste member is 
paid a fixed portion of grain at each harvest the 
amount depending upon the size of the household 
or land-holding of the agriculturalist and the 
type of service performed. Application of the 
term "jajman" to the clients of artisans appears 
to be the result of substitution by analogy of a 
term which is convenient for explanatory purposes 
because it is understood by those accustomed to 
the Brahmanical system of client relationships.
This may account in part for widespread 
application of the term to artisan's clients in 
anthropological writings. In some areas of Uttar 
Pradesh, however, this usage is reported even 
among villagers, while in others it is absent.
It should be mentioned that many low castes 
perform minor ritual services for their clients 
for which they receive small additional amounts 
of grain or money. In this ritual context the 
term "jajman" is literally applicable. It is 
used in this way in a plains village reported by 
K.N. Sharma, but not in Sirkanda.
The Pahani term which Sirkanda villagers 
normally use in reference to an artisan's 
clients, parallel to their use of "jajman" in 
reference to a Brahman's clients, is gaikh, one 
who purchases the services of another. Ideally 
the relationships between artisan and gaikh is a 
permanent one with standard traditional payments, 
but in practice there is a good deal of shifting, 
especially where there is more than one local 
artisan available (Berreman 1962: 388-9).'
54. Once Mysore State
55. Formerly the capital of the princely State of Mysore of which 
Mayasandra had been part.
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56. Tanks are large earthern dams.
57. Toddy trees are used for making toddy, a kind of palm wine. 
Toddy itself can be distilled and made into arrack.
58. When I use the term hamlet, it is being used solely in reference 
to these villages.
59. Nowadays this is occurring increasingly as landlords educate 
their sons for non-agricultural employment. One reason why joint 
families are more common among landowning families is so more 
family labour is available for supervision.
60. I use the term ’landlord’ with reluctance as it implies an 
absentee class, who lease out their land to tenants. Neither of 
these suggestions is true of Mayasandra’s landowning class.
61. These powers are related to the gods who dwell in the forge. In 
medieval Europe too the blacksmith was regarded as having special 
powers.
62. Srinivas described the harvest festival of the Coorg.
The solidarity prevalent between the various 
castes in a village (or nad) finds ritual 
expression during putri, the harvest festival of 
Coorgs. On this occasion, the representatives 
of the priestly artisan, and servant castes 
living in the village (or nad) visit the house 
of every Coorg in their area, and either give a 
gift or perform a service characteristic of 
their caste. They are given in return gifts of 
provisions like rice, rice-flour, pepper, 
jaggery, coconut oil, coconuts and a giant yam 
(putri genasu) which is harvested during putri.
The local Brahman priest visits, in turn, each 
Coorg house in his village (or nad) . He 
purifies the house by sprinkling it with a 
little consecrated water which he carried in a 
ritually pure vessel. He also gives each member 
of the house a tiny spoonful of consecrated 
water to drink. The caste is sent away with a 
gift of provisions.
Like the priest, the Kaniya astrologer visits 
the various Coorg houses in his village (or 
nad) . He informs the head of each house when 
the rites of neve Kattuvudu (...) and cutting 
the paddy shears should be performed. These 
rites are performed only during auspicious 
periods.
The members of the artisan castes follow the 
Kaniya. The Tachchayira or carpenter brings 
with him a gift of a new wooden ladle with which 
to stir the festival curry made with all the 
vegetables grown at this time of the year. He
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also brings a bamboo receptacle (kutti) in which 
the severed paddy sheaves are brought home. The 
malla or blacksmith brings a new sickle with 
which the sheaves are cut. The Meda brings a 
new harvest basket (putri pachchiya) which is 
used in the festival. The Kumbara or potter 
brings a new pot in which the harvest curry is 
cooked. Finally, the Poleya brings a new mat 
which is used in the festival.
The harvest festival is the biggest occasion of 
the various calendar festivals of Coorgs, and on 
this occasion each of the several castes with 
whom Coorgs live in close and intimate contact 
does some service, or brings some gift, 
characteristic of it. Gifts are given in turn 
to each of them. Srinivas, 1952: 44)
Although the Coorg are a tribal people, Srinivas' description 
fits Hindu harvest festivals. Contemporary festivals are rarely 
so elaborate but apparently this is due to changes in Hindu 
society, and not to differences between the Coorg and Hindus. I 
will discuss these changes later.
63. So called because they are described in the Sanskritic 
literature.
64. Her shrine was on the tank wall and one of her duties was to 
protect the tank.
65. One reason for this is that as animal sacrifice is central to the 
worship of the village gods, it would be most unsuitable for 
vegetarian castes to serve them.
Srinivas mentioned the surprizing fact that, while a local 
god was worshipped through sacrifice, his priest was (through his 
own choice) a vegetarian (Srinivas 1976: 299). Srinivas noted in 
another section that, 'a gudda [hereditary non-Brahman priest' 
(Srinivas 1976: 346)] was expected to lead a stricter life than a 
layman. A gudda, who was a vegetarian, or meticulous about the 
observance of pollution and diet rules, was singled out for 
praise by the villagers just as a lax gudda was criticized 
(Srinivas 1976: 193).
For Hindu theologians, a deeper reason would be that the 
world of everyday reality, maya, which is the realm of action and 
desire, to which village gods and goddesses belong, is only one 
aspect of reality. This world, hides the deeper reality of 
Brahman where the supreme godhead (normally identified with 
Vishnu or Shiva) and the individual elements of which the 
universe is composed, are to some degree (depending on the 
theology) identified. The Shaivites (devotees of Shiva) identify 
the world of action and desire with Shakti, the female side of 
Shiva, normally depicted as Shiva's consort Parvathi, or in one 
of her forms Kali, Durga or the numerous village goddesses. In 
Mayasandra the principal village goddess is Mayamma (amma meaning 
mother is attached to all female names). As in this case, Maya 
can be a synonym for Shakti. It is to Shakti that appeals for 
the fulfilment of the desires of the world (e.g. relief from
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disease or childlessness) must be made. The Sanskritic gods are 
concerned with problems of a higher order.
The higher castes cannot represent Shakti for they represent 
the spirit, as opposed to the actions and desires of the body. 
In Hindu terms they represent the humour of sattva as opposed to 
the humours of rajas and tamas. Zaehner noted that these
can be literally translated as "the quality of 
being, energy, and darkness" (Zaehner 1966: 69).
Usually they are translated as "goodness, 
energy, and dullness".
It is sattva which is needed for the transcendence (moksha) of 
the soul from maya to Brahman, whereas the qualities of rajas and 
tamas are responsible for the continuity of Maya.
Members of any caste can obtain moksha (though the innate 
qualities of rajas and tamas make it unlikely in case of the 
lower castes), and even the higher castes are concerned with the 
world of action, but they must solve those problems through 
priests who have the requisite qualities. However, their 
inherent qualities naturally mean that higher and lower castes 
have different problems and interests in their religious 
observations.
66. However, like kamins, halemagas could have more than one patron 
family.
67. Indian cattle normally stay at night in compounds built into 
their owner’s houses, or even in the houses themselves.
68. Epstein's position was similar to that put earlier by Iyer,
Formerly, each family of the Madigas was 
attached to one or more families of ryots or 
agriculturists, whose work they had to do, and 
in return get the customary remuneration. The 
Madiga was entitled to take the carcass of any 
cattle that might die in the master’s house.
This qualified kind of serfdom has, however, all 
but died out, except in the rural parts.
A village Madiga has to supply each person who 
contributes to his yearly allowance of grain 
with a pair of sandals and some leathern ropes 
for the ploughing cattle. He has also to make 
the leather bucket for lifting water with the 
hides supplied by the ryot and to keep it in 
proper repair. He is required to help at the 
harvest. In return for this service, the Madiga 
gets, in addition to the dead bodies of cattle 
in his patron’s house, one bundle of the 
unthreshed crop and a winnowful of grain, food 
for the working-man, and remanant of the grain 
left on the threshing-floor after measurement.
He is also given other perquisites, such as food 
on marriage and other festivals observed in the 
patron's house. (Iyer, 1931, Vol. 4: 166)
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69. Mayasandra's Brahman community might have been founded as an inam 
gift.
70. For example, the medieval traveller and Moslem holy man, Ibu 
Battuta, who complained that inam rights to one hundred villages 
were inadequate for his mosque (and himself).
71. It was discontinued later.
72. This description is similar to the village republic as described 
by Buchanan's critic Wilks (despite their very different views on 
land tenure) though Wilks referred to village servants being paid 
by land or grain.
73. It is unclear precisely what form potgi took, for in this quote 
it is described as a cash allowance, but in another passage the 
Tumkur Gazeteer described it as remuneration in kind,
[In 1874 the potgi rules were passed] providing 
for the remuneration in kind of the minor 
village servants, introduced first in the 
Nandrug division. These rules were more or less 
the offshoots of the introduction of the revenue 
survey and settlement. (M.S.G.T.D.: 347)
Potgi probably could be paid in either cash or grain. As will be 
argued later in more detail, each was open to substitution by the 
other.
74. Inam, both as payment for services to the king and to the 
village, and to ensure the provision of services was described by 
Robert Knox in his account of seventeenth century Ceylon:
The Countrey being wholly His, the King Farms 
out his land, not for Money, but Service. And 
the People enjoy Portions of Land from the King, 
and instead of Rent, they have several 
appointments, some are to serve the King in his 
Wars, some in their Trades, some serve him for 
Labourers, and others are as Farmers to furnish 
his House with the Fruits of the Ground: and so 
all things are done without cost and every man 
paid for his pains: that is, they have lands for 
it; yet all have not watered land enough for 
their needs, that is, such land as good rice 
requires to grow in; so that such are fain to 
sow on dry land, and Till other mens Fields for 
a subsistence. These Persons are free from 
payment of Taxes; only sometimes upon 
extraordinary occasions, they must give an Hen 
or Mat or such like, to the King's use: for as 
much as they use the Wood and Water that is in 
his Countrey. But if any find the Duty to be 
heavy,- or too much for them, they may leaving 
their house and land, be free from the King's 
Service, as there is a Multitude do. And in my 
judgement they live far more at ease, after they
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have relinquished the King's land, than when 
they had it.
Many Towns are in the King's hand, the 
inhabitants whereof are to Till and Manure a 
quantity of the land according to their Ability, 
and lay up the Corn for the King's use. These 
Towns the King often bestows upon some of his 
Nobles for their Encouragement and Maintenance, 
with all the fruits and benefits that before 
came to the King from them. In each of these 
Towns there is a Smith to make and mend the 
Tools of them to whom the King hath granted 
them, and a Potter to fit them with Earthen 
Ware, and a Washer to wash their Cloaths, and 
other men to supply what there is need of. And 
each one of these hath a piece of land for this 
their Service, whether it be to the King or the 
Lord; but what they do for the other People they 
are paid for. Thus all that have any Place or 
Employment under the King, are paid without, any 
Charge to the King. (Knox 1981 [1681]: 167)
What stands out in this passage is Knox's treatment of inam as a 
simple contract - to the extent that the poor's need for land 
allowed, and not as a feudal obligation. Individuals received 
inam land if they were willing to serve the king of lords 
appointed in his place. The individuals receiving the land were 
only constrained to serve for 'free' those who gave them land. 
Everybody else had to pay for their services.
75. In some instances the legal status of the original inam grant may 
have reduced the impact of legislation abolishing inam. Benson 
noted that in Andhra Pradesh 'inam' grants made by the headman 
were not registered (Benson, 1977: 491). This meant that, like 
inams recognised by the State, they were not subject to taxation. 
As long as this land remained unregistered they remained untaxed 
and in effect inam. Freedom from taxation would have proved a 
powerful incentive for these inam holders not to claim ownership 
of their land. This legislation has given tenancy rights to 
tenants, but it required the land to be registered.
76. I will discuss the reasons for this later.
77. I have not discussed Chris Fuller's article as I only found it 
when my thesis was well advanced. Many of his ideas are similar 
to those pursued here, and I find little to disagree with. 
Nevertheless there are clear differences as readers of both 
essays will note.
78. Buchanan mentioned taxation both in cash and in kind for Mysore.
79. Fuller pointed out that this rather undermined the concept of the 
isolated village community. Though in one sense it did not, for 
the village always met any demands made upon it and was otherwise 
was largely self-sufficient.
80. I.e. halemaga.
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81. Figures given for payments differed greatly between villages, and 
even between people. One estimate was that, for each session 
(one in the morning, one in the afternoon), men were paid 
two-and-a-half rupees, without food, or two rupees with food (one 
meal each session). Females were paid one-and-a-half rupees 
without food in the busy session (though they may get piece rates 
instead) or one rupee without food in the slack season. Children 
were paid the same rates as adults.
However, in Epsteinsfs Wangala junior rates were lower than 
adult rates (Epstein, 1962: 72).
N.B. There were at the time of field work approximately ten 
rupees to the Australian dollar.
82. Father Dubois was a French priest who fled revolutionary France 
to , India. He spent many years in Madras and Mysore, before 
writing down his experiences (Colonel Mark Wilks arranged their 
publication for the East India Company).
83. Dubois’ type of jita servantship is related to the classical form 
of bonded labour where the worker merely works to pay off the 
interest. Bonded labour of this sort is not restricted to India. 
In the Australian novel, My Brilliant Career, Sibilla worked in 
lieu of the interest on a loan to her father. She received board 
and lodging as part of the terms of the bond.
84. Epstein used jita (jeeta) for what I am calling bonded labour.
85. The Dublas were a Gujerati caste of agricultural labourers.
86. A Brahman landowning caste in Gujarat.
87. Permanent relationships will be discussed later.
88. As the Indian family is a corporate unit, inter-family permanent 
ties are inherited by the descendants of the original parties.
89. In Maine's terminology, status more than contract.
90. This applies not only to ties between families but even to the 
relationship between the farmer and the king (and the zamindar 
where he existed). This was a permanent relationship between the 
farmer's family and the royal dynasty. Just as the kamin 
received his share so too did the king. This does not in itself 
prove than grain payments extended beyond jajman-kamin 
relationships. It can be argued that the king (and the zamindar 
as a sort of mini-king) received his share for carrying out his 
caste duty as a Kshatrya: i.e., protection.
91. Yet share farming all over the world uses such a system.
92. It may seem questionable whether this would apply to kamins like 
barbers and washermen who are not necessary for agricultural 
production. However, during a good season they too may prefer to 
work on their own farmland (including inam land) or as 
agricultural labourers rather than carry out jajmani duties.
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93. Admittedly, even if jajmani payments were open to adjustment, it 
might have been claimed that there still would have been an open 
labour market simply because there was a permanent relationship.
Even this, however, has been disputed. Adrian Mayer has 
noted for Malwa in Central India that jajmans frequently changed 
kamins to obtain better service (Mayer, 1960: 69). In contrast, 
in the Mayasandra area, people claimed that kamins were changed 
only in cases of long disputes and only if the old kamins 
accepted the change. Normally, kamins would only surrender a 
family in exchange for another, thus keeping the total patronage 
of each unchanged. However, there is a considerable discrepancy 
between what people say and what they do. That this might 
particularly be true of jajmani is highly likely considering the 
relationship between jajmani and caste. Caste, like religion, is 
often spoken of in terms of ideal models. However, the records I 
assembled for Mayasandra appeared to show great stability in 
those jajman-kamin relations which did exist.
94. A similar argument had been proposed by J.P. Hewitt (Hewitt, 
1897: 628-41).
95. The florist received 0.19 acres of cultivated land, the oil 
presser 0.86 acres, the washerman 0.41 acres, the carpenter 1.34 
acres, the seamster 0.87 acres, the sweeper 1.15 acres, and the 
Brahman for lighting the Holi fire 2.33 acres (Wiser, 1958: 83). 
See also Wiser, 1971: 112.
96. As with inam land, what were being given were usufruct rights. 
As Wiser noted, 'For this [land] no rent is charged and the 
employee is expected to render a particular type of service in 
the village' (Wiser, 1958: 82).
97. Undoubtedly, Wilks would have disputed this.
98. Grants of land to artisans can be made by lesser landowners. I 
have already noted Janet Benson's reference to large landowners 
in a ryotwari district making such grants (Benson, 1977: 248).
99. Permanent ties may be defined as open-ended relationships between 
two parties, in this case families, which are hereditary among 
the descendants of those families.
100. This is an over-simplification of Dumont's position but for the 
present it will suffice.
101. Author's emphasis.
102. Rampur should not be confused with Srinivas' Rampura.
103. Joint villages were very similar to the village republic as 
described by Mark Wilks. Indeed, Metcalf who first applied the 
concept of village republic to North India, used the joint 
villages of the Delhi region as his model. He, like Wilks, 
argued that zamindari tenure resulted from the decay of the 
original village republic (Stokes, 1978: 65). According to 
Maine, the British originally failed to perceive the importance 
of the village republic because the part of India they first came 
to know well, Bengal, was the area where joint villages were most
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decayed. It was only when they conquered more remote areas they 
came to realise their importance (Maine 1876: 103-4). One point 
that Lewis' account emphasises is that the joint village, and 
therefore the village republic, was not an egalitarian 
institution.
104. Common land only comprised five per cent of the total area of 
Rampur. Thus, Lewis not surprisingly placed little emphasis on 
concessions such as rent-free land or grazing rights. In 
contrast, he strongly emphasised access to house sites. Houses 
were located on common land and in the past, non-Jats had to pay 
a 'rent' to the Jats for its use (Lewis, 1958: 74).
105. According to Cox,
The caste structure is fundamentally a labour 
structure, a system of interrelated services 
originating in specialised groups and 
traditionalised in a religious matrix.
Cox quotes Pramathanath Bannerjea as follows:
The chief economic significance of the system is 
that it fixes absolutely the supply of any kind 
of labour. The scope given for the play of 
competition thus becomes limited, and 
consequently the law of demand and supply is 
rendered inoperative or oppressive in its 
operation. When any change takes place in the 
economic world, labour is unable to adjust 
itself...Wages and prices have very often to be 
regulated by custom or some artificial means.
(Lewis, 1958: 56)
106. Lewis' student Beidelman was in keeping with the logic of this 
statement in characterising the jajmani system as feudal 
(presumably Lewis and Beidelman regarded the feudal 'estate' as 
being a rigid type of class too).
107. This did not prevent him from recognising class as well as caste,
We tend for example, to think of castes as 
forming rather homogeneous units, and they are 
so described, at least by implication, in much 
of the literature. But our study shows that 
even in a small village dominated by a single 
proprietary agricultural caste (the Jats) there 
is a great range of variation within the caste 
with regard to socio-economic status, 
landholdings, etc. (Lewis, 1958: 89)
108. Though he did note the high opinion held of their farming prowess 
and their rapid adaptation to irrigated farming. The Punjab in 
the 1950's was the site of major irrigation projects.
109. The Punjab to which Lewis was referring included at that time 
both the modern states of Haryana and Punjab. It was the western 
neighbour of Delhi Union Territory in which Rampur was situated.
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110. Lewis accepted that the relationship between jajman and kamin was 
not entirely coercive, in that, in return for his services, the 
kamin had some valued rights (as is suggested by the notion of 
sale),
The kamins have valued rights and advantages 
which make them hesitate to move.
(Lewis, 1958: 57)
Nevertheless he did not regard this as being fundamental to 
jajmani relations.
111. The terms kharif and rabi refer not to the type of crop grown 
(which may be practically anything) but to the season when the 
crop is grown. The kharif crop was grown with the aid of 
monsoonal rains. The rabi crop, grown during the dry season, 
depended upon irrigation (Lewis, 1958: 31).
112. A difference which is reminiscent of that between halemaga and 
jita servantship in Karnataka.
113. Corveeor obligatory labour without pay (Lewis, 1958: 350).
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114. Table 3 Households which make hadade payments
MAYASANDRA BOMMENAHALLI DASIHALLI KHODINAGA- KOMBARADE-
SANDRA • VANAHALLI
No. % No. % No. % No. % No. %
Whether grain is 
shared out at 
harvest
. Not a farmer 113 49.1 4 10.0
. Yes 12 31.3 28 70.0
. No 45 19.5 8 20.0
TOTAL 230 99.9 40 100.0
ether grain 
iven to
Agricultural 
labourers 
. Not a farmer 113 49.1 4 10.0
. Yes 6 2.6 1 2.5
. No 111 48.3 3.5 87.5
TOTAL 230 100.0 4 100.0
Priests
. Not a farmer 113 49.1 4 10.0
. Yes 32 13.9 15 37.5
. No 85 37.0 21 52.5
TOTAL 230 100.0 40 100.0
Washermen
. Not a farmer 113 49.1 4 10.0
. Yes 38 16.5 13 32.5
. No 79 34.3 23 57.5
TOTAL 230 99.9 40 100.0
Barbers
. Not a farmer 113 49.1 4 10.0
. Yes 29 12.6 23 57.5
. No 88 38.3 13 32.5
TOTAL 230 100.0 40 100.0
Dasappas
. Not a farmer 113 49.1 4 10.0
. Yes 32 13.9 8 20.0
. No 85 37.0 28 70.0
TOTAL 230 100.0 40 100.0
Blacksmiths
. Not a farmer 113 49.1 4 10.0
. Yes 11 4.8 9 22.5
. No 106 46.1 27 67.5
TOTAL 230 100.0 40 100.0
6 11.3 1 5.9 - -
41 77.3 16 94.1 18 94.1
6 11.4 - - 1 5.9
53 100.0 17 100.0 17 100.0
6 11.3 1 5.9 - -
1 1.9 1 5.9 3 17.6
46 86.8 15 88.2 14 82.4
53 100.0 17 100.0 17 100.0
6 11.3 1 5.9
40 75.5 16 94.1 11 64.7
7 13.2 - - 6 35.3
53 100.0 17 100.0 41 100.0
6 11.3 1 5.9 -2
18 34.0 13 76.5 15 88.2
29 54.7 3 17.6 2 11.8
53 100 17 100.0 41 100.0
6 11.3 1 5.9
20 37.7 11 64.7 16 94.1
27 50.9 5 29.4 1 5.9
5.3 99.9 17 100.0 17 100.0
6 11.3 1 5.9
11 20.8 12 70.6 8 47.1
36 67.9 4 23.5 9 52.9
53 100.0 17 100.0 17 100.0
6 11.3 1 5.9
20 37.7 9 52.9 11 64.7
27 51.0 7 41.2 6 35.3
53 100.0 17 100.0 17 100.0
(Table 3 continued)
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114. Table 3 (continued)
SORAVANAHALLI TIGALARA- TABINAKATE . VITTALAPURA TOTAL
TALYA VILLAGES
No. % No. % No. % No. % No. %
Whether grain is 
shared out at 
harvest
. Not a farmer 2 4.9 3 9.4 4 13.3 15 18.5 14.8 27.4
. Yes 34 83.0 28 87.5 24 80.0 64 79.0 32.3 59.7
. No 5 12.2 1 3.1 2 6.7 2 2.5 70 12.9
TOTAL 41 100.1 32 100.0 3.0 100.0 81 100.0 541 100.0
Whether grain 
given to
1 Agricultural 
labourers
. Not a farmer 2 4.9 3 9.4 4 13.3 15 18.5 148 27.4
. Yes 6 14.6 - - 1 3.3 2 2.5 21 3.9
. No 33 80.5 29 90.6 25 83.3 64 79.0 372 68.8
TOTAL 41 100.0 32 100.0 30 99.9 81 100.0 541 100.1
2 Priests
. Not a farmer 2 4.9 3 9.4 4 13.3 15 18.5 148 27.4
. Yes 21 51.2 8 25.0 17 56.7 22 27.2 182 33.6
. No 18 43.9 21 65.6 9 30.0 44 54.3 211 39.0
TOTAL 41 100.0 32 100.0 30 100.0 81 100.0 541 100.0
3 Washermen
. Not a farmer 2 4.9 3 9.4 4 13.3 15 18.5 148 27.4
. Yes 32 78.0 19 59.4 22 73.3 61 75.3 231 42.7
. No 7 17.1 10 31.3 4 13.3 5 6.2 162 29.9
TOTAL 41 100.0 32 100.1 30 99.9 81 100.0 541 100.0
4 Barbers
. Not a farmer 2 4.9 3 9,4 4 13.3 15 18.5 148 27.4
. Yes 19 46.3 22 68.8 17 56.7 59 72.8 216 39.9
. No 20 48.8 7 21.9 9 30.0 7 8.6 177 32.7
TOTAL 41 100.0 32 100.1 30 100.0 81 99.9 541 100.0
5 Dasappas
. Not a farmer 2 4.9 3 9,4 4 13.3 15 18.5 148 27.4
. Yes 15 36.6 6 18.8 6 20.0 13 16.0 111 20.5
. No 24 58.5 23 71.9 20 66.7 53 65.4 282 52.1
TOTAL 41 100.0 32 100.1 30 100.0 81 99.9 541 100.0
6 Blacksmiths
. Not a farmer 2 4.9 3 9.4 4 13.3 15 18.5 148 27.4
. Yes 12 29.3 5 15.6 3 10.0 44 54.3 124 22.9
. No 27 65.8 24 75.0 23 76.7 22 27.2 269 49.7
TOTAL 41 100.0 32 100.0 30 100.0 81 100.0 541 100.0
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115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
Dumont wrote,
One can observe that the small and more or less 
incomplete caste system formed by the Lingayats 
is grouped under the aegis of the sect and in 
virtue of this depends closely upon 
renunciation, either directly or through the 
medium of the sect's own priests. This is a 
special feature, as this is not so in Hindu 
castes. It may be wondered whether this 
complementarity between caste and renunciation 
does not in some manner replace the 
complementarity of the pure and the impure. In 
other words, only the presence of renouncers 
dedicated to bhakti and beneath them of priests 
sharing the doctrine and the dignity of the 
renouncers, can preserve the Lingayats from 
impurity; at the same time, it tends to maintain 
the division into castes, this being, in fact, 
part of the definition of the Jangama priests.
(Dumont, 1980: 191)
The Brahmans are the most educated community in Karnataka, having 
adapted their caste position as the scribes and literati of India 
to Western education.
Moksha is defined by the Concise Oxford as 'release from the 
cycle of existence', that is the cycle of birth and rebirth. 
What precisely this means differs according to different Hindu 
sects.
Though Maine believed that 'Western individualism' had developed 
out of the village community.
The odd writer out of those I have discussed is Oscar Lewis. 
Lewis did- not share in the development of the concept of the 
village community. He* had more in common with Wilks than with 
the later writers in that he essentially saw society as 
consisting of groups of individuals. Admittedly, those 
individuals were organized into interest groups and could and did 
bring pressure to bear upon other individuals to conform to their 
interests.
Marx too believed that village boundaries had 'preserved' the 
traits of small communities in India, and thus their destruction 
was necessary for India's future development:
English interference having placed the spinner 
in Lancashire and the weaver in Bengal, or 
sweeping away both Hindu spinner and weaver, 
dissolved these semi-barbarian, semi-civilized 
communities, by blowing up their economic basis, 
and thus produced the greatest, and, to speak 
the truth, the only social revolution, ever 
heard of in Asia.
Now, sickening as it must be to human feeling 
to witness those myriads of industrious 
patriarchal and inoffensive social organizations 
disorganized and dissolved into their units,
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thrown into a sea of woes, and their individual 
members losing at the same time their ancient 
form of civilization and their hereditary means 
of subsistence, we must not forget that these 
idyllic village communities, inoffensive though 
they may appear, had always been the solid 
foundation of Oriental despotism, that they 
restrained the human mind within the smallest 
possible compass, making it the unresisting tool 
of superstition, enslaving it beneath 
traditional rules, depriving it of all grandeur 
and historical energies. (Marx 1973a: 306)
The 'smallest possible compass *. restraining the human mind is 
reminiscent of Durkheim's later concept of the collective 
conscious.
121. It is perhaps for this reason that village studies have been more 
revealing than similar studies in the west, though an equally 
important reason may be that most readers already know more about 
western society.
122. It would not have been a suitable model for studying intra-caste 
relations as, for instance, a study of marriage and the family 
would require, for these involve ties crossing village 
boundaries. This is particularly true of North India because of 
the practice of village exogamy.
123. Though it should be remembered that inter-caste relations in the 
village were affected by inter-caste relations elsewhere. The 
relations of the castes to the dominant castes in surrounding 
villages and to the ruler were of particular importance. More 
recently, a caste's hold on urban jobs has also affected 
inter-caste relations.
124.— 'The Hindu Jajmani System has as its central 
cor*e the belief that God himself intended that 
society should be organized as is described in 
these pages. As has already been indicated, the 
various functions to be performed by the 
different castes are a biological fact 
representing inherent differences in physical 
and mental traits irrevocable except through the 
intervention of God himself. C. Bougie, in his 
study of the Indian caste regime, has come to 
the conclusion that without the religious factor 
neither the origin nor the long existence of the 
caste system are comprehensible (...) The place 
held by religion as a social control of man's 
conduct is brought out by numerous writers. But 
more convincing still is the system that we have 
been studying in these pages. The threads of 
religion are woven through and through, and very 
few changes can be made without breaking one or 
more of these threads.
The greatest contributing factor to a sense 
of security and social insurance in a village 
community is the recognition of its common
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responsibility for the livelihood of all its 
members, including its own dependents, 
delinquents, and defectives’.
(Wiser 1958: 153-154).
I noted earlier that Wiser's model of the jajmani system was 
greatly influenced by Durkheim through Mukerjee. Durkheim’s 
concept of the collective conscience would have encouraged 
Wiser’s static model for it assumed the existence of a small 
bounded society where everyone shared common beliefs-.-—-Anything 
that threatened that homogeneity threatened the jajmani system.
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